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iAbstract
My PhD thesis comprises of three chapters on Political Economy and Development. The
first chapter contributes to a burgeoning literature that uses sub-national micro data to
identify the causes of civil conflicts. In particular, I study the Maoist conflict in India
by constructing a comprehensive district level database using conflict data from four
different terrorism databases and combining it with socioeconomic and geography data
from myriad sources. In addition to exploiting the within country regional heterogeneity,
I use the micro structure of the data to construct group-level characteristics. Using data
on 360 districts for 3 time periods, I find evidence on how land inequality and lower
incomes are important for the conflict. Moreover, making use of the micro structure
of the data I am able to ask whether exclusion of the low castes and tribes from the
growth story of India is important. I find that the growth of incomes of Scheduled
Tribes significantly decreases the intensity of the conflict. Finally, I show how historical
property rights institutions from colonial times that go back centuries can affect present
day conflict outcomes through their impact on economic outcomes, social relations and
the political environment in the district.
In the second chapter, I compute new measures of religious diversity and intolerance and
study their effects on civil conflict. Using a religion tree that describes the relationship
between different religions, I compute measures of religious diversity at three different
levels of aggregation. I find that religious diversity is a significant and robust correlate
of civil conflict. While religious fractionalization significantly reduces conflict, religious
polarization increases it. This is most robust at the second level of aggregation which
implies that the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, Jews, and Christians etc. is more
relevant than that between either subgroups of religions like Protestants and Catholics,
Shias and Sunnis, etc. or that between higher levels of aggregation like Abrahamic and
Indian religions. I find religious intolerance to be a significant and robust predictor of
conflict.
In the third and final chapter of the thesis, I show that ethnic distances can explain
the huge disparities in child mortality rates across ethnic groups in Africa. Using high
quality individual level micro data from the Demographic and Health Surveys for four-
teen Sub-Saharan African countries combined with a novel high resolution dataset on
the distribution of ethnic groups across space I show that children whose mothers have
a higher linguistic distance from their neighbours have a higher probability of dying
before reaching the age of five. On the other hand linguistic diversity measured by
fractionalization or polarization reduces the probability of child death. One possible
ii
explanation for my findings is that ethnic diversity reflects a higher stock of knowledge
and information which leads to better health outcomes. However, such knowledge does
not flow smoothly to groups which are linguistically distant and thus such groups lose
out.
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Resumen
Mi tesis doctoral consta de tres cap´ıtulos sobre Economı´a Pol´ıtica y Desarrollo Econo´mico.
El primer cap´ıtulo contribuye a la literatura que utiliza microdatos sub-nacionales para
identificar las causas de los conflictos civiles. En particular, estudio el conflicto mao´ısta
en la India mediante la construccio´n de una base de datos a nivel de distrito. Para con-
struir este base utilizo datos de conflicto a partir de cuatro bases de datos distintas de
terrorismo, y las combino con datos socioecono´micos y geogra´ficos a partir de mu´ltiples
fuentes. Adema´s de explotar la heterogeneidad regional dentro del pa´ıs, uso la micro
estructura de los datos para construir caracter´ısticas a nivel de grupo. Utilizando datos
de 360 distritos para 3 per´ıodos de tiempo, encuentro evidencias de que la desigualdad
en la distribucio´n de tierra y el nivel de renta en el districto son factores importantes
para explicar el conflicto. Por otra parte, haciendo uso de la microestructura de los
datos estudio si la exclusio´n de grupos marginados (como castas bajas y tribus) del crec-
imiento experimentado por la India en los u´ltimos an˜os, es un factor importante para
explicar el nivel de conflicto. Encuentro evidencia que el crecimiento de los ingresos de
las tribus desfavorecidas disminuye significativamente la intensidad del conflicto. Final-
mente, muestro co´mo las instituciones de derechos de propiedad de la e´poca colonial,
que se remontan siglos atra´s, pueden todav´ıa afectar el nivel actual de conflicto a trave´s
de su impacto en los resultados econo´micos, las relaciones sociales y el entorno pol´ıtico
en el distrito.
En el segundo cap´ıtulo, calculo nuevas medidas de diversidad religiosa e intolerancia y
estudio sus efectos sobre el conflicto civil. Haciendo uso de un a´rbol de las religiones
que describe la relacio´n entre las diferentes religiones, puedo calcular medidas de la
diversidad religiosa en tres niveles diferentes de agregacio´n. Encuentro evidencia que
la diversidad religiosa es un correlato significativo y robusto de los conflictos civiles.
Mientras el fraccionamiento religioso reduce significativamente el nivel de conflicto, la
polarizacio´n religiosa lo aumenta. Esto es ma´s robusto en el segundo nivel de agre-
gacio´n, lo que implica que la divisio´n entre hinduistas, musulmanes, jud´ıos, cristianos,
etc. es ma´s relevante que la que existe entre cualquiera de los subgrupos de religiones
como protestantes y cato´licos, los chiitas y los sunitas, etc., o entre niveles ma´s altos
de agregacio´n, como las religiones abraha´micas y las de la India. Finalmente, encuen-
tro evidencia que la intolerancia religiosa es un predictor significativo y robusto de los
conflictos.
En el tercer y u´ltimo cap´ıtulo de la tesis, muestro que las distancias e´tnicas pueden
explicar las enormes disparidades en las tasas de mortalidad infantil entre los grupos
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e´tnicos de A´frica. Utilizando microdatos a nivel individual de alta calidad (de las En-
cuestas de Demograf´ıa y Salud (DHS)) para catorce pa´ıses del A´frica Subsahariana,
combinados con una nueva base de datos de alta resolucio´n sobre la distribucio´n de los
grupos e´tnicos sobre el espacio, encuentro evidencia que los nin˜os cuyas madres tienen
una mayor distancia lingu´ıstica de sus vecinos tienen una mayor probabilidad de morir
antes de cumplir los cinco an˜os. Por otra parte, la diversidad lingu´ıstica medida por
fraccionamiento o polarizacio´n reduce la probabilidad de muerte del nin˜o. Una posi-
ble explicacio´n de mis hallazgos es que la diversidad e´tnica refleja un mayor stock de
conocimientos e informacio´n que lleva a mejores resultados de salud. Sin embargo, tal
conocimiento no fluye adecuadamente a grupos que son lingu´ısticamente distantes, y por
lo tanto e´stos grupos terminan siendo perjudicados.
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Chapter 1
The Political Economy of the
Maoist Conflict in India: An
Empirical Analysis
1.1 Introduction
In recent years the relation between economic performance and civil conflicts has gener-
ated a considerable amount of interest among economists. Within the span of a few years
a lot has been written on the subject.1 A good part of the literature has taken a cross-
country approach using aggregate data to identify the causes of civil conflicts.2 However,
there is a small but burgeoning literature showing that going to the sub-national level is
key. Conflicts are often localized, and have to do with the unequal spatial distribution
of resources within countries. Thus, treating countries as being homogeneous is often
problematic. In addition, the use of aggregate data in most studies limits the kind of
questions one can address. For example, if ethno-linguistic diversity is shown to have
an impact on the probability of conflict, aggregate data do not allow us to determine
whether this is solely picking up the effect of cultural diversity or whether it is also
proxying for economic heterogeneity across groups. To address this question, one needs
microdata that give information on, say, income at the level of different ethnic groups.
This paper uses micro data at the sub-national level to analyze the Maoist (aka Naxalite)
conflict in India. The conflict started as a localized land conflict in Naxalbari (hence
the name Naxalite), a village in West Bengal in 1967. However, it has seen a terrifying
1See Blattman and Miguel [2010] for a recent survey of the existing literature.
2See for e.g. Collier and Hoeffler [2004], Fearon and Laitin [2003], Miguel et al. [2004], Ciccone [2010],
Besley and Persson [2008].
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increase in proportions only in the last decade. In the period 2004-2010 there have been
more than 5000 lives lost (even by official estimates). Including the number of wounded
and displaced would make the figure many times higher. In fact, it has been identified
as “the single biggest security challenge to the Indian state” by Dr. Manmohan Singh,
the Prime Minister of India. While on paper the aim of the movement is to establish
a “people’s democratic state under the leadership of the proletariat” (Harris [2010]), at
the heart of the conflict is land (rights, acquisition and its unequal distribution) and
“in practice land redistribution appears to be one of the main goals” (Iyer [2009]). In
addition, there is an ethnic/caste element to the conflict, as some tribal groups are at
the lower end of the income distribution, and feel they are being left behind the rising
tide of the Indian economy in the last decades (Guha [2007]).3
Although the conflict has spread over several states across India, by no means is it
affecting all regions in the same way. The goal of the paper is to exploit this spatial
heterogeneity to understand the sources of the conflict. In particular we try to address
some of the following questions: How important is land inequality? Are tribal groups
resorting to violence because of being left behind? Does the spatial heterogeneity in
colonial institutions help us explain the current distribution of violence?
With the above goal in mind we use district level conflict data for the period 1979-2009
along with socio-economic and geography data from multiple National Sample Surveys
(NSS), Censuses etc. to build a district level dataset. To account for differences across
tribal groups and castes, we use microdata to construct economic variables at the level of
these groups for each district. This gives us a comprehensive dataset of 360 districts (for
the 16 main states which constitutes > 90% of the population) over three time periods.
We use Probit regressions to explain the probability of conflict and Negative Binomial
regressions to explain the intensity of conflict at the district level. The main findings of
the paper are listed below.
A first finding is that land inequality is one of the key determinants of the conflict
controlling for all other factors that the literature has found to be important. Land
inequality reflects not just the inequality in the distribution of land but also differences
in the socio-economic lives of people in a predominantly agrarian society. Moreover, it
also implies more scope for inadequate compensation under land acquisition.4
District income on the other hand, also comes out to be an important determinant of
the conflict. In the Probit and Negative Binomial regressions low income comes out
to be a significant predictor of conflict. Moreover, we obtain similar results in the
3Moreover, a lot of the land acquisition is taking place in the tribal areas.
4We use a time invariant measure of land inequality from a period prior to the conflict. However,
there is still scope for omitted variable bias and thus caution should be exercised while giving a causal
explanation to our results
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2SLS, Instrumental variable regressions using its own lagged values as an instrument for
income. We find that lower income significantly increases both the probability and the
intensity of conflict.
The evidence on the being-left-behind hypothesis of the disadvantaged groups, i.e., the
low castes and the tribes, is mixed. One often heard argument is that tribal groups
and lower castes resort to violence because their groups are not equally benefiting from
the high rates of growth. We find that the income levels of the Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes have no significant impact on the conflict. However, when we look at
the growth in incomes of the three groups separately, the picture changes. We find that
a lower growth in incomes of the Scheduled Tribes significantly increases the intensity of
conflict. Moreover, in some specifications, we also find that the presence of the Scheduled
Tribes leads to more conflict.
A final finding is that historical institutions matter. Class antagonism driven by land
institutions that have lingered for centuries has a significant impact on both conflict
presence and intensity. Districts where land rights were traditionally enjoyed by land-
lords have higher conflict compared to districts where land rights were traditionally with
the farmers themselves.
The existing literature has witnessed several different approaches to empirically identify
the causes of civil conflicts. There are two clear directions in which this literature needs
progress. The first direction is using sub-national micro data in order to overcome the
shortcomings of the cross country analyses. The second crucial issue is to establish a
causal relation between conflict and its determinants.
With regard to the use of cross country data in the analysis of civil conflict, Do and
Iyer [2009] point out two caveats: (1) Data might not be comparable across countries.
(2) Reasons for the conflict might vary from country to country.5 Another serious
shortcoming of such studies is that they ignore the within country heterogeneity by
treating the country as a unit of observation.6 Conflicts are often localized and depend
on the unequal spatial distribution of resources within the country. For example, in
the context of the Maoist conflict in India, in West Bengal, one of the severely affected
states, the conflict is very pronounced in the Midnapore and Puruliya districts while it
is completely absent in districts like Howrah, North and South 24 Parganas.7 This is
5Further, even within a country focusing on one specific conflict might give us more interesting
insights than looking at overall violence.
6Also, they do not allow us to control for all the factors that are constant within the country viz. the
macroeconomic variables.
7Again, if one looks at Maharashtra (which is a state located in the west of the country), almost
all the Maoist incidents have been concentrated solely in the Gadchiroli district (formerly part of the
Chandrapur district). Again, while the conflict affects virtually all the districts of Bihar, it is almost
completely absent in the states of Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana.
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the kind of heterogeneity that one cannot take into account using even states as units of
analysis. Moreover, by making use of micro data we can take into account the differences
in incomes of disadvantaged groups vis-a-vis others and also the heterogeneity in the
distribution of these groups.
The other critical issue in this literature is establishing a causal relation between conflict
and its determinants. This is due to two main problems, as highlighted by Do and Iyer
[2009] (1) There might exist unmeasured factors that affect both conflict intensity and
pre conflict characteristics. (2) Districts that are experiencing more violence might
also be districts that have experienced high past conflict. Recent studies have tried
to address this issue using an instrumental variable approach when clearly exogenous
instruments have been available. Miguel et al. [2004] and Ciccone [2010] have used
weather shocks. Dube and Vargas [2008] have used exogenous shocks to agricultural
and resource prices. When clear instruments have not been available authors have tried
to use data on covariates from the pre conflict period in order to prevent endogeneity
arising out of reverse causality.8 Also, all potential covariates are controlled for in order
to reduce endogeneity arising out of omitted variables. Following in the same vein, in
this paper we use data from the pre conflict period; control for all possible variables
(that the literature suggests are important) that might play a role subject to the data
availability and always control for the presence of past conflict. In addition, we also run
IV regressions with previous period income as an instrument for present income.
As far as the literature on the Naxalite conflict itself is concerned, there are very few
rigorous empirical studies. Barooah [2008] relying on a simple cross section OLS analysis
finds that the probability of conflict in the district is increasing in the poverty rate and
is decreasing in the literacy rate. Hoelscher et al. [2011] also using a cross section
and relying on probit and negative binomial techniques, find forest cover, prevalence of
conflict in the neighbouring district and presence of Scheduled Castes and Tribes to be
important. Gawande et al. [2012] using a district level panel find that negative natural
resource shocks increase the intensity of conflict. Vanden Eynde [2011] on the other
hand also using a district level panel finds that negative labour income shocks increases
violence against civilians to prevent them from being recruited as police informers. While
all these papers are important for understanding the nature and causes of the Maoist
conflict in India, they ignore some important factors like land inequality, historical land
institutions and the exclusion of the tribals in India, which are crucial in understanding
the conflict.9
8e.g. Do and Iyer [2009]; Mitra and Ray [2010]
9There exist several descriptive case studies on the issue. See Harris [2010] for a summary.
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Thus, to summarize, this paper contributes to several different strands of the literature.
The first strand is the research using sub-national-micro data exploiting the spatial het-
erogeneity within a country and the micro characteristics of the data to pin down the
causes of civil conflict.10 This is a clear progress over existing cross country literature.
Moreover, we show how horizontal inequality in growth rates matters rather than growth
itself. We see that while overall growth/or the lack of it does not affect the conflict, the
low growth in incomes of the Scheduled Tribes significantly increases the intensity of
conflict, controlling for income growth of other ethnic groups. Finally this paper also
contributes to the broad class of literature that traces divergences in current economic
outcomes to differences in historical institutions in a country.11 We show that, in addi-
tion to economic underdevelopment, land relations and historical institutions within a
country could lead to conflict.
In the next section we discuss the Maoist conflict in India, in Section 3 we list the main
hypotheses of the study. Section 4 gives the empirical analysis and results and Section
5 concludes.
1.2 The Maoist/Naxalite Conflict
The start of the Maoist conflict is marked by a peasant uprising in the year 1967 in
Naxalbari, a small village in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. “A tribal youth
having obtained a judicial order went to plough his land on 2 March 1967. The local
landlords attacked him with the help of their goons. Tribal [peasants] of that area
retaliated and started forcefully recapturing their land” [Kujur, 2008]. The rebellion left
nine tribal people and one police personnel dead and the Naxalite movement in India was
born. The rebellion itself was contained by government forces within 72 days with the
use of force, but had already gathered huge visibility from Communist revolutionaries
from across the country.
After West Bengal the movement spread to the state of Andhra Pradesh where the
formation of the People’s War Group (PWG) in 1980 marks the revival of the movement
post the Naxalbari uprising. It has since then spread across various states in India
including Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and
Karnataka across many districts and has existed in varying degrees across the country.12
However, it was the 2004 merger of the PWG with the Maoist Communist Center (MCC)
that lead to the formation of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) that
10Some of the recent papers in this literature are Do and Iyer [2009], Dube and Vargas [2008], Jha
[2008], Iyer [2009].
11A very novel concept in the conflict literature. Jha [2008] is the other paper in this context.
12See map in Figure B.1 in appendix B.
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marks the modern revival of the movement and followed a huge rise in insurgency and
violence thereafter.
While the term “Naxalite” comes from the place of birth of the movement the term
“Maoist” is used due to the Maoist ideologies that many of these rebel groups adhere
too. The CPI-Maoists for example claim to be committed to a “democratic revolution”
through “a protracted people’s war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its
central and principal task” (Iyer, 2009). While the conflict as a whole has been termed
as a Maoist/Naxalite conflict, the movement itself is hardly homogeneous. It has in fact,
always had a fragmented structure with multiple groups operating without a centralized
movement organization. At present, the CPI-(Maoist) is the biggest operating group.
There have been more than 5000 lives lost (civilians, rebels and security personnel) and
more than 12000 incidents of violence in the period of 2004-2010 due to the Naxalite
conflict. The number of people displaced in Chhattisgarh alone was more than 43000
(Sundar [2008]), end of 2006. The geographical spread of the conflict has seen a phe-
nomenal increase from 55 districts in 8 states in 2003 to 194 districts spread across 18
states in 2007 [Iyer, 2009]. “While it is difficult to put an exact figure to the number of
rebels, there is an estimated 10000 to 20000 full time fighters with countless thousands
of village militias controlling particularly remote jungle areas where the state is hardly
present.” (The Economist).
Bhatia [2005] focusing on Central Bihar, identifies three distinct albeit inter-related
classes of reasons behind the Naxalite movement viz. (1) Economic rights (2) Social
rights (3) Political rights. The economic issues that Bhatia [2005] mentions are, land
rights; minimum wages; common property resources; and housing. The Government of
India in its own study recognizes land related factors, displacement and forced evictions,
livelihood, and social oppression as the main socio economic reasons behind the discon-
tent of people and support to Naxalism.13 Guha [2007] on the other hand argues that
the exclusion of the tribals from the development in India is crucial to the conflict.
As far as the participation is concerned, “... the social base of the movement ... consists
overwhelmingly of the landless, small peasants with marginal landholdings, and to lesser
extent middle peasants. In caste terms, the base of the movement consists of lower and
intermediate castes” (Bhatia, 2005). The fight against the social oppression that the
dalits [lower castes] and the lower among the OBCs [other backward castes] have been
regularly subjected to is perhaps the most significant among the issues used by the
Naxalite movement” (GOI, 2008). Moreover, there is a huge tribal participation in the
movement. The Scheduled Tribes are in fact economically one of the worst performing
13See Government of India [2008]. Apart from the socio economic reasons issues arising out of bad
governance and policing are also mentioned.
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groups in India (even behind the Scheduled Castes) and exclusion of the tribes from
the growth that the Indian mainstream has been experiencing is seen as one of the key
driving forces of the Maoist movement.14
1.3 The Main Hypotheses
The literature speaks of a variety of different factors that might lead to civil conflicts.
“Civil Wars are more likely to occur in countries that are poor, are subject to negative
income shocks, have weak state institutions, have sparsely populated peripheral regions
and possess mountainous terrain” [Blattman and Miguel, 2010]. Some of the other fac-
tors that have been mentioned in the literature are, ethnic and religious diversity and
fragmentation, lack of democracy and civil liberties, linguistic and religious discrimina-
tion, inequality, new states and political instability, non-contiguous territory, population
pressure, colonial occupation, etc.15
In this study we try to identify which factors might be more relevant in the context of
the Naxalite conflict in India. Thus, combining the findings from the previous literature
and our understanding of the conflict we test for five different hypotheses.
1.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Land inequality increases conflict.
Land rights are one of the most important issues taken up by the Naxalites: “Khet
par adhikar ke liye ladho, desh mai janwad ke liye badho” (Fight for land rights, march
towards democracy in the country - Liberation (a Naxalite group) slogan) [Bhatia, 2005].
In fact, regardless of the ideologies of the different Maoist factions in practice land
redistribution has remained one of the main goals of the movement. This is evident
from the failed peace talks between the Andhra Pradesh government and the PWG in
2004 where this was one of the main issues [Iyer, 2009].16 There is empirical evidence
on the importance of land distribution on conflicts from elsewhere in the world as well
[Andre and Platteau, 1996, Macours, 2011, Verwimp, 2003].
There are several potential ways in which the land distribution could affect conflict
outcomes. A highly skewed land distribution reflects higher disparities in the social
and economic lives of the people and thus a higher potential for grievance. Moreover,
14See Guha [2007]
15See Fearon and Laitin [2003] for a discussion.
16In a recent hostage incident when a government collector was kidnapped, two of the primary demands
of the Maoists were as follows: grant of land rights to tribal people in scheduled areas; minimum
displacement of tribals while making space for industries and mining (The Hindu, Feb 22, 2011: Orissa
accepts eight Maoist demands: http://www.hindu.com/2011/02/22/stories/2011022264251300.htm).
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if the distribution is too unequal and dominated by a few large landlords there is an
additional source of problem. In case of land acquisition by the government while the
entire community is adversely affected the compensation mostly or fully goes to the big
landlords who to start with enjoy a higher socio-economic status, while the vast majority
of the affected are left uncompensated. Moreover, it is also common that tribal people in
remote places have been living on a certain plot of land for generations but do not have
any formal title deeds to the land resulting in no compensation whatsoever in case of
acquisition by the government. Thus, the Naxalites are fighting for land issues against
both big landlords and the state.
The land distribution is crucial not only for the Maoist conflict but for the overall health
of the rural economy. The land reforms in India in the post-independence period has
been associated with significant poverty reduction [Besley and Burgess, 2000]. However,
implementation was hardly homogeneous across states. These heterogeneities exist even
within states which have witnessed widespread implementation. “The 3 extreme Maoist
districts in West Bengal are West Midnapur, Puruliya, Bankura-where land reforms
on the scale affected by the CPI-(M) in other parts of the state haven’t taken place.”
[Chakravarti, 2008] Thus, we will use a measure of land inequality at the district level
and try to verify if indeed more land inequality is associated with more conflict.
1.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Underdevelopment leads to more conflict.
The relation between income and civil conflict is one of the most robust relations in
the empirical literature on conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004 and Fearon and
Laitin, 2003). Collier and Hoeffler [2004] argue that the opportunity cost of fighting
is lower when incomes are low and thus making it easier to recruit rebels. Fearon and
Laitin [2003] on the other hand argues that lower incomes reflect limited state capacity
to put the rebellion down. The Maoist conflict is also concentrated in some of the
most impoverished regions of the country. “Even if there was no truth behind the
accusations that poor tribes are being exploited and are being illegally disposed of their
lands, it is fairly certain that the Naxalites are feeding on the festering discontent of the
impoverished and marginalized tribal communities. According to the 2001 census for
example, about three quarters of Dantewada’s 1,220 villages are almost wholly tribal;
1,161 have no medical facilities; 214 have no primary school; the literacy rate is 29% for
men and 14% for women.” (The Economist, 2006).
Apart from the levels of income, negative shocks to income have also been found to be
important. The theoretical idea goes back to Becker [1968] where he argues that rise
in returns to crime induces more workers to the criminal sector. Miguel et al. [2004]
Chapter 1. The Political Economy of the Maoist Conflict in India 9
demonstrate how negative income shocks lead to higher levels of conflict. Dube and
Vargas [2008] argue that lower wages increase conflict (lower international coffee prices
lead to a negative shock to certain regions of Colombia leading to higher conflict levels).17
Thus, a priori both income levels and changes in incomes could potentially affect the
conflict. We will explicitly check in our analysis whether districts with lower per capita
incomes, and lower rates of growth indeed experience more conflict.
1.3.3 Hypothesis 3: The exclusion of disadvantaged groups (Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) leads to more conflict.
In India, the Scheduled Castes (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST) are two groups that
have been historically disadvantaged and find themselves at the bottom of the social
hierarchy.18 The Scheduled Castes are at the bottom of the Hindu caste system. The
Scheduled Tribes on the other hand are tribal populations who are outside the Hindu
caste system. As discussed in the previous section the main support and the recruits
for the conflict are supposed to be mostly from the lower caste and tribal populations.19
While these disadvantaged minorities have enjoyed affirmative action in the post inde-
pendence India, they are still not economically and socially at par with others. “There
are over 200,000 pending cases of atrocities against lower castes in India, and the convic-
tion rate is just a little over 2 percent. There are an estimated 162 million untouchables
in rural India, according to the National federation of Dalit Land rights movement. 70%
of them don’t own land” [Chakravarti, 2008]. Guha [2007] stresses that in the last 60
years after independence the tribals have been the group that has been left out and
even suffered in the growth story of India. In fact, the predominantly tribal areas like
Chhattisgarh have experienced very high levels of conflict.
Thus, caste and tribal identities are important issues that could exacerbate the conflict.
It would be interesting to see once we control for incomes, if presence of lower castes and
tribals still makes a difference. Moreover, heterogeneity in incomes across these ethnic
lines could also be important. “...‘[H]orizontal’ inequality- inequality that coincides
with ethnic or other politically salient cleavages is a particular important driver of civil
conflict.” (Blattman and Miguel [2010]) Thus, we try to verify whether grievances arising
out of feelings of exclusion of the disadvantaged groups impact the conflict by controlling
17This is the opportunity cost channel. Dube and Vargas [2008] also find that a positive shock to the
natural resource price increases conflict via the rapacity channel.
18“Historically disadvantaged groups are commonly defined as groups which have been systematically
excluded from institutions and cultural practices that provide skills and resources.”(Pande [2003])
19”The main support for the Naxalite movement comes from dalits (SC) and adivasis (ST) (Govern-
ment of India [2008]).”
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for both the presence of different groups and differences in incomes and growth rates
across groups.
1.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Historical land institutions directly impact the
conflict.
There is a huge body of literature showing that historical institutions have a persistent
effect on current economic performance.20 In the context of civil conflicts, focussing on
the Hindu-Muslim communal conflicts in India, Jha [2008] finds that, in the presence of a
historical complementarity between the two groups the probability of conflict is lower.21
Banerjee and Iyer [2005] have highlighted the importance of historical land institutions
in the context of India. They have shown that districts in which property rights in land
were historically given to landlords by the British have ended up with worse economic
outcomes in the post-independence period.
We argue that the historical land institutions could affect the Maoist conflict, through
their effects on economic outcomes, and directly through their effects on social relations
among people. “Areas most associated with Maoist uprisings are WB [West Bengal],
Bihar & Srikakulam district of AP [Andhra Pradesh]- all landlord areas. Paul R. Brass
(1994 pg. 326-327) argues explicitly that these peasant movements have their roots
in the history of exploitation and oppression of peasants by landlords.”(Banerjee and
Iyer [2005]) Also, the allocation of the responsibility of collecting land revenue to the
landlords (which translates into a de facto property right over the land) gave birth to
a reason for perpetual conflict between the peasants and landlords. “Elsewhere, the
colonial state directly collected the land revenue from the cultivator, thereby avoiding
this particular source of internecine conflict.” (Banerjee and Somanathan [2007])22
Moreover, land acquisition for mining purposes, building dams, or for private industry
and the resulting displacement and loss of livelihood of people is an important issue
pursued by the Maoists. Such land acquisition often leads to large scale. Given adequate
compensation people might be less discontent with the displacement induced by land
acquisition. In this context, Duflo and Pande [2007] show how the landlord districts do
worse than the non-landlord districts as far as effects of dams are concerned. They argue
that since the social relation in the landlord districts somehow renders collective action
20Acemoglu et al. [2001, 2002], La Porta et al. [1998, 1999, 2000], Engerman and Sokoloff [1997, 2002]
21Besley and Persson [2008] highlight the importance of political institutions i.e. whether the country
is a parliamentary democracy, or has a system of strong checks and balances, in explaining conflict
outcomes.
22The effect of these institutions on land inequality is unlikely to be a problem since, “ districts
with worse land distribution historically have also seen more land reforms in the post-independence
period. This makes it unlikely that the persistence of the landlord effect is mainly through its effect on
contemporaneous land distribution.” Banerjee and Iyer [2005])
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difficult it leads to inadequate compensation. Following the same argument, if land is
taken away in the landlord districts for industrial, mining or the purposes of building
dams, historically people in such districts have less potential for collective action leading
to inadequate compensation, which in turn leads to more grievances. This makes for
easier Maoist recruits.
Thus, there are reasons to believe that the land institutions have an effect on the conflict
over and above the effect through the contemporaneous land inequality and underdevel-
opment. In this paper we empirically verify if these institutions indeed have an impact
on the conflict.
1.3.5 Hypothesis 5: Suitable geographic conditions impact the con-
flict.
Guerrilla warfare is usually concentrated in remote rural areas where the rebels get suit-
able conditions to pursue such insurgencies. The favourable conditions that such regions
provide include superior knowledge of local conditions and territory by rebels than by
government forces, rough mountainous territory or forests providing suitable hideouts to
insurgents etc. Even for nations with strong military capabilities such conditions could
turn out to be daunting (e.g. the US in Vietnam, British in the initial days in Northern
Ireland),23 for poorer nations with weak military capabilities and corrupt bureaucratic
set ups it could be hopeless.
Geography determines the cost, time and tactics necessary to curtail and check such
activity. Fearon and Laitin [2003] for example find that conditions favouring insurgency
like rough terrain increases the likelihood of conflict. We thus control for the geographical
factors like percentage of forests, steep sloping land, sandy land, barren rocky land etc.
in the district.
Apart from the variables mentioned in the above hypotheses we control for a host of
other variables that the literature has found to be important. We control for income
inequality and size variables like population density, area etc.24
1.4 Empirical Analysis
Districts are the smallest administrative units in India for which coherent reliable data
is available. The idea of the study is to exploit the sub-national micro structure of the
23Examples from Fearon and Laitin [2003]
24Population might either indicate more pressure on existing resources like land or more potential
recruits.
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data and thus all regressions are at the district level. We use data from the 16 main
states in India 25 which covers about 90% of the Indian population. The data is pooled
from diverse sources and a complete description is provided in the data appendix.
We have annual data on the conflict variables for the period 1979-2009. However, more
than 90% of the data is concentrated in the years 2000 onwards and 70% in the years
2005 onwards. We divide the data into three distinct time periods due to the nature of
our income data.
District-specific indicators of income or expenditure are not available for India. Instead,
per capita consumption expenditure is calculated from the National Sample Survey
(hereafter NSS) data. These data are not only nationally representative but also repre-
sentative at the district level. We thus use mean per capita consumption expenditure
at the district level from the NSS as our proxy for income at the district level. Since we
have only three rounds of NSS data viz. 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st),
we club the conflict data to match these three different NSS periods. The district names
are first mapped to the districts that existed in 1987. Then all the conflict data from the
period 1988-1999 are collapsed and clubbed together and matched to the 1987-88 NSS
data, all the conflict data from the period 2000-2004 are clubbed together and matched
to the 1999-2000 NSS data, all the conflict data from the period 2005-2009 are clubbed
together and matched to the 2004-2005 NSS data. Since the conflict is concentrated
completely in the rural areas only rural data from the NSS is used. Thus we have data
on around 360 districts for three time periods.26
There are primarily two variables of interest that we try to explain viz. ‘Probability of
Conflict’ and ‘Intensity of Conflict’. In order to explain the probability of conflict we
create a 0-1 binary outcome variable that takes the value ‘1’ if a district has seen any
Maoist activity in the relevant period or the value ‘0’ otherwise. While it is extremely
important to understand which factors increase conflict probabilities it is equally im-
portant to understand what factors lead to higher intensity of conflict. Intensity is a
latent variable that is measured using two variables viz. “Total number of incidents”
in a particular district and “Total number of deaths + wounded” in the district in the
relevant periods. The econometric specification is straightforward:
(Conflict)j,t = α(Conflict)j,t−1 + βXj,t−1 + γGj + αs + δt + j,t (1.1)
25Districts of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal are considered to be part of Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh states respectively, i.e. their old state before the creation of the new ones.
26While running the regressions we sometimes have lesser number of districts due to the unavailability
of data on certain covariates for some or all periods for certain districts.
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The (Conflict)j,t variable gives the conflict (presence or intensity) in district “j” in
round “t”. The explanatory variables Xj,t include economic variables like the mean per
capita consumption expenditure (MPC) and the gini coefficient of income inequality.
“G” includes all variables that do not change over time: land inequality, demographic
variables, presence of marginalized factions like Scheduled Tribes and Castes and geo-
graphic variables like barren and rocky land, steep sloping land, percentage forests etc.
“αs” is the state dummy, while “δt” is the time dummy.
27
For the 0-1 probability of conflict variable we use Probit specifications. The intensity
variables are both count variables by nature taking integer values from zero upwards.
The Poisson model is the standard model used in such cases. However, the Poisson model
assumes the mean and variance to be equal. In the presence of many zeros in the data
like in our case there is over-dispersion and thus the equi-dispersion assumption of the
Poisson model does not hold true. The number of zero counts in our data is more than
70%. The standard parametric model to account for over-dispersion is the Negative
Binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Thus, we use the Negative Binomial
model (Poisson is a special case of it) for explaining intensity. All the regressions use
cluster robust standard errors, clustered at the state level.
Our identification strategy relies on using data on the explanatory variables from the pre-
conflict period. In particular, we use data on consumption expenditure (our proxy for
income) from the beginning of the period. Thus, there is no serious risk of endogeneity
arising out of reverse causality. Further, we always control for past conflict levels in all
the specifications. However, there is still potential for endogeneity arising out of omitted
variables. We thus try to control for all potential variables that might be important in
our specification. However, in order to be completely sure we also run the specifications
using an instrumental variables approach using lagged consumption expenditure as an
instrument for current consumption expenditure.
1.4.1 Benchmark
Table 1.1 is our benchmark table. In columns 1-3, we try to understand what variables
explain the presence of conflict using Probit regressions. In Columns 4-6, we run Nega-
tive Binomial regressions to explain the intensity of conflict. The dependent variable in
these columns is the number of dead and wounded people in the district.
27The summary statistics and the correlation matrix for all the variables used in the analysis are
provided in the appendix C in tables C.1 and C.2
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In column 1, which is our baseline specification to explain the probability of conflict, we
see that lower incomes and higher land inequality both significantly increase the proba-
bility of conflict. A higher Scheduled Caste population does not affect the probability of
conflict. On the other hand, a higher tribal population significantly increases the prob-
ability of conflict. However, this relationship is not monotonic. This is evident from
the fact that the square term of the proportion Scheduled Tribe variable is negatively
significant.
Table 1.1: The determinants of the Maoist Conflict in India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita -1.323*** -1.434*** -1.561** -3.014** -1.530 -4.239**
(0.425) (0.528) (0.734) (1.478) (1.272) (1.922)
land inequality 3.617*** 3.566*** 4.435*** 15.01*** 13.52*** 14.68***
(0.781) (1.202) (0.899) (2.934) (3.083) (3.647)
proportion sandy -1.524 -0.603 0.332 -31.58 -42.51** -10.25
(2.645) (2.687) (1.393) (21.01) (21.55) (8.838)
log state capital distance -0.0823 0.0521 -0.0201 -0.795*** -0.472** -0.303
(0.147) (0.146) (0.178) (0.216) (0.190) (0.219)
proportion barrenrocky 10.50*** 15.93*** 13.12*** 40.97** 47.68*** 26.93***
(2.734) (3.510) (4.414) (16.73) (16.70) (4.656)
proportion steepsloping -67.35*** -86.49*** -126.6*** -270.3*** -242.1*** -346.3***
(21.16) (32.92) (32.94) (36.59) (56.58) (72.58)
proportion forest cover 0.889 1.568** 2.397*** 2.669 2.965 6.060***
(0.708) (0.775) (0.597) (2.040) (2.075) (1.757)
%Scheduled Castes -0.629 0.0471 2.922** -4.485 -5.038* 7.018*
(1.349) (1.517) (1.291) (4.095) (2.794) (4.046)
%Scheduled Tribes 4.383*** 4.229** 2.882*** 10.04** 10.01*** 6.231***
(1.651) (1.872) (0.677) (4.432) (3.621) (2.243)
%Scheduled Tribes square -5.630** -4.826** -2.062 -12.15** -13.49*** -3.831
(2.805) (2.309) (1.361) (6.174) (4.954) (2.832)
population density 0.293 0.618* 0.329 -0.150 -0.00329 -0.0382
(0.230) (0.329) (0.297) (0.562) (0.515) (0.535)
log area 0.671*** 0.749*** 0.681*** 2.416*** 2.380*** 2.388***
(0.216) (0.275) (0.142) (0.408) (0.394) (0.396)
income inequality -0.131 -3.545* 1.658 -7.344 -14.11** -1.936
(2.057) (1.849) (1.500) (5.025) (5.544) (3.095)
initial consumption per capita -0.491 -3.749***
(0.615) (0.778)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 656 996 996 656 996
ll -269.1 -181.9 -192.9 -1013.1 -829.0 -913.4
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The marginal effects are provided in Ta-
ble A.10. The data is from a database built by the author combining myriad databases. All regres-
sions at the district level with robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in parentheses).
Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the district) using
Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded
in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions. There are 3 time periods used corresponding
to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years
1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds.
In column 2 we consider data from the latest 2 rounds instead of all 3 rounds and control
for the initial period income using data from the first round. In column 3 we control for
Chapter 1. The Political Economy of the Maoist Conflict in India 15
the state dummies in the baseline specification of column 1. Our results are robust to
the different specifications.
Column 4, which is our baseline specification to explain the intensity of conflict, shows
that lower incomes and higher land inequality significantly increase the number of dead
and wounded people. Moreover, the presence of tribals also has a significant effect.
Like in column 2, in column 5 we consider data from the latest 2 rounds instead of all
3 and control for the initial period income using data from the first round. In column 6
we control for the state dummies in the baseline specification of column 4. The results
remain unaltered.
From the above it is clear that, poorer regions experience more conflict. This is in line
with the previous literature and is in fact one of the most robust results in the conflict
literature. In terms of average marginal effects, a 1 standard deviation increase in the
log of mean per capita consumption expenditure increases the probability of conflict in
the next period by 5%, and results in 50 more dead and wounded people in a year.
On the other hand, while income inequality does not seem to play any role in the context
of the Maoist conflict, land inequality is a highly significant and robust predictor of
conflict in all the specifications. Land inequality also significantly increases the intensity
of conflict and this is robust to different controls. This gives support to the grievance
arising out of land inequities being a key reason behind the conflict. In terms of average
marginal effects if we look at our baseline specification, a 1 standard deviation increase
in land inequality increases the probability of conflict in the next period by 9%, and
results in 157 more dead and wounded people a year.
As mentioned above the percentage of Scheduled Tribes in the district has a non mono-
tonic impact on conflict. In Figure 1, we notice that the marginal effect increases till
about 40% tribal presence in the district and then it starts falling. At around 80% tribal
presence the marginal effect actually becomes negative. We see that districts which have
around 40% more Scheduled Tribes face around 12% higher probability of conflict and
around 120 more dead and wounded people in a year.
As far as the geography variables are concerned, they turn out to be quite important.
We see that barren and rocky areas experience more conflict. This is in agreement with
our expectations. In a primarily agrarian economy, a higher proportion of barren and
rocky land indicates lack of economic opportunity. This supports the opportunity cost
story.
The percentage of forest cover variable comes out to be significantly increasing the
probability and intensity of conflict in many of the specifications (but not all). One
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Figure 1.1: Effects of Scheduled Tribe presence
explanation could be that large patches of forest cover provides the perfect hiding and
fighting conditions for rebels and makes it quite difficult for security forces to keep up
with them. Also, we see that districts with higher geographical areas experience both a
higher probability and intensity of conflict.
The percentage steep sloping land variable on the other hand comes out to be negatively
significant. This stands in contrast to the previous literature which has found mountain-
ous land as being more suitable for conflict. In the context of India, the proportion of the
district which is steep sloping probably proxies some other variable like the proportion
of land (not) under agriculture or the like and thus it has a negative sign. However, due
to data constraints we are unable to point out what exactly this variable is picking up.
In Table 1.2 we add a control for historical institutions to the otherwise identical speci-
fications of Table 1.1. The relevant variable gives the proportion of the district that was
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not under the control of the landlords. The historical institutions variable has a signifi-
cant and quite robust impact on the conflict. However, consumption per capita becomes
less robust while land inequality on the other hand continues to be significant and ro-
bust. The presence of Scheduled Tribes does not seem to matter anymore. However, by
adding the control for historical institutions we lose a third of the observations due to
the unavailability of data on the institutions variable for all districts.28 Thus, sample
change might be the cause of the change in significance of the other variables. In fact,
this is what seems to be the reason behind the Scheduled Tribe and the consumption
per capita variables turning insignificant in Table 1.2.29
In Table 1.3, we instrument current consumption expenditure with its own lagged val-
ues. Otherwise, we have the identical specifications of Table 1.1. We use two stage
instrumental variable regressions. In the first stage we notice that the instrument is
highly significant.
In the second stage we notice a few changes from Table 1. We find that consumption
expenditure per capita and land inequality continue to be significant in explaining the
probability and the intensity of conflict. However, we notice that the presence of Sched-
uled Tribes is no longer significant. We also report the coefficients of the proportion
Scheduled Tribe variable in the first stage. We see that the proportion Scheduled Tribe
significantly reduces the per capita consumption expenditure. Thus, in the second stage
once we control for this effect, the proportion Scheduled Tribe variable does not matter
anymore.
28Data on the land institutions variable is available only for the districts which were directly under
British control.
29See Table A.3 in appendix C where we have the same sample as in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: The role of historical institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita -0.862* -0.955* -0.942 -1.724 -1.378 -3.115
(0.470) (0.556) (0.891) (1.294) (1.131) (2.809)
land inequality 2.438*** 2.170** 3.917*** 11.20*** 9.867*** 13.36***
(0.546) (0.852) (0.901) (2.189) (2.359) (2.998)
proportion Non landlord -0.935*** -1.041*** -1.188** -2.496*** -2.088*** -1.402
(0.276) (0.249) (0.476) (0.679) (0.609) (0.859)
proportion sandy 17.66** 20.83*** 32.15** 44.76 -17.15 42.28
(7.832) (6.724) (15.35) (78.21) (38.28) (55.40)
log state capital distance 0.190 0.243 0.163 -0.0216 0.134 -0.127
(0.195) (0.219) (0.208) (0.470) (0.352) (0.393)
proportion barrenrocky 19.02*** 26.28*** 22.95*** 54.94** 51.73*** 39.80***
(3.395) (4.609) (6.081) (25.72) (15.01) (9.432)
proportion steepsloping -53.55* -95.53*** -132.3*** -207.3*** -331.6*** -366.8***
(27.34) (35.33) (43.57) (74.18) (116.1) (101.9)
proportion forest cover 1.543** 2.109*** 2.727*** 5.319*** 5.458*** 7.333***
(0.692) (0.695) (0.622) (1.922) (1.842) (1.904)
%Scheduled Castes -0.969 -0.592 4.252*** -4.802 -6.595 10.62***
(1.398) (1.520) (1.310) (4.316) (4.504) (3.125)
%Scheduled Tribes 2.749 4.273* 1.438 -3.397 -1.640 -0.123
(2.542) (2.596) (1.160) (6.369) (7.405) (3.261)
%Scheduled Tribes square -5.565 -8.690** -1.199 -2.575 -8.935 2.205
(4.337) (4.050) (2.020) (10.20) (12.91) (4.054)
population density 0.484** 0.762** 0.413 0.199 0.0307 0.134
(0.203) (0.341) (0.317) (0.597) (0.651) (0.642)
log area 0.846*** 1.008*** 0.902*** 3.316*** 3.029*** 2.782***
(0.200) (0.317) (0.138) (0.587) (0.498) (0.326)
income inequality -2.807 -5.845*** -1.116 -15.47*** -20.54*** -3.583
(1.865) (1.724) (1.937) (5.244) (6.346) (6.438)
initial consumption per capita 0.242 -2.315***
(0.811) (0.765)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 655 431 655 655 431 655
ll -177.9 -131.6 -138.2 -642.2 -535.5 -590.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table is identical to Table 1.1 but also controls for historical institutions. The table reports
coefficients and not marginal effects. The marginal effects are provided in Table A.11. The data
is from a database built by the author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district
level with robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3
explain the probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district)
using Negative Binomial regressions. There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds,
1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which
are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds.
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Table 1.3: The determinants of the Maoist Conflict in India - IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita -2.642*** -3.033*** -4.556*** -6.971*** -4.813** -10.34***
(0.857) (1.164) (1.160) (1.651) (1.988) (3.006)
land inequality 3.171*** 3.183** 3.768*** 12.78*** 13.48*** 7.892***
(1.103) (1.367) (0.992) (3.440) (3.620) (2.894)
proportion sandy 0.516 0.443 0.397 -25.68* -35.76** -12.84
(2.530) (2.926) (1.567) (15.35) (16.76) (11.73)
log state capital distance 0.0129 0.0316 0.0567 -0.616*** -0.546*** -0.123
(0.153) (0.141) (0.158) (0.180) (0.177) (0.220)
proportion barrenrocky 15.11*** 16.40*** 14.98** 49.91*** 52.07*** 32.64***
(3.832) (3.592) (6.119) (14.19) (14.49) (8.903)
proportion steepsloping -48.50** -81.30** -91.21** -174.1*** -232.2*** -232.2***
(22.01) (33.72) (39.60) (25.66) (62.55) (62.66)
proportion forest cover 1.642* 1.597** 2.872*** 3.855* 3.562 7.583***
(0.855) (0.804) (0.854) (2.217) (2.180) (1.974)
%Scheduled Castes -0.249 -0.430 2.022* -6.754** -6.538** 0.573
(1.635) (1.677) (1.084) (2.914) (2.847) (3.741)
%Scheduled Tribes 2.809 2.486 -0.766 2.963 5.844 -1.733
(2.196) (2.293) (2.136) (2.874) (3.693) (2.291)
%Scheduled Tribes sq -3.444 -3.043 1.693 -5.680 -9.201** 1.831
(2.819) (2.816) (2.703) (3.765) (4.620) (2.841)
population density 0.577 0.535 0.258 -0.357 -0.303 0.315
(0.356) (0.371) (0.382) (0.628) (0.639) (0.711)
log area 0.628** 0.608** 0.464** 1.793*** 2.112*** 1.816***
(0.311) (0.297) (0.207) (0.358) (0.343) (0.415)
income inequality -1.296 -0.516 5.412** -6.500 -10.22* 7.342
(2.200) (2.595) (2.418) (5.021) (5.981) (5.337)
initial consumption per capita No Yes No No Yes No
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage
consumption per capita lagged 0.602*** 0.461*** 0.359*** 0.601*** 0.461*** 0.358***
(0.0642) (0.0608) (0.0520) (0.065) (0.065) (0.052)
%Scheduled Tribes -0.679*** -0.674*** -0.684*** -0.679*** -0.678*** -0.680***
(0.166) (0.170) (0.136) (0.168) (0.171) (0.140)
%Scheduled Tribes square 0.636*** 0.656*** 0.678*** 0.636*** 0.665*** 0.669***
(0.158) (0.165) (0.174) (0.166) (0.170) (0.180)
Observations 640 638 640 640 638 640
ll 84.31 91.60 236.0 -834.1 -826.5 -762.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the
author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using IV-Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain
the intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using OLS regressions in
the first stage and Negative Binomial regressions in the second stage. There are 3 time periods
used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The conflict
data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds. Previous period
consumption expenditure instruments following period consumption expenditure.
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1.4.2 Testing for the “Exclusion” hypothesis
In this section we check specifically for the “Exclusion” story. In other words we try
to identify if horizontal inequalities in incomes or growth i.e. differences in incomes or
the growth of incomes across different ethnic groups have any significant impact on the
conflict.
Table 1.4: The growth in income of different ethnic groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity
General Castes growth -0.0263** -0.0325** 0.00549 -0.00239 0.00901 -0.00426
(0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0168) (0.0160) (0.00972) (0.00835)
Scheduled Castes growth -0.0142 0.00539 0.0377 0.0386* 0.0142 0.0244
(0.0137) (0.0105) (0.0247) (0.0227) (0.0121) (0.0155)
Scheduled Tribes growth -0.0156 -0.0201 -0.0930*** -0.0695* -0.0595*** -0.0438**
(0.0187) (0.0276) (0.0290) (0.0355) (0.0231) (0.0220)
proportion sandy -4.741 -0.0125 -84.78*** -39.39** -23.26** -13.07***
(5.887) (2.860) (32.08) (17.89) (10.71) (4.514)
log state capital distance 0.118 0.129 -0.347 0.0230 -0.303 0.00305
(0.104) (0.211) (0.220) (0.323) (0.227) (0.263)
proportion barrenrocky 15.97*** 21.55*** 30.53 27.05*** 21.27 21.06**
(5.749) (8.341) (26.10) (9.680) (14.81) (9.082)
proportion steepsloping -185.2*** -251.8*** -442.7*** -352.4*** -241.6*** -198.3***
(53.76) (95.98) (129.8) (130.7) (72.69) (74.77)
proportion forest cover 2.461*** 4.882*** -1.162 4.502 1.365 5.412***
(0.788) (1.418) (1.552) (2.788) (1.539) (1.923)
%Scheduled Castes 0.950 3.568 -7.556* 1.666 -1.812 3.120
(1.353) (2.990) (3.952) (5.108) (3.485) (4.505)
%Scheduled Tribes 1.548 0.638 8.996 6.967*** 4.568 2.847
(2.319) (1.816) (5.636) (2.675) (3.725) (1.978)
%Scheduled Tribes square -1.006 0.231 -12.87* -8.309*** -5.967 -1.821
(2.683) (2.076) (6.687) (2.856) (4.325) (2.252)
population density 0.192 0.264 -0.701 0.0926 -0.0870 0.663
(0.438) (0.490) (0.749) (0.921) (0.628) (0.710)
log area 1.242*** 0.996*** 3.705*** 3.152*** 2.657*** 2.370***
(0.319) (0.255) (0.478) (0.542) (0.619) (0.500)
income inequality -5.516** -6.117*** -15.73*** -14.37*** -11.84*** -9.873**
(2.189) (1.658) (4.707) (5.475) (3.053) (4.345)
land inequality 7.679*** 7.624*** 19.09*** 12.58*** 12.09*** 7.446***
(1.436) (0.894) (3.899) (4.120) (2.270) (2.569)
initial consumption per capita No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 290 284 290 290 290 290
ll -74.40 -57.41 -544.7 -511.9 -493.8 -453.0
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The marginal effects are provided in Ta-
ble A.12. The data is from a database built by the author combining myriad databases. All
regressions at the district level with robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in paren-
theses). Columns 1 and 2 explain the probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the district)
using Probit regressions. Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (columns 3 and
4 - the no. of dead & wounded in the district; columns 5 and 6 - the number of incidents in the
district) using Negative Binomial regressions. There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3
NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The growth rates correspond to the
2 latter rounds. The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding
NSS rounds.
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In Table 1.4, we study the impact of differences in growth rates of the different groups.
We see that as far as the presence of conflict is concerned (i.e. columns 1 and 2), it is the
growth rate of the incomes of the General Castes that matter but the marginal effects
are small and are similar in magnitude to the effects of growth rates of other ethnic
groups. A 1 standard deviation increase in the growth rate for the General Castes leads
to a 4% lower probability of conflict while a similar increase for the Scheduled Castes
and Tribes is not significant in the baseline specification of column 1.
For the specifications explaining intensity (columns 3-6), the growth rates of the General
Castes is not significant and even changes its sign in some of the specifications. On
the other hand a growth in incomes of the Scheduled Tribes significantly and robustly
reduces the intensity of conflict in all the specifications.30 In terms of marginal effects,
a 1 standard deviation fall in the income growth of the Scheduled Tribes leads to an
increase in the number of dead and wounded people in the district by around 155 people
in the next period. This means that some of the participation in the conflict by the
tribals and/or support for the Maoists among them might actually be driven by the
lower growth in incomes of the Scheduled Tribes as they feel excluded from the growth
that the rest of society is facing.31 The rate of growth of incomes of the Scheduled
Castes comes out to be insignificant.
Looking at the levels of income Table A.4, and Table A.5, we do not find any robust
results. The lower castes and the tribes are ethnically two very different groups of people.
However, both these groups are seriously disadvantaged socially and economically. In
order to be able to use more observations, we club the Scheduled Castes and Tribes
together and treat them as one group (See Table A.6). We find that the incomes of
both groups matter. However, the coefficient for the incomes of the Scheduled Castes
and Tribes is almost always greater than that of General Castes. Moreover, in almost
all the specifications we have percentage of Scheduled Castes and Tribes in the district,
significantly increasing the conflict presence and intensity. While this is not conclusive,
it does give some confirmation of the participation from the lower castes and tribes.
One limitation with this analysis is that the number of Scheduled Tribal people surveyed
is low in many of the districts owing to the low percentage of Scheduled Tribes living
in those districts. We include only districts which have at least a weighted population
of 15 tribal people surveyed.32 This significantly reduces our sample size. However, the
comparison of incomes across ethnic groups is suitable only in districts which have at
30In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the number of dead and wounded people and in columns
5 and 6, it is the number of incidents in the district.
31The overall growth rate of income in the district does not have any significant impact on the conflict.
See Table A.7 and Table A.8
32Including districts which have even fewer or more Scheduled Tribal people surveyed makes no sig-
nificant difference in the results.
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least some residents of each of the groups we would like to compare, actually residing in
those districts. Thus, we proceed with our analysis with the reduced sample size.
1.4.3 Temporal variation in the conflict
In the previous tables we have found some interesting insights about the causes of the
Naxalite conflict in India. However, it will be interesting to check whether there is a
change in the nature and causes of the conflict over time. In Table 1.5, we thus regress the
conflict variables over the 3 rounds separately. This table gives us some more interesting
insights. Columns 1-3 show the change in causes of the presence of conflict over the three
rounds, while columns 4-6 show the corresponding change in the causes of intensity of
conflict. We see that land inequality is important across all periods. But its relative
importance varies over time, particularly for the intensity of the conflict. We see that
to start with land inequality is a very important factor but over time the magnitude of
the coefficient falls, suggesting that its relative importance is declining over time.
On the other hand we see that to start with Consumption expenditure is not that
important, but in the first half of decade of 2000s (round 2) the conflict shifts to poorer
areas. And finally we see that the conflict actually in the last five years (round 3) moves
to areas where there are more tribal people. However, as in Table 1, this relationship is
non-monotonic. We also see how in the first round the proportion of barren and rocky
land does not matter but it does in the next rounds.
Interestingly we see that initially having a higher proportion of tribals in the district
does not matter. In rounds 1 and 2 the proportion of Scheduled Tribes in the district
is not significant. However, in round 3 we notice that having a higher proportion of
tribals in the district significantly increases the conflict. This perhaps goes to show that
in recent times the conflict has been spreading to tribal areas.
We also try to split the incomes of the separate groups and try to identify the temporal
differences in their effects. We do not find any significant results. This is perhaps driven
by the fact that we lose a lot of observations in the rounds 2 and 3 which are in fact the
rounds where most of the conflict is concentrated.33
33See Table A.9
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Table 1.5: Change in causes of conflict over time
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita 0.698 -3.436*** -0.990 0.875 -6.042*** -2.333
(0.663) (0.590) (0.673) (3.301) (1.602) (1.509)
land inequality 4.796*** 3.726*** 3.605** 20.19*** 18.29*** 10.32***
(1.290) (1.221) (1.447) (2.987) (4.070) (2.835)
%Scheduled Tribes 3.219 -0.652 8.317*** 10.16 7.630* 10.66**
(3.656) (2.438) (2.126) (11.80) (4.375) (5.202)
%Scheduled Tribes square -5.395 0.930 -10.31*** -16.05 -7.126 -17.65**
(6.475) (3.454) (2.776) (14.10) (5.571) (7.297)
%Scheduled Castes -2.400 -3.382** 1.916 -5.941 -4.721 -4.695
(2.472) (1.601) (1.923) (7.436) (3.660) (3.622)
proportion sandy -27.77 0.125 0.547 -98.65* -150.7*** -12.81
(19.41) (2.847) (2.561) (59.65) (38.47) (17.52)
proportion barrenrocky -0.203 22.24*** 10.42* 56.20 32.23** 41.43**
(4.344) (4.492) (5.641) (44.11) (14.71) (16.58)
proportion steepsloping -139.3*** -134.4*** -36.40* -829.2*** -202.2*** -173.5***
(48.60) (40.72) (19.22) (230.3) (44.76) (30.76)
log state capital distance -0.330* 0.178 -0.0338 -0.748* -0.690*** -0.376*
(0.176) (0.157) (0.257) (0.384) (0.261) (0.222)
proportion forest cover -0.172 1.866* 1.368 3.163 -0.458 3.479
(1.315) (1.087) (1.125) (2.656) (1.138) (2.500)
log area 1.208*** 0.927*** 0.574** 6.459*** 2.569*** 1.773***
(0.335) (0.356) (0.276) (1.085) (0.480) (0.426)
population density -0.316 0.679* 0.623 1.239 -1.219 0.542
(0.474) (0.391) (0.421) (1.168) (0.831) (0.546)
income inequality 5.712* -1.404 -4.271** 0.758 -15.05 -9.497*
(3.365) (1.258) (2.118) (10.35) (9.751) (5.252)
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 336 321 339 336 321 339
ll -61.32 -85.11 -88.77 -147.0 -306.9 -522.6
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the
author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS
rounds.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the political economy of the Maoist conflict in India in-depth using
a district level panel. It also contributes to the civil conflict literature by adding to
a growing number of studies that use sub-national micro data to study civil conflicts.
Making use of a newly constructed district level conflict database the paper provides
some interesting insights on the causes of the Maoist conflict in India.
The main finding of the paper is that the story behind the Maoist Conflict in India is
a story of grievances arising out of feelings of exclusion of various forms. We see how
the underdeveloped districts and districts with higher land inequality are more prone to
conflict. Moreover, we have evidence in favour of participation from the Scheduled Tribes
in the conflict. We see how low growth rates in the incomes of Scheduled Tribes leads
to more conflict. Also, we see how social divisions created by historical institutions play
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a role in the conflict. All these findings indicate that certain sections of society feel left
behind in the growth story of India leading to more grievances and social tensions which
help Maoists by creating more sympathizers and boosting their recruitment efforts.
There is a huge scope for future research on the Maoist Conflict in India. One interesting
exercise would be controlling for land reforms at the district level and verifying its
effects on the conflict outcomes. Also, establishing causal relations between the different
variables of interest and the conflict outcomes would be the other avenue of future
research. Finding adequate instruments for the income and land inequality variables
would allow us to further ensure that our results are not affected by endogeneity and thus
establish causality. Moreover, a lot of work remains to be done in terms of data collection
from the households of the perpetrators and victims in order to further pin down both
the causes and consequences of the Maoist conflict at the household/individual level.
Chapter 2
Religious diversity, Intolerance
and Civil conflict
2.1 Introduction
Does religious diversity affect the probability of civil conflict? If we are to take seri-
ously the popular perception supported by the views of political scientists like Samuel
Huntington then the answer to this question should be in the affirmative. Huntington
(1993a,1993b,1998), in his well-known Clash of Civilizations hypothesis, proposes that
people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the
post-cold war period. Brahm [2005] points out that, “[i]n virtually every heterogeneous
society, religious difference serves as a source of potential conflict”. Surprisingly, the
few studies that try to empirically answer this question suggest otherwise. We resolve
this apparent contradiction by addressing some of the major shortcomings of the exist-
ing empirical literature. We argue that the groupings used so far in the literature to
calculate religious diversity are unsatisfactory. For example, while calculating measures
of religious diversity, the existing literature considers the cleavage between Catholics
and Protestants to be identical to that between Catholics and Muslims. However, since
Protestants and Catholics are both sub-sects of Christianity the cleavage between them
might be less problematic than that between Catholics and Muslims. We incorporate
this insight in the diversity calculations. Moreover, we show that one cannot ignore
religious intolerance while investigating the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict.
Using newly constructed measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance we find
that both religious diversity and religious intolerance are important correlates of civil
conflict.
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Empirically, there are numerous studies that have tried to pin down the relation between
ethnic diversity and civil conflicts.1 However, most of these studies focus on ethno-
linguistic diversity and very few of them rigorously study the relation between religious
diversity and civil conflict. The few papers that have actually controlled for religious
diversity while investigating the correlates of civil conflict have found it to be insignificant
[Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005].2 This is surprising since
conflicts such as the civil wars in Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia and the Sudan, the
peace process in Israel and the conflict in Northern Ireland are essentially all conflicts
between ethnic groups of different religions [Fox, 1997]. However, the accepted paradigm
in this literature is that ethno-linguistic diversity is relevant for civil conflicts while
religious diversity is not.
There are several reasons why we revisit the relationship between religious diversity and
civil conflicts. First, we argue that the definition of religious groups used in the literature
so far has been highly unsatisfactory and unclear which has led to the erroneous finding
that religious diversity does not matter for civil conflicts. Religious diversity is always
calculated using the currently existing religious sub-groups like Protestants, Catholics,
Shias and Sunnis etc. as the relevant groupings.3 However, it is hardly obvious why these
groupings should be more relevant than broader groupings of Christians, Muslims and
Hindus etc. Also, Christianity and Islam both share the same origin (Abraham), whereas
Hinduism is an Indian religion. Thus the difference between Hindus and Muslims might
arguably be more relevant than that between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore if
there is any truth in the Clash of Civilizations idea of Huntington (1993a,1993b,1998),
all sects of Christianity belong to the same civilization, whereas Christianity and Islam
clearly belong to different civilizations. Thus, a conflict between the different sects of
Christianity might be less likely than that between Christians and Muslims. We thus
calculate indices of religious diversity at three different levels. At Level 3 we consider
all the existing sub-sects of religions (e.g. Shias and Sunnis), at Level 2 we consider the
parent religions of these sects (e.g. Islam and Christianity) and at Level 1 we consider
the broad religious traditions from which these religions come (e.g. Abrahamic and
Indian).
Theoretically, it is clear that there could be differences in the diversity indices calculated
using different group definitions but does it make a difference empirically? To illustrate
our approach let us consider a comparison of two countries - India and Switzerland.
1Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel et al. [2004], Collier (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon
(2005), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005].
2Fox [2004] is the only paper that finds evidence in favour of religion being important for conflicts.
He finds that not only can religion influence conflict, its influence has been increasing.
3 For instance the religious diversity measures used in Fearon and Laitin [2003], Miguel et al. [2004],
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]
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The religious composition of India is: Muslims -13.4%, Christians - 2.3%, Hindus- 80.5%,
Sikhs -1.9%, other religions - 1.8% (including some other Indian religions like Buddhism,
Jainism etc.), and none - 0.1%. Switzerland’s religious composition is: Muslims - 4.3%,
Christians - 78.5% (Roman Catholics- 41%, Protestants - 35.3%, Orthodox 1.8%, Other
Christians -0.4 %), other religions - 1%, and none -15.4.%. Evidently Switzerland has
high religious diversity if we consider all the sub-sects of Christianity along with its
4.3% Muslim population. However, not only do all the sub-sects of Christianity share
the same origins, Christianity and Islam themselves are both Abrahamic religions and
thus share the same origin. On the other hand, in India, not only are the three biggest
groups of Hindus, Muslims and Christians culturally more dissimilar than the different
denominations of Christianity that are present in Switzerland, but more importantly,
Hinduism and Sikhism on the one hand and Islam and Christianity on the other hand
represent completely different civilizations. Hinduism and Sikhism are both Indian reli-
gions whereas Islam and Christianity originated from Abraham.
Not surprisingly, calculating religious polarization (fractionalization) for India at the
level of existing religious sub-groups or sects4 its ranking is 138 (139) which is quite
low. However, as soon as we move up levels of aggregation to take into account the
origins/cultural similarity of the religions, its ranking changes to 78 (70) at level 2, and
to 57 (56) at level 1. Thus, from level 3 to level 2 its ranking moves up 60 places. India
is a country which has indeed experienced several violent riots between the Hindus and
the Muslims right from the pre-independence period to the present times. Looking at
the diversity index calculated at the most disaggregated level, India looks like a below
average religiously diverse country. However, once we move up levels it’s religiously
diversity ranking is quite high. On the other hand if we look at Switzerland, it is one
of the most religiously diverse countries calculating diversity at the most disaggregated
level. Its religious polarization (fractionalization) ranking is 9 (76) at level 3. However
once we move up levels its religious polarization (fractionalization) ranking changes to
128 (128) at level 2, and to 156 (156) at level 1. Switzerland is indeed one of the most
peaceful countries in the world.5
Second, the issue of religious intolerance has been entirely ignored in the literature.
Since, religious intolerance could lead to both lower religious diversity and higher conflict,
not controlling for it would lead to meaningless results. Let us consider some illustrative
examples. Afghanistan is one of the least religiously diverse countries in the world
with 99% of the population being Muslims. However, it is the 5th most intolerant
country in our dataset and it has faced years of violent domestic conflict. Moreover,
religious intolerance might itself directly lead to lower religious diversity but a higher
4This is what is done in all the existing studies that calculate religious diversity.
5More examples are provided in the data section.
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probability of civil conflict. For example, Pakistan is the third most intolerant country
in our dataset. During its partition from India and later on right through to the present
day there has been a mass movement of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India,
leading to a fall in religious diversity.6 On the other hand Pakistan has continuously
experienced conflict throughout the years. Thus, without controlling for intolerance
Pakistan appears to be a not so diverse country with significant civil violence. In order
to correctly identify the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict we need to control for
religious intolerance. We thus argue that the finding that religious diversity is irrelevant
for conflict while ethno-linguistic diversity is important for it is as much a consequence
of not controlling for religious intolerance as it is for constructing religious diversity
measures at an erroneous level of aggregation.
We have several novel findings in this paper. First, we find that religious diversity is a
significant and robust correlate of the incidence of civil conflict but not so robust correlate
of the onset of civil conflict. While religious fractionalization has a significantly negative
correlation with the incidence of conflict, religious polarization has a significantly positive
correlation with it. This is in line with the theory that points out that there is a non-
monotonic relation between diversity and conflict. High polarization represents a large
ethnic minority facing off an ethnic majority increasing the probability of conflict, while
fractionalization on the other hand increases coordination problems and reduces the
probability of conflict (Horowitz [1985], Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]). Contrary
to the findings in the existing literature, religious diversity remains a significant correlate
of conflict even after controlling for ethno-linguistic diversity.7
We find that the religious diversity measures at the second level of aggregation are the
more robust correlates of conflict than at other levels. This implies that the cleavage
between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. is more relevant than that between
Abrahamic and Indian religions or that between different denominations of Christians -
like Protestants and Catholics, or of Muslims - like Shias and Sunnis. This result further
indicates that aggregating the data at different levels is crucial. Following Huntington’s
hypothesis, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam all represent different civilizations and
that explains the potential for clash among them.
We also find that religious intolerance is a significant and robust predictor of civil con-
flict. Since our measure of religious intolerance is composed of several components we
6Hindu refugees continue coming to India as recently as 2012:
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hindu-refugees-from-pakistan-continue-to-reach-
india/1/214086.html
7Furthermore, the correlations between our measures of religious diversity and the different measures
of ethno-linguistic diversity are very low which further ensures that we are not picking up the effects of
ethno-linguistic diversity and that religious diversity is an important correlate of civil conflict in its own
right.
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investigate which specific aspects of intolerance are more important than others. We find
that intolerance arising out of social and government regulation of religion significantly
lead to more conflict. Government favouritism on the other hand is not a significant
predictor of conflict. This is not surprising since social and government regulation of
religion are arguably related to the more fundamental right of freedom to worship or to
practice a religion of one’s own choice.
Finally, we also try to verify whether some religions are more conflict-prone than others
and if having more religious people in the population has any impact on civil conflict.8
We find no evidence in favour of the popular perception that some religions (specifically
looking at Islam and Christianity) are more violent than others. We do find some
evidence that having more Christians or Non-Religious people in the country reduces
the incidence of conflict. This is however not the case for the onset of conflict. We argue
that what matters is having a more polarized society and that this polarization comes
from groups which are culturally dissimilar, like Christians, Hindus, and Muslims etc.
The actual combination of religions that leads to more polarization does not matter.
More importantly, the intolerance of the government and society of a country is more
relevant for conflict than the presence of any particular religion.
Our results are robust to the use of alternate datasets and specifications, viz. Desmet
et al. [2012] and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]. We then add a host of additional
controls including ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, percentage of different
religious groups including Muslims, Christians and even Atheists and Non-religious.
Our results remain qualitatively similar.
In this paper we seek to make a four-fold contribution to the literature. As discussed
above most of the existing literature has focused on the relation between ethno-linguistic
diversity and civil conflict. This is a serious gap in the literature. As Huntington
[1993b] highlights, “In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force
that motivates and mobilizes people.” Thus, our first contribution is that we rigorously
investigate the relation between religious diversity and civil conflict by calculating indices
of diversity at three different levels of aggregation. We then let the data tell us what
level of aggregation matters for civil conflict.
The second contribution is that we highlight the importance of intolerance in the debate
on diversity and conflict. Religious diversity may or may not be important in predict-
ing conflict depending on how tolerant or intolerant society is towards other religions.
Moreover, both diversity and conflict might be correlated to intolerance. Thus, it is
impossible to over emphasize the importance of intolerance.
8Previous research has found religious beliefs to have an effect on crime rates [Shariff and Rhemtulla,
2012].
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Thirdly, one often heard argument is that some religions are more peace-loving or more
violent than others. Thus one could argue that it is not religious diversity that matters
per se but some religions by virtue of being more violent than others lead to more
civil conflicts. Controlling for the percentage of Christians, Muslims and Atheists/Non-
religious populations we are partly able to answer this question. We find no evidence of
any particular religion being more violent than others.
Our final contribution is in terms of the new dataset that we create. We construct
six different measures of religious diversity (fractionalization and polarization) at three
different levels of aggregation corresponding to different historical depths of cleavages.
Moreover, we generate a completely new index of religious intolerance.
To the best of our knowledge no other study has done such a rigorous analysis of the
relation between religious diversity, religious intolerance and civil conflict. Moreover, no
data on such detailed measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance currently
exist for such an exhaustive list of countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data sources
and explain the construction of our measures in detail. In Section 3 we report our results
and in Section 4 we conclude.
2.2 Data & Methodology
2.2.1 Religious diversity
In order to construct our measures of religious diversity we follow the methodology of
Desmet et al. [2012]. They demonstrate that the degree of coarseness of ethno-linguistic
classifications has profound implications for inference on the role of diversity. They com-
pute ethno-linguistic diversity measures at different levels of aggregation by exploiting
the information of language trees. They refer to this as a phylogenetic approach, since
tree diagrams describe the family structure of world languages. Depending on how finely
or coarsely groups are defined the measure of diversity will be different.9
This approach has two advantages. Firstly, it allows the classification of diversity at
different levels of aggregation. Secondly and perhaps more interestingly this approach
gives a historical dimension to the analysis. Coarse divisions, obtained at high levels
of aggregation, describe cleavages that go back thousands of years. In contrast, finer
divisions, obtained at low levels of aggregation, are the result of more recent cleavages.
9They find that less aggregate measures matter more for public good provision, whereas for civil
conflicts deeper cleavages are more relevant than shallower ones.
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Moreover, calculating our diversity measure at three different levels we are able to in-
troduce in our indices a measure of cultural dissimilarity between religions. Hindus and
Christians are culturally more dissimilar than Protestants and Catholics. This cultural
dissimilarity aspect is a crucial point in the Clash of Civilizations hypothesis.
The data on religious diversity comes from three distinct sources. We primarily use
the CIA World Factbook,10 and the Alesina et al. [2003] data from Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica (EB). Both of these datasets give the proportion of adherents to different reli-
gions in the different countries of the world. This data is supplemented by data from
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/11 in case of missing values or lack of detail for some
country. Our criteria was to have the most detailed data possible on sub-categories of
religions which would allow us to construct meaningful indices at the different levels.
For example for Papua New Guinea, the different groups following the CIA World fact-
book are Baha’i, Indigenous religions, Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, United
Church, Seven day Adventist, Pentecostal, Evangelical Alliance, Anglican, Baptist and
Other Protestant. Whereas following the EB there are only the four following groups:
Protestant, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Others. Thus, in this case we prefer to use
the CIA data instead of the EB data.
Finally using this data on the percentage of followers of the different religions in each
country, we construct six different measures of religious diversity (three of fractionaliza-
tion and three of polarization) following the below explained methodology. All religions
in the world can be classified into several broad groups owing to their origins or cultural
traditions. For example, Christianity and Islam are both Abrahamic religions, while
Hinduism and Buddhism are both Indian religions. Again, Protestants and Catholics
are two sects of Christianity, while Sunnis and Shias are two sects of Islam. For the pur-
poses of this paper we represent this information as tree diagram as given in Figure 2.1.
As evident in Figure 2.1, sects like Protestants, Catholics, Shias and Sunnis form our
Level 3, which is the most disaggregated level. Then at Level 2 come the parent religions
of these sects (Christianity and Islam in this case). And finally at the highest level i.e.
Level 1 we have the broad groupings like Abrahamic and Indian religions. Our final
data comprises of 118 religious groups at the third level, 45 groups at the second level
and 5 groups at the first level (excluding Atheists and Non-religious).12
As evident in Figure 2.1, classifying the above broad groups and their corresponding di-
visions and subdivisions as a tree diagram we have three different levels at which we can
measure religious diversity. We thus construct three indices of religious fractionalization
10Fearon and Laitin [2003] use a similar dataset based on estimates derived using the CIA Factbook
by R. Quinn Mecham.
11Allan Drazen also uses data from “World Statesmen” but on some different variables. See: http :
//econweb.umd.edu/ drazen/Data Sets/Appendix Composition and Elections revision22012.pdf
12The entire list of the divisions can be found in the appendix Table B.16.
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Figure 2.1: The religion tree
(rfrac1, rfrac2, and rfrac3) and three indices of religious polarization (rpol1, rpol2, and
rpol3) corresponding to the three different levels of aggregation. Rfrac1 (rpol1) corre-
sponds to the highest level of aggregation i.e. it is the most aggregated. Rfrac2 (rpol2)
corresponds to the second level of aggregation. And rfrac3 (rpol3) corresponds to the
lowest level of aggregation i.e. it is the least aggregated.
The idea behind the measures at each level is identical to the measures of ethno-linguistic
diversity (ELF) in Desmet et al. [2012]. The different measures of fractionalization and
polarization are constructed as follows:
Fractionalization:
rfrac(j) = 1− Σ[Si(j)]2. (2.1)
Polarization:
rpol(j) = 4Σ[Si(j)]
2[1− Si(j)]. (2.2)
where Si(j) is the proportion of the population pertaining to religious group i at level of
aggregation j.13 The fractionalization measure rfrac(j) gives the probability that two
randomly selected individuals from a given country belong to different religious groups.
The polarization measure rpol(j) on the other hand measures how far the distribution
of the religious groups is from the bipolar distribution (i.e. the (1/2, 0, 0, ... , 0, 1/2)
13In case of ethno-linguistic diversity as in Desmet et al. [2012], Si(j) refers to the share of population
speaking a particular language i at level of aggregation j.
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distribution) which represents the highest level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol [2005]). The fractionalization index is maximized when each individual in the
country belongs to a different religious group, while the polarization index is maximized
when there are only two groups in the country and they are equally sized. The reader is
directed to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] for a detailed discussion and comparison
of the two measures.
In order to better illustrate the importance of aggregating at the three different levels let
us consider a few countries that have experienced civil conflicts in the past few decades.
Consider Angola for example. It is a highly religiously polarized country at any of the
three levels of aggregation. At aggregation level 3, it is the 13th most polarized country
in the world. However, once we move up levels, it comes out to be the most and second
most polarized country in the world considering the 2nd and 1st levels of aggregation
respectively. Moreover, if we consider countries like India, Nepal or Indonesia, their
religious diversity rankings change by about 60 places moving from the third to the
second level of aggregation. The movement from the 3rd to the 2nd level and that from
the 2nd to the 1st level need not always be in the same direction. For instance for India,
the ranking keeps going up if we move from the 3rd to the 2nd level or the 2nd to the 1st
level. However, for Indonesia and Nepal, the ranking goes up from the 3rd to the 2nd
level, and falls while moving from the 2nd to the 1st level. These examples help illustrate
how changes in the level of aggregation could lead to non-trivial changes in the rankings
according to religious diversity.14
At any given level, religious fractionalization and religious polarization are highly cor-
related. While moving from one level to another in many cases both religious fraction-
alization and polarization seem to move in the same direction. However, the relative
changes in the rankings are often different. Consider Nigeria for example. Its polariza-
tion ranking is 96 at level 3 making it not a very polarized country. Its fractionalization
ranking is 28, making it highly fractionalized country. But when we move to level 2, its
fractionalization ranking goes up 19 places to 7, while its polarization ranking goes up
65 places to 31. Moreover, there are cases when the rankings by fractionalization and
polarization move in opposite directions while moving from one level to the other. For
example, Lebanon is a highly fractionalized country with its fractionalization ranking
being 16 at level 3. But it is not a very polarized country placed at rank 116 at level
3. Once we move up one level to level 2, its fractionalization ranking goes down by a
14In view of the recent happenings in the Arab world, it is interesting in its own right to look at the
religious diversity indices of the Arab Spring countries. While none of these countries have very high
levels of religious diversity, their rankings go up significantly while moving up from the 3rd to the 2nd
level of aggregation.
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marginal 4 places, placing it at 20. On the other hand, its polarization ranking shoots
up by 90 places taking it to a rank of 26.15
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2 we provide the summary statistics and the correlations between
the six different measures of religious diversity. In the appendix Table B.2 we provide
the correlations between our measures of religious diversity and the ethnic and religious
diversity measures of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]. In appendix Table B.3 we
provide the correlations of our measures with the ethno-linguistic diversity measures of
Desmet et al. [2012] respectively.16 We notice that there is not a very high correlation
between our measures and those of either Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] (most are
below 0.5 and the highest is 0.7 which is the correlation between their relfrac and our
rfrac2) or Desmet et al. [2012] (most are below 0.2 and the highest is 0.37 which is the
correlation between their elf10 and our rfrac2).17
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for the religious diversity indices
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Religious fractionalization at level 1 0.156 0.178 0 0.643
Religious fractionalization at level 2 0.239 0.206 0 0.703
Religious fractionalization at level 3 0.432 0.25 0 0.891
Religious polarization at level 1 0.295 0.325 0 1
Religious polarization at level 2 0.412 0.321 0 0.996
Religious polarization at level 3 0.570 0.259 0 0.992
N 222
Table 2.2: Correlation between the religious diversity indices
rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3
rpol1 0.9906
rfrac2 0.8235 0.8132
rpol2 0.7818 0.7906 0.9669
rfrac3 0.5472 0.5504 0.5845 0.5721
rpol3 0.5022 0.5146 0.5864 0.6281 0.7821
2.2.2 Religious Intolerance
One obvious concern with any study analysing the effects of religious diversity on conflict
is the possible endogeneity of religious diversity. Societies that are more tolerant towards
other religions are likely to sustain more religions and thus experience more religious
diversity on the one hand, and less civil conflict on the other. Thus if we are to say
anything interesting about the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict we must take
15See maps in appendix figures A.6 to A.11 to visualize how the rankings change across countries
moving from one level to another.
16The religious diversity measures of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] are calculated using the
existing religious groups which theoretically correspond to our third level of aggregation and are based
on data from L’ Etat des religions dans le monde and the World Christian Encyclopedia.
17A list of all the 222 countries along with their corresponding rankings according to the different rfrac
and rpol values is provided in the appendix Tables B.18 and B.19.
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into account how tolerant the society is. If we do not control for religious intolerance
we would be facing the risk of endogeneity arising from the omitted variable bias.
Measuring religious intolerance is not an easy task since getting reliable data is a big
challenge. We use the cross-national, International Religious freedom data, from the
Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA). The specific dataset used is the “In-
ternational Religious Freedom Data, Aggregate File (2001-2005).”18
Each year (since 1999) the U.S. State Department releases International Religious Free-
dom Reports on approximately 196 countries or territories.19 Based on the text in these
reports, ARDA researchers systematically coded the measures using a survey question-
naire for the years 2001, 2003, and 2005. The most immediate goal was to develop
measures for religious regulation and favouritism. For all variables, the coders were
asked to make substantive observations of the qualitative data and to base their codes
on empirical observations of actions or patterns of behaviour that were documented in
the reports.
The three different years of coding are not three discrete measures, but rather represent
trend information that continues to be reported for several years running. Thus, ARDA
advises researchers to not treat the data as separate measures from which time lines
are developed since it may be possible that later years report newly arising problems
in addition to old ones. The aggregate dataset for the three years of coding contains
the mean score of each ordinal variable across the three years. ARDA suggests that
those using the data for social scientific modelling and analysis use the aggregate data
set, which has the benefit of greater variation in the variables and lesser error since
random errors from one year will be attenuated in the aggregate data. We thus use this
aggregate dataset which contains the different indices measured as averages of the three
years 2001, 2003 and 2005.20
In order to construct our measures of religious intolerance we take into account three
different broad level indices which are related to religious intolerance.
1. Government Regulation Index (GRI): This index takes into account the following
factors: whether foreign or other missionaries are allowed to operate; if prosely-
tizing, public preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted; if the government
interferes with an individual’s right to worship; how freedom of religion is de-
scribed in the report; and, if the Introduction section of the Report mentions that
the government “generally respects” the right (to religious freedom) in practice.
18http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/IRFAGG.asp
19http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/
20The reader is directed to the ARDA website for a more detailed description of the data.
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2. Social Regulation Index (SRI): This index takes into account the following factors:
the societal attitudes toward other or non-traditional religions; social attitudes
towards conversions to other religions; if traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the
clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing [trying to win converts]; if
established or existing religions try to shut out other religions in any way; and the
situation regarding social movements in relation to religious brands in the country.
3. Government Favouritism Index (GFI): This index takes into account the following
factors: What is the balance of government funding (including ‘in kind’ such as
funding buildings) to the religious sector; how does the government subsidize reli-
gion (including ‘in kind’ to organizations run by religions, e.g., hospitals, schools,
etc.); and if the government funds some things related to religion.
Making use of the above indices we construct our measure of religious intolerance via a
principal component analysis for 197 countries. Religious intolerance is defined as the
first principal component of the three variables, GRI, SRI and GFI. This allows us not
only to reduce the dimensionality i.e. have one measure of religious intolerance instead
of multiple ones, but also since we use the first principal component we are able to
explain about 74% of the orthogonal variation in the data with our measure of religious
intolerance.
It is of course possible that our measure of religious intolerance is itself endogenous to
conflict. If individuals of any religion experience more conflict with individuals of other
religions they might become more intolerant towards other religions and thus the possi-
bility of reverse causality. This is very much a realistic possibility and given our data we
partly solve this problem by using a time invariant measure of intolerance. Moreover, we
leave out other available variables that also indicate religious intolerance but are more
prone to endogeneity. For example variables like, ESTIMAAG - estimated number of
people who were physically abused or displaced due to religion and PERSECAG - esti-
mated number of people who were physically abused, displaced from home, imprisoned,
or killed due to religion, are left out. Government and Social regulation of religion are
variables that are relatively stable over long periods of time.21
In Table 2.3, we provide the summary statistics of the religious intolerance variable and
its components. Higher values of the variable indicate more intolerance. In Table B.20
of the appendix there is a list of all countries with the corresponding value of religious
intolerance of that country. The ten most intolerant countries in our sample are Saudi
21As a robustness check we do include both ESTIMAAG and PERSECAG in the calculation of our
intolerance index. But due to their potential endogeneity we leave them out from our final calculations.
However, results remain qualitatively unchanged to their inclusion. Results are not provided, but are
available upon request.
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Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Burma (or Myanmar), Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Uzbekistan,
Kuwait and the Maldives, in that order.22
In appendix Table B.1 we provide the correlations of religious intolerance with the mea-
sures of diversity calculated at different aggregation levels. We notice that as expected
religious intolerance is negatively correlated with religious diversity at all levels of ag-
gregation. The correlations are not very high, the highest correlation being of about
-0.4 between religious intolerance and religious fractionalization at the third level of
aggregation.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics - Religious intolerance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Government Regulation Index 3.293 3.076 0 9.722
Social Regulation Index 3.605 2.928 0 10
Government Favouritism Index 4.837 2.778 0 9.388
Religious intolerance -0.008 1.489 -2.299 3.258
N 197
2.2.3 Specification
We use the above constructed measures to study the effects of religious diversity and
intolerance on the onset and incidence of civil conflict. Our baseline econometric spec-
ification given by equation 3, follows Desmet et al. [2012] who in turn borrow it from
the baseline specification of Fearon and Laitin [2003] and augment it with a number of
additional control variables.
yit = α+ δDi(j) + γIi + βXit + it (2.3)
where, yit is either the onset or the incidence of civil conflict in country i in year t. While
onset refers to a new conflict starting in a particular year, incidence refers to whether a
country is experiencing a civil conflict in that particular year. Di(j) is a time invariant
measure of religious diversity at aggregation level j in country i, Ii is the time invariant
religious intolerance in country i, α is the constant term and it the error term. The
vector of controls Xit come from major contributions in the literature. They include,
lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that
is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy,
instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-
Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal
origin dummies. The conflict data and the corresponding data on the covariates span
22Appendix Figure A.5 gives a world map for religious intolerance.
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from 1945 to 1999 and were constructed by Fearon and Laitin [2003]. The legal origin
dummies come from La Porta et al. [1999].
Our dependent variable yit representing either the onset or incidence of conflict is a 0-1
binary variable. On the other hand our primary variables of interest, religious diversity
and intolerance are time invariant. Thus, we use a pooled Logit approach.23 The
standard errors are always clustered at the country level.
Since we want to study the partial effects of religious diversity and religious intolerance
on civil conflict, δ and γ are the main coefficients of interest.24
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Civil Conflict
First, using the data and estimation method of Desmet et al. [2012], we examine how
religious diversity and religious intolerance affect the incidence and onset of civil conflicts.
The difference is that instead of using their measures of ethno-linguistic diversity we use
our measures of religious diversity in addition to controlling for religious intolerance
in some of the specifications. Also, following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] we
include both fractionalization and polarization in the same specification.
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 give our baseline results. The dependent variable in Table 2.4 is
the incidence of civil war, while the dependent variable in the Table 2.5 is the onset of civil
war. In both tables, Columns 1 to 3 each correspond to a different level of aggregation
in the calculation of religious diversity. Column 1 corresponds to the highest level of
aggregation while column 3 to the lowest level. Columns 4 to 6 are identical to the
specifications of columns 1 to 3, but in these three columns we also control for religious
intolerance.
In the first three columns of Table 2.4 we notice that while religious polarization is
significant at the second and third levels of aggregation, religious fractionalization is
significant at all levels of aggregation. In columns 4 to 6, where we control for religious
intolerance in the specifications of columns 1 to 3, the results change substantially. We
see that religious intolerance is associated with more civil conflict and this relation is
significant in two of the three specifications. Religious diversity on the other hand
23We could have also use a pooled Probit approach, but following Fearon and Laitin [2003] and Desmet
et al. [2012] we stick to the Logit model
24Causality is not the main focus of this paper and thus caution should be exercised when interpreting
δ and γ causally.
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Table 2.4: Correlates of Incidence of Civil wars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -7.911* -3.197* -1.574* -9.910** -4.252** -1.123
(4.302) (1.873) (0.892) (4.303) (1.877) (0.919)
Religious polarization 3.819 1.965* 1.576** 4.948** 2.605** 1.328*
(2.392) (1.188) (0.697) (2.375) (1.196) (0.705)
Lagged civil war 6.258*** 6.271*** 6.253*** 6.196*** 6.206*** 6.202***
(0.216) (0.215) (0.211) (0.211) (0.210) (0.207)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.307** -0.302** -0.230* -0.194 -0.182 -0.174
(0.146) (0.146) (0.139) (0.144) (0.143) (0.139)
Log lagged population 0.346*** 0.337*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 0.300*** 0.292***
(0.0700) (0.0628) (0.0654) (0.0779) (0.0717) (0.0762)
% mountainous 0.0104*** 0.00927** 0.0105*** 0.00993** 0.00843** 0.00963**
(0.00383) (0.00398) (0.00387) (0.00389) (0.00411) (0.00384)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.393 0.399 0.496 0.512 0.512 0.586*
(0.348) (0.339) (0.336) (0.346) (0.333) (0.335)
Oil exporter dummy 0.236 0.223 0.198 0.0289 0.00142 0.0543
(0.275) (0.260) (0.254) (0.302) (0.280) (0.282)
New state dummy 1.818*** 1.831*** 1.831*** 1.762*** 1.781*** 1.789***
(0.381) (0.383) (0.382) (0.394) (0.395) (0.392)
Instability dummy -0.0165 -0.0125 0.0127 -0.0200 -0.0143 0.00889
(0.280) (0.277) (0.280) (0.282) (0.280) (0.281)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0125 0.0122 0.0162 0.0185 0.0192 0.0206
(0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0208)
French legal origin dummy 2.422*** 2.835*** 2.955*** 2.250*** 2.666*** 2.776***
(0.532) (0.547) (0.594) (0.578) (0.600) (0.638)
UK legal origin dummy 2.316*** 2.697*** 2.832*** 2.085*** 2.497*** 2.577***
(0.539) (0.542) (0.610) (0.603) (0.614) (0.681)
Socialist legal origin dummy 2.064*** 2.171*** 2.223*** 1.990*** 2.075*** 2.103***
(0.566) (0.540) (0.617) (0.603) (0.588) (0.657)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.162 0.104 -0.0321 0.474 0.439 0.212
(0.342) (0.328) (0.361) (0.371) (0.363) (0.390)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.555* 0.477 0.594* 0.984*** 0.980** 0.853**
(0.309) (0.330) (0.359) (0.376) (0.394) (0.391)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.710** 0.482 0.486 0.902** 0.694** 0.545
(0.358) (0.316) (0.321) (0.391) (0.338) (0.347)
Religious intolerance 0.192* 0.207** 0.149
(0.0996) (0.0960) (0.107)
Constant -7.810*** -8.171*** -8.901*** -8.464*** -8.802*** -9.072***
(1.444) (1.407) (1.450) (1.497) (1.469) (1.536)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.743 0.744 0.745 0.744 0.744
ll -593.8 -594.7 -592.6 -589.4 -590.0 -589.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the incidence of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to
religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from
Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based
on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
becomes highly significant at the first and second level of aggregation and less so at the
third level of aggregation.
We find that religious polarization increases the probability of conflict while fractional-
ization reduces it. This is in line with the previous literature on ethnicity and conflict
which argues that the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict is not mono-
tonic. Societies where a large ethnic minority face an ethnic majority experience more
conflict. On the other hand, highly heterogeneous or homogenous societies face less
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Table 2.5: Correlates of Onset of Civil Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -8.280 -2.859 -1.639 -10.27* -3.791* -1.077
(5.297) (2.100) (1.257) (5.805) (2.154) (1.283)
Religious polarization 4.068 1.595 1.755* 5.255 2.240* 1.473
(2.987) (1.314) (0.974) (3.208) (1.339) (0.958)
Lagged civil war -0.872*** -0.892*** -0.899*** -0.931*** -0.956*** -0.928***
(0.262) (0.267) (0.260) (0.249) (0.247) (0.245)
Log lagged GDP/capita -0.603*** -0.607*** -0.553*** -0.512*** -0.510*** -0.496***
(0.148) (0.147) (0.151) (0.158) (0.156) (0.158)
Log lagged population 0.336*** 0.319*** 0.301*** 0.275*** 0.254*** 0.238***
(0.0827) (0.0766) (0.0736) (0.0937) (0.0862) (0.0846)
% mountainous 0.00931* 0.00805 0.00757 0.00848 0.00652 0.00640
(0.00481) (0.00497) (0.00511) (0.00548) (0.00578) (0.00565)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.373 0.417 0.441 0.478 0.527 0.568
(0.370) (0.368) (0.353) (0.365) (0.357) (0.347)
Oil exporter dummy 0.683*** 0.707*** 0.710*** 0.467* 0.494** 0.538**
(0.239) (0.238) (0.230) (0.253) (0.243) (0.239)
New state dummy 1.771*** 1.781*** 1.793*** 1.713*** 1.730*** 1.746***
(0.371) (0.371) (0.377) (0.382) (0.383) (0.383)
Instability dummy 0.606*** 0.626*** 0.646*** 0.602*** 0.619*** 0.641***
(0.217) (0.215) (0.217) (0.218) (0.216) (0.219)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0200 0.0194 0.0231 0.0274 0.0279 0.0295
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0207)
French legal origin dummy 1.258* 1.547** 1.842** 1.082 1.373* 1.612*
(0.679) (0.706) (0.799) (0.749) (0.770) (0.858)
UK legal origin dummy 1.027 1.308* 1.601** 0.724 1.040 1.198
(0.669) (0.685) (0.797) (0.750) (0.766) (0.871)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.289* 1.347** 1.445* 1.224 1.257* 1.276
(0.708) (0.684) (0.783) (0.761) (0.745) (0.833)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.172 0.112 -0.0117 0.581 0.566 0.370
(0.404) (0.397) (0.431) (0.393) (0.394) (0.422)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.295 0.288 0.235 0.770* 0.834* 0.614
(0.401) (0.479) (0.481) (0.435) (0.491) (0.473)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.600* 0.404 0.344 0.812** 0.620* 0.440
(0.354) (0.349) (0.336) (0.387) (0.366) (0.357)
Rel intolerance 0.240** 0.250** 0.219**
(0.102) (0.104) (0.108)
Constant -4.491*** -4.553*** -5.359*** -4.728*** -4.815*** -5.232***
(1.732) (1.685) (1.797) (1.788) (1.739) (1.869)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.098 0.101 0.105 0.103 0.104
ll -453.6 -454.5 -453.3 -450.3 -451.0 -450.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
conflict. While Polarization captures the former concept, fractionalization captures the
latter concept.25
In Table 2.5 we use the same specifications as in Table 2.4 , but instead of using the
incidence of civil wars we use the onset of civil wars as our dependent variable. We
notice that our results are qualitatively similar. Religious intolerance is highly significant
25See Horowitz [1985], Esteban and Ray [1999], Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]. See Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol [2005] for a discussion.
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and associated with more civil conflicts. Religious diversity on the other hand remains
significant only at the second level of aggregation.26
We notice that the level of aggregation matters for understanding the relation between
religious diversity and civil conflicts. In particular, the robustness of the measures of
religious diversity constructed at the second level of aggregation implies that the cleavage
between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. is more relevant than a higher or lower
level of aggregation. This gives further support to our hypothesis that the level of
aggregation at which the measures of diversity are constructed is important.
2.3.2 Components of intolerance
Our measure of religious intolerance is constructed using three different components viz.
government regulation, social regulation and government favouritism. Next we analyse
which of these specific components of religious intolerance are more important for civil
conflicts. In Table 2.6 we use the identical specifications of the last three columns of
Table 2.4, but in place of religious intolerance we control for its different components
separately in the 3 panels. The columns 1 to 3 (and 4 to 6) each correspond to a different
level of aggregation in the calculation of religious diversity. The dependent variable in
the first three columns is the Incidence of conflict, whereas in the columns 4 to 6 the
dependent variable is the Onset of conflict.
In Table 2.6, we see that government and social regulation of religion are significant and
robust correlates of both the Incidence and Onset of civil conflict. On the other hand,
government favouritism of religion does not seem to be relevant for civil conflicts. This
result is not surprising since government and social regulation of religion are arguably
more fundamental types of intolerance as they relate to the more fundamental right of
freedom to religion, while government favouritism is less so.
We also notice that when we control for each component of religious intolerance sepa-
rately our religious diversity measures continue to remain significant and robust predic-
tors of the Incidence of civil conflict particularly at the second level of aggregation. As
far as the Onset of conflict is concerned as before religious diversity does not come out
to be relevant.
26When religious fractionalization and polarization enter the specifications separately, they are not
significant. Results in appendix Tables B.5, B.6, B.7 and B.8.
Chapter 2. Religious diversity, Intolerance and Civil conflict 42
Table 2.6: Components of intolerance and Civil wars
Incidence Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -10.01** -4.040** -1.210 -10.02* -3.728* -1.178
(4.214) (1.870) (0.917) (5.739) (2.119) (1.274)
Religious polarization 4.906** 2.395** 1.329* 4.990 2.094 1.434
(2.333) (1.196) (0.715) (3.157) (1.302) (0.981)
Government Regulation Index 0.0905* 0.0886* 0.0550 0.108** 0.110** 0.0849
(0.0477) (0.0473) (0.0540) (0.0442) (0.0463) (0.0521)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.744 0.744 0.104 0.102 0.102
ll -589.5 -590.6 -590.3 -450.6 -451.5 -451.5
Religious fractionalization -9.121** -3.974** -1.131 -8.915 -3.246 -0.920
(4.417) (1.867) (0.865) (6.210) (2.126) (1.190)
Religious polarization 4.566* 2.382** 1.278* 4.612 1.896 1.313
(2.420) (1.206) (0.681) (3.363) (1.333) (0.893)
Social Regulation Index 0.124** 0.134*** 0.112** 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.164***
(0.0492) (0.0461) (0.0514) (0.0530) (0.0525) (0.0559)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.109 0.108 0.109
ll -587.6 -588.0 -587.8 -448.2 -448.5 -448.2
Religious fractionalization -8.151* -3.478* -1.366 -8.501 -3.036 -1.425
(4.387) (1.895) (0.909) (5.412) (2.134) (1.275)
Religious polarization 3.960 2.160* 1.470** 4.190 1.716 1.662*
(2.422) (1.196) (0.691) (3.055) (1.344) (0.967)
Government Favoritism Index 0.0127 0.0215 0.00744 0.0110 0.0145 0.0146
(0.0434) (0.0436) (0.0449) (0.0505) (0.0517) (0.0517)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.743 0.743 0.744 0.100 0.098 0.100
ll -591.8 -592.6 -591.2 -452.8 -453.7 -452.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable in the first three columns is the Onset of Civil Conflict, and in the last
three columns it is the Incidence of civil conflict. Column 1 (4), 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to
religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the
data are from Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious
intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources
explained in detail in the data section.
2.3.3 Are some religions more problematic than others?
One often heard argument is that some religions are more violent than others. Thus,
one could argue that it is not religious diversity that matters per se but some religions
by virtue of being more violent than others lead to more civil conflicts. In this section
we investigate this claim and find no evidence whatsoever in its favour. Since Christians
and Muslims are the biggest religious groups in the world and are widely distributed
across countries we consider these two religions. We also consider the presence of Athe-
ists/Agnostics and Non-religious populations.
In Table 2.7 we have religious intolerance and religious diversity at the three different
levels of aggregation as in our baseline specification of Table 2.4. We however, also
control for the percentage of Muslims, Christians, and Non-religious etc. entering in
different combinations. We first notice that our measures of religious diversity continue
to remain significant predictors of the conflict. Religious intolerance however, becomes
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Table 2.7: Incidence of Civil wars - Percentages of different groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7
Religious fractionalization -7.633* -9.831** -9.552** -6.924* -7.660* -9.503** -6.190
(4.261) (4.308) (4.189) (4.120) (4.250) (4.174) (4.082)
Religious polarization 3.735 4.950** 4.599** 3.167 3.783 4.447* 2.519
(2.352) (2.368) (2.318) (2.290) (2.340) (2.295) (2.288)
Religious intolerance 0.156 0.165 0.134 0.0833 0.137 0.154 0.108
(0.102) (0.109) (0.104) (0.109) (0.110) (0.107) (0.109)
Percentage of Non Religious/Atheists -0.0122 -0.0147** -0.0118 -0.0185**
(0.00751) (0.00736) (0.00763) (0.00812)
Percentage of Muslims 0.00213 0.00163 -0.00326 -0.00633
(0.00322) (0.00326) (0.00462) (0.00504)
Percentage of Christians -0.00642** -0.00727** -0.00883* -0.0122**
(0.00309) (0.00309) (0.00477) (0.00516)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.746 0.745 0.745 0.746
ll -588.4 -589.2 -588.0 -586.5 -588.3 -587.7 -585.7
Religious fractionalization -4.288** -4.208** -4.389** -4.446** -4.248** -4.439** -4.542**
(1.849) (1.880) (1.851) (1.814) (1.856) (1.874) (1.831)
Religious polarization 2.816** 2.674** 2.650** 2.874** 2.872** 2.606** 2.797**
(1.181) (1.194) (1.178) (1.155) (1.176) (1.178) (1.139)
Religious intolerance 0.163 0.171 0.160 0.107 0.132 0.173 0.130
(0.1000) (0.105) (0.101) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108)
Percentage of Non Religious/Atheists -0.0173** -0.0188** -0.0170** -0.0198**
(0.00792) (0.00787) (0.00797) (0.00822)
Percentage of Muslims 0.00273 0.00246 -0.00181 -0.00359
(0.00351) (0.00345) (0.00572) (0.00574)
Percentage of Christians -0.00565* -0.00633** -0.00691 -0.00886
(0.00320) (0.00319) (0.00549) (0.00556)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.745 0.744 0.745 0.746 0.745 0.745 0.746
ll -587.9 -589.7 -588.8 -586.4 -587.7 -588.8 -586.2
Religious fractionalization -4.288** -4.208** -4.389** -4.446** -4.248** -4.439** -4.542**
(1.849) (1.880) (1.851) (1.814) (1.856) (1.874) (1.831)
Religious polarization 2.816** 2.674** 2.650** 2.874** 2.872** 2.606** 2.797**
(1.181) (1.194) (1.178) (1.155) (1.176) (1.178) (1.139)
Religious intolerance 0.163 0.171 0.160 0.107 0.132 0.173 0.130
(0.1000) (0.105) (0.101) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108)
Percentage of Non Religious/Atheists -0.0173** -0.0188** -0.0170** -0.0198**
(0.00792) (0.00787) (0.00797) (0.00822)
Percentage of Muslims 0.00273 0.00246 -0.00181 -0.00359
(0.00351) (0.00345) (0.00572) (0.00574)
Percentage of Christians -0.00565* -0.00633** -0.00691 -0.00886
(0.00320) (0.00319) (0.00549) (0.00556)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.745 0.744 0.745 0.746 0.745 0.745 0.746
ll -587.9 -589.7 -588.8 -586.4 -587.7 -588.8 -586.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the Incidence of civil conflict. Panel 1, 2 and correspond to religious diversity calculated
at levels 1, 2 and 3 respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad
sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log
of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil
exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables
for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies
from La Porta et al. [1999].
insignificant. We notice that the percentages of Christians and Non-religious/Atheist
population reduce the incidence of civil conflict. The percentage of Muslims in the
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Table 2.8: Incidence of Civil wars - Percentages of different groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7
Religious fractionalization -5.767 -8.391** -8.246** -6.167 -6.502 -8.111** -5.255
(4.332) (4.237) (4.182) (4.176) (4.240) (4.107) (4.082)
Religious polarization 2.698 4.204* 3.802 2.700 3.189 3.659 1.978
(2.407) (2.333) (2.331) (2.335) (2.336) (2.270) (2.298)
Percentage of Non Religious/Atheists -0.0141* -0.0149** -0.0119 -0.0187**
(0.00805) (0.00747) (0.00812) (0.00825)
Percentage of Muslims 0.00499* 0.00404 -0.00163 -0.00537
(0.00297) (0.00304) (0.00449) (0.00498)
Percentage of Christians -0.00902*** -0.00912*** -0.0104** -0.0136***
(0.00306) (0.00298) (0.00487) (0.00519)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.744 0.745 0.746 0.744 0.745 0.746
ll -592.3 -592.5 -590.6 -589.0 -591.5 -590.5 -588.4
Religious fractionalization -3.420* -3.402* -3.701** -3.953** -3.578* -3.697** -3.967**
(1.835) (1.892) (1.857) (1.816) (1.854) (1.867) (1.813)
Religious polarization 2.308** 2.294* 2.209* 2.563** 2.549** 2.243* 2.509**
(1.171) (1.199) (1.170) (1.146) (1.174) (1.177) (1.131)
Percentage of Non Religious/Atheists -0.0185** -0.0190** -0.0167** -0.0197**
(0.00825) (0.00795) (0.00835) (0.00843)
Percentage of Muslims 0.00589* 0.00496 0.000873 -0.00171
(0.00324) (0.00326) (0.00549) (0.00564)
Percentage of Christians -0.00835*** -0.00837*** -0.00766 -0.00971*
(0.00314) (0.00307) (0.00558) (0.00565)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.744 0.744 0.745 0.745 0.744 0.745
ll -592.2 -593.1 -592.0 -589.4 -591.1 -592.0 -589.3
Religious fractionalization -3.420* -3.402* -3.701** -3.953** -3.578* -3.697** -3.967**
(1.835) (1.892) (1.857) (1.816) (1.854) (1.867) (1.813)
Religious polarization 2.308** 2.294* 2.209* 2.563** 2.549** 2.243* 2.509**
(1.171) (1.199) (1.170) (1.146) (1.174) (1.177) (1.131)
Percentage of Non Religious/Atheists -0.0185** -0.0190** -0.0167** -0.0197**
(0.00825) (0.00795) (0.00835) (0.00843)
Percentage of Muslims 0.00589* 0.00496 0.000873 -0.00171
(0.00324) (0.00326) (0.00549) (0.00564)
Percentage of Christians -0.00835*** -0.00837*** -0.00766 -0.00971*
(0.00314) (0.00307) (0.00558) (0.00565)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.744 0.744 0.745 0.745 0.744 0.745
ll -592.2 -593.1 -592.0 -589.4 -591.1 -592.0 -589.3
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the Incidence of civil conflict. Panel 1, 2 and correspond to religious diversity calculated
at levels 1, 2 and 3 respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad
sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log
of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil
exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables
for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies
from La Porta et al. [1999].
country on the other hand has no effect on the incidence of civil conflicts.27
Looking at the list of countries ranked by our measure of religious intolerance in appendix
Table B.20, one could argue that since most of the Muslim majority countries figure
high up on the list, our insignificance of the percentage of Muslims in the data is driven
27In appendix Tables B.9 (with intolerance) and B.10(without intolerance) we see that no religion can
be particularly blamed for the onset of conflict. Religious intolerance continues to be significant for the
onset of conflict.
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by the inclusion of the religious intolerance variable. In Table 2.8 we use the same
specification of Table 2.7 but leave the religious intolerance variable out. Our results
remain qualitatively similar. We notice that percentages of Christians and Atheists/Non-
religious continue to reduce the incidence of the conflict. The percentage of Muslims in
marginally significant as long as we do not control for the percentage of other groups,
but as soon as we control for the other groups the percentage of Muslims becomes
insignificant. Thus, the insignificance of percentage of Muslim variable is not driven by
the inclusion of religious intolerance in the specification.28
In the diversity measures we have been using so far, each religious group existing at
a particular level enters as a separate entity at that level. One might argue that if a
particular religion is more problematic than others then the relevant conflict inducing
cleavage is the one between that problematic religion and all other religions. Thus, a
diversity index which includes all religions separately might not be the best one to pick
this effect up. In order to verify this, we construct three new measures of religious
diversity dividing the population of each country into only two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive groups for each of the three measures. In the first one, we consider only
Muslims and Non-Muslims as the relevant groups, in the second one we consider only
Christians and Non-Christians as the relevant groups and finally, in the third one we
consider only Religious and Atheists/ Non-Religious as the relevant groups. Since, in this
case there are only two groups entering the calculation of diversity, both polarization and
fractionalization yield the same ranking of countries. We use fractionalization without
loss of generality.29 Neither of these new measures of diversity are significant with or
without the inclusion of religious intolerance. Religious intolerance continues to have a
significant and robust effect on the onset of civil conflict and less so on the incidence of
civil conflict.30
The insignificance of the diversity measures that include only the division between Mus-
lims and Non-Muslims or that between Christians and Non-Christians further supports
our previous finding that neither Christianity nor Islam is particularly problematic.
The insignificance of the diversity index that includes only Religious and Atheists/ Non-
Religious as the relevant groups, indicates that the cleavage between the religious and
Non-religious people in the country is not relevant in predicting civil conflict.
28As seen in the Table B.4 the correlation between religious intolerance and the percentage of different
groups is not especially high.
29Using polarization instead would produce identical results. For only two groups polarization =
2*fractionalization (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] page 798 for a discussion.)
30Results are not provided and are available upon request. In the first two of these indices we have
tried including the atheists and Non-religious in the calculation. The inclusion or non-inclusion of the
atheists and Non-religious has no qualitative effect on the results.
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2.3.4 Robustness checks
Next, we try to ensure that our results are robust to other datasets and specifications.
In order to do so we look specifically at the dataset and specification of Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol [2005]. They use a sample of 138 countries for the 1960-1999 period and
divide the sample into 5 five-year periods. The data comes from the Peace Research
Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars and their basic endogenous variable
corresponds to the incidence of civil wars following the definition of PRIO which includes
intermediate and high-intensity armed conflicts (PRIOCW). 31
Table 2.9: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] specification with Religious diversity
& intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -52.84** -14.19*** -2.273
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (23.68) (4.379) (2.167)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 26.03** 8.882*** 3.392*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (12.46) (2.897) (1.930)
LGDPC -0.584** -0.415 -0.427* -0.400* -0.243 -0.309
(0.237) (0.253) (0.225) (0.227) (0.235) (0.213)
LPOP 0.549*** 0.479*** 0.412** 0.410** 0.327* 0.238
(0.180) (0.151) (0.207) (0.202) (0.167) (0.222)
PRIMEXP 0.0697 -0.457 -0.569 -0.863 -1.167 -1.830
(2.068) (1.778) (1.694) (2.126) (1.679) (1.910)
MOUNTAINS -0.00478 -0.00391 -0.00582 -0.00660 -0.00659 -0.00562
(0.00925) (0.00921) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0100)
NONCONT 0.106 0.000484 0.330 0.185 0.0433 0.404
(0.581) (0.536) (0.622) (0.635) (0.550) (0.670)
DEMOCRACY 0.0675 0.0332 0.115 0.303 0.315 0.225
(0.348) (0.357) (0.354) (0.398) (0.397) (0.370)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 1.896 1.804 1.885
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.155) (1.149) (1.180)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 1.096 1.476 0.647
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (1.036) (1.007) (1.054)
Religious intolerance 0.395* 0.448** 0.407**
(0.212) (0.195) (0.192)
CONSTANT -7.160** -7.859*** -7.234** -6.728** -7.151** -5.542
(3.284) (2.862) (3.584) (3.343) (2.930) (3.691)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.215 0.202 0.190
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -279.9 -284.5 -288.6
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the incidence of civil wars from PRIO following the definition which
includes intermediate and high-intensity armed conflicts (PRIOCW). Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6)
correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively.
All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from
myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
Their main finding is that ethnic polarization has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the incidence of civil wars. Then in some of their specifications they also look
at the effects of religious heterogeneity. They find that neither religious fractionalization
nor religious polarization have a significant effect on conflict when they enter separately.
31See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] for more details.
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On the other hand, in the basic logit regressions using both religious fractionalization and
religious polarization, they find that religious fractionalization is marginally insignificant,
while religious polarization is statistically significant. However, once ethnic polarization
is included only ethnic polarization is significant and all the other diversity measures
become insignificant. They argue that “It seems clear that ethnic polarization has a
robust and powerful explanatory power on civil wars in the presence of other indices of
fractionalization and polarization, while the statistical relevance of religious polarization
depends on the particular specification.” Thus, we try to verify if this is indeed true or
does our measure of religious diversity still have a significant effect on civil conflict once
we control for ethnic fractionalization and polarization. At the same time we also ensure
that our results are robust to using the PRIO dataset.
In Table 2.9 we use the data and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]
and add to it our measures of religious diversity instead of theirs.32 Columns 1 to 3
correspond to the 3 different levels of aggregation. Columns 4 to 6 are identical to
columns 1 to 3 but also control for religious intolerance. Unlike them we find that re-
ligious fractionalization and religious polarization continue to be highly significant in
predicting civil conflict even after controlling for ethnic fractionalization and polariza-
tion. While this result holds at almost all levels of aggregation, it is the second level of
aggregation that is the most significant once we control for religious intolerance. Also,
religious intolerance is highly significant in all the specifications. Moreover, while our
measures of religious diversity continue to be significant, ethnic polarization becomes
insignificant once we control for religious intolerance. Most of the literature has so far
found ethnic polarization to be significant and religious diversity to be insignificant in
explaining civil conflict. But our finding indicates that the result was driven by the
non-inclusion religious intolerance in the specifications.
In Table B.11, we re-investigate which of the three components of religious intolerance
are more relevant. This is similar to Table 2.6, but while in Table 2.6 we use the
data and specification of Desmet et al. [2012], here we use the data and specification of
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]. In the first three columns we do not control for any
component of intolerance whereas in the last three we do control for each of the three
components in the three different panels. Again we clearly notice that government and
social regulation of religion are highly significant in explaining civil conflict. Moreover,
religious diversity continues to be highly significant and robust.
We finally subject our analysis to some more robustness checks. We control explicitly
for ethnic fractionalization and polarization from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] in
the Desmet et al. [2012] data and specification (Appendix Table B.12 and Table B.13).
32This corresponds to Table 1, Column 8 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]
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We also added the percentage of Muslims, Christians and Non-religious/atheists in the
countries, both entering together and separately in of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005]
(Appendix Table B.14). Our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
In all the above analyses we do not consider the Non-religious/Atheists/Agnostics as a
relevant group in the calculation of the diversity indices. As a further robustness test
we re-calculated our religious diversity measures including these groups. Our results
remain qualitatively unchanged but less significant. We find that when we do not con-
trol for religious intolerance, and religious fractionalization and polarization enter the
specifications separately, both religious polarization and fractionalization are significant
(only) at the highest level of aggregation (for both incidence and onset). But the sign is
negative i.e. religious diversity (both fractionalization and polarization) at the highest
level of aggregation seems to reduce conflict. This significance however, disappears for
polarization once we control for religious intolerance for the incidence of conflict and
also fractionalization for the onset of conflict. Further, unlike our other specifications
if religious fractionalization and polarization enter the specifications together, neither is
significant.33
We argue that “since what we are trying to capture is religious interaction, it is reason-
able not to treat the no-religion group as other religions because the only things that
people in this group have in common is the fact they do not belong to any religious
group. Therefore, there are not specific common interests that permit to identify them
as a collective and that distinguish them from the interest of all the other groups. This
means that from a political point of view there is no common point of reference that
keeps them together. Moreover, the non-religious group does not have the necessity
to reaffirm its identity because, as a group, it has no identity. This means that social
friction caused by religious differences with other groups will not be present” (Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol [2000]).
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper we create measures of religious diversity at three different levels of ag-
gregation corresponding to different historical depths of cleavages. We also construct a
new measure of religious intolerance. Using our newly constructed measures we do an
in-depth empirical analysis of the relation between religious diversity, intolerance and
the probabilities of onset and incidence civil conflict.
33These results are not provided and are available upon request.
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Through our empirical analysis, we find that religious diversity is an important correlate
of civil conflict. The relationship is more robust for the incidence of conflict and less
so for the onset of conflict. Religious fractionalization reduces conflict while religious
polarization increases it. The relationship is a lot weaker for the onset of conflict.
Moreover, religious intolerance is a significant and robust correlate of civil conflict, more
so for the onset of conflict. In particular intolerance arising out of social and government
regulation of religion significantly leads to more conflict. While we do find some evidence
that a higher percentage of Non-religious/Atheists and Christians reduce the incidence
of conflict we find no evidence in favour of the perception that some religions are more
violent than others. Moreover, having more Muslims, Christians or more religious people
in the country has no significant effect on the onset of conflict.
We also find that religious diversity measured at the second level of aggregation is the
most robust one. In other words, the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians
etc. is more relevant than that between Abrahamic and Indian religions or that between
different denominations of Christians - like Protestants and Catholics, or of Muslims -
like Shias and Sunnis. Thinking in terms of Huntington [1993a], the relevant groups
that define civilizations which potentially clash are the groups like Hindus, Muslims,
and Christians etc. as defined by the second level of aggregation. On the other hand,
thinking in terms of Caselli and Coleman [2013], these religious identies or groups are
seperated by an ethnic distance which imposes a high enough cost on individuals of one
group to pass themselves off as members of the other.
Our results are robust to a host of specifications, data and controls including controls for
other forms of ethnic diversity. We conclude from the above empirical analysis that both
religious diversity and intolerance are important predictors of civil conflict and must be
taken into account in any analysis investigating the correlates of civil conflict.
Chapter 3
The Health Costs of Ethnic
Distance: Evidence from
Sub-Saharan Africa
3.1 Introduction
Nineteen thousand children die worldwide every day before reaching the age of five. The
highest rates of child mortality are still concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 1
in 9 children die before reaching the age of five, which is not only more than 16 times
the average for developed regions (1 in 152) but also a lot higher than South Asia (1 in
16) which has the second highest rates of child mortality [UNICEF, 2012]. The striking
feature of child mortality rates in Africa is that while all of Africa is poor, there is
a huge disparity in child mortality rates across ethnic groups. We argue that ethnic
distances could explain the existence of such disparities in child mortality rates across
ethnic groups in Africa. The ethnic distance between any two ethnic groups is measured
by how different the languages that the two groups speak are. We show that children of
mothers who are ethnically distant to their neighbours have higher mortality rates. One
possible explanation for our finding is that information does not flow smoothly across
ethnic lines and individuals who are ethnically distant to their neighbours lose out.
Child mortality or under-five mortality is an important measure of development and
reducing it is in fact a Millennium Developmental Goal (MDG no. 4). Our main focus
is to explain why the child mortality rates vary across ethnic groups in Africa. The liter-
ature so far has attributed such differences in child mortality rates across ethnic groups
in Africa to different practices by different ethnic groups which affect the demographic
behaviour and cultural status of women; the geographical location of different groups,
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i.e. whether the groups live close to cities, or in environmentally better regions with
better climate that supports better crops, and less diseases like malaria or if they live
in economically important regions etc. Gyimah [2002] for example, particularly stresses
the differences in socio-cultural practices such as dietary taboos and food avoidances on
mothers and infants, as well as perceptions of disease aetiology and treatment patterns
across ethnic groups.1
Using high quality individual level micro data from the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) combined with a novel dataset on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups at the
level of approximately 1 km2 for fourteen Sub-Saharan African countries we highlight
the importance of ethnic distance in explaining the disparities in child health outcomes
between ethnic groups while controlling for the commonly provided explanations in-
cluding geography, location, cultural differences between ethnic groups etc. The ethnic
distance variable is calculated using the average linguistic distance of the mother from
individuals living around her in circles of different radii.
There are two primary findings of our study. First, children of mothers who are ethni-
cally distant from their neighbours have a higher probability of dying as children. This
result is robust to the inclusion of the commonly used measures of ethnic diversity (frac-
tionalization or polarization), as well as several individual specific controls, apart from
ethnicity, region, and country-time fixed effects. This finding holds as long as ethnic
distances are calculated using circles of radii ranging from 25 km to 125 km around the
mother, but not in bigger circles. Our second key finding is that children of mothers
living in more ethnically fractionalized places have a lower probability of child death.2
In terms of average marginal effects, if we consider a circle of 75km around the mother,
a one standard deviation (0.267) increase in the linguistic distance of the mother from
her neighbours increases the probability of her children dying by around 0.75%, which
is about 3.3% of all the child deaths in our sample. By itself this marginal effect looks
small. But to put things in perspective, a one year increase in the mother’s education
leads to only a 0.5% decrease in the probability of child death. And moving to live one
standard deviation closer to the capital decreases the probability of death by only 0.6%.
While there are several possible alternative explanations, we use the recent insights of
Ashraf and Galor [2013] to interpret our empirical findings. Ashraf and Galor [2013]
1“Among the Mole-Dagbani groups in northern Ghana, for instance, women are denied eggs and other
protein food during pregnancy which is likely to affect their nutritional status hence the birth weight of
the child. Similarly, pregnant Akan women are encouraged to avoid rich food such as mangoes and ripe
plantain for fear of miscarriages, particularly in the early months of pregnancy” [Gyimah, 2002].
2Controlling for polarization instead does not change the results. Fractionalization gives the prob-
ability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country speak two different languages.
Polarization measures how far the distribution of the linguistic groups is from the bipolar distribution
(1/2, 0, 0, ... , 0, 1/2).
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point out that diversity could have both positive and negative impacts on economic
outcomes. In the same vein, we argue that ethnic diversity leads to a higher stock
of knowledge in society about how to rear one’s children and thus improves health
outcomes of children, whereas individual ethnic distances act as barriers to accessing
such knowledge and thus leads to worse health outcomes.3
Since we control for ethnicity specific fixed effects our results are not driven by hetero-
geneity in unobservable characteristics across ethnic groups. This lets us abstract from
previously provided explanations of differences in child mortality rates between ethnic
groups including differences in cultural practices between different ethnic groups etc.
Also, the use of region and country-time fixed effects allow us to discard the location
and geography explanations. However, there still remain concerns about endogeneity of
our results due to unobserved differences between individuals who live in places where
they are ethnically more or less distant. In order to address such endogeneity we control
for a host of variables that would reduce the possibilities of omitted variable bias. We
also explicitly control for migration in some of the specifications. Then, using recently
developed methods by Altonji et al. [2005] we show that our results are not driven by
selection on unobservables.
Apart from our two main results we also find some evidence that wealthier mothers can
mitigate some of the negative effects of linguistic distance. But we find no heterogeneity
in the effects of linguistic distance by education, gender, place of residence (urban or
rural), or distance from the capital. Neither do we find any evidence of nonlinearities
in the effects of either linguistic distance or ethnic diversity. We do several robustness
checks including the use of the linear probability model instead of probit regressions,
and using infant mortality as our dependant variable instead of child mortality. Our
results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Our paper contributes to several different strands of the literature. One of the primary
strands is the literature that finds ethnic diversity to have a negative effect on the
provision of public goods including health outcomes.4 However, most of the literature
is at the cross country level. Interestingly, Platas [2010] finds that, but for Africa ethnic
diversity is either insignificant or has a positive and significant effect on some health
outcomes including child mortality (e.g. Appendix Table 12 of Platas [2010]). The
literature has yet to provide an explanation for this seemingly puzzling finding. In
contrast take this literature to an individual level analysis with a rich set of controls
3We discuss some of the other possible explanations in the next section.
4Miguel and Gugerty [2005], Alesina et al. [1999], Vigdor [2004], Habyarimana et al. [2007], Alesina
et al. [2003], Desmet et al. [2012], La Porta et al. [1999], Ahlerup [2009], Ghobarah et al. [2004], Lieber-
man [2007], Platas [2010]
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and point out that while ethnic diversity might indeed have a positive effect on child
mortality rates, ethnic distance has a negative effect.
The second strand that we contribute to is the literature that views child mortality as an
indicator of individual welfare or development and tries to understand its determinants.5
Some of this literature particularly focuses on ethnic favouritism ([Franck and Rainer,
2012, Kudamatsu, 2009]. However, these papers usually attempt to identify the effect of
the ethnicity of the countries’ leader on mortality rates in different groups. So far none
of these papers have looked at the effects of individual ethnic distance on child health
outcomes.
The third strand to which we contribute is the small but growing literature that em-
phasizes the role of ethnic distances in explaining different socio-economic outcomes.6
We take this literature a step forward. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
relate individual level health outcomes to the ethnic distance of the individual from her
neighbours.7
Finally, we contribute to the literature that tries to explain the existence of ethnic
inequality in health outcomes. Ethnic inequality defined as the inequality in well-being
across ethnic groups that coexist, is bad for economic growth [Alesina et al., 2012],
provision of public goods [Baldwin and Huber, 2010], and can lead to civil conflicts
[Gomes, 2012, Mitra and Ray, 2010] etc. Most of the literature studying the effects of
ethnic inequality on different socio-economic outcomes has taken such inequality to be
exogenously given. In contrast, we show how ethnic distances might lead to disparities in
health outcomes between ethnic groups. There are some papers [Brockerhoff and Hewett,
2000, Gyimah, 2002] that have tried to explain ethnic inequality in child mortality rates,
but we are the first to underscore the importance of ethnic distance.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains why ethnic distance
and diversity might matter for child mortality. Section 3 discusses the data sources and
how different variables are constructed. Section 4 gives the econometric specification.
Section 5 gives the results and section 6 concludes.
5Besley and Kudamatsu [2006], Kudamatsu [2009], and Kudamatsu et al. [2012], Franck and Rainer
[2012].
6Desmet et al. [2012], Desmet et al. [2009], Gomes [2013], Spolaore and Wacziarg [2009], Esteban
et al. [2012a], Esteban et al. [2012b].
7 Kumar et al. [2012] find geographic distance to be an important barrier to good maternal and child
health outcomes in India. We on the other hand investigate the effects of ethnic distance on child health
outcomes while controlling for geographic distance.
8Ethnic inequality is not just a feature of Africa. Banerjee and Somanathan [2007] point out how the
Scheduled Tribes are falling behind Scheduled Castes in India while to start with both the groups were
historically disadvantaged.
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3.2 Why Does Ethnic Distance Matter?
Our empirical findings show that the more ethnically distant a mother is from her neigh-
bours the higher the probability of her children dying before reaching the age of five.
On the other hand children of mothers living in more ethnically fractionalized places
have a lower probability of dying. There are several possible alternative explanations
to our empirical findings. We use the recent insights of Ashraf and Galor [2013] who
underscore that diversity could have both beneficial and detrimental effects on produc-
tivity. On the one hand diversity enhances knowledge creation and accumulation and
fosters technological progress in the economy. On the other hand diversity leads to more
inefficiency by increasing the possibilities of disarray and mistrust and thus leading to
reduced cooperation and disrupting socioeconomic order.
Using the Ashraf and Galor [2013] framework with minor modifications we argue that
diversity reflects a higher stock of knowledge and information about how to rear one’s
children. Overall child mortality is thus lower in diverse localities. However, such
knowledge does not flow smoothly across ethnic groups and especially it does not flow
to groups which are ethnically very distant and thus such groups lose out. Formally, we
consider an economy where the level of ethnic diversity affects the level of productivity.
The level of technology is given by A = A(z, ω), where z denotes the institutional,
geographical and human capital factors and ω = [0, 1], which is the degree of ethnic
diversity, has a positive but diminishing effect on the level of technology.9 However, δi,
which is the ethnic distance of an individual to her neighbours, reduces the individual
production. Let x be the individual labour input. Thus, the individual health production
function is given by,
yi = (1− δi)A(z, ω)f(xi) (3.1)
The individual ethnic distance, δi, represents a barrier to knowledge and impedes indi-
vidual access to information about good health.10 On the other hand overall diversity
actually improves health outcomes via the technology term technology A = A(z, ω).
The role of information for healthcare cannot be over emphasized. Malhotra [2012] for
example points out how lack of information on feeding practices or nutritional knowledge
amongst families plays a key role in the persistence of chronic child malnutrition in India.
9A(z;ω) > 0, Aω(z;ω) > 0, and Aωω(z;ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ [0; 1].
10If we take δi = 0, then we get a simplified version of the model in Ashraf and Galor [2013]. In Ashraf
and Galor [2013] additionally “a fraction, αω, of the economy’s potential productivity, A(z;ω), is lost
due to lack of cooperation and resultant inefficiencies in the production process.” Hence, they show that
y = (1− αω)A(z, ω)f(x) ≡ y(x, z, ω) is a strictly concave hump-shaped function of ω.
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More than a third of under-five deaths worldwide are attributable to under nutrition
[UNICEF, 2012]. Again, the Audience Scape National Surveys highlight the role of
information for health care for several African countries. For example, they find that
in Zambia people who have received information about HIV/AIDS, malaria, or family
planning within the month prior to the survey were more likely to be in better health
[Zhou, 2010]. “Word of mouth” is found to be important for health information, with
friends or family members acting as key channels of such information. The top three
most trustworthy sources for health issues were found to be medical doctors, radio, and
friends or family members.11
There is also evidence in the literature of how ethnicity might act as a barrier to informa-
tion and thus affect health care. Pongou [2009] for example points out that information
circulates more easily within ethnic groups than across and highlights the implications
for HIV/AIDS in Africa. Again, in Kenya there is clear evidence on targeting of spread
of health information via maximum language use, Kiswahili being the language of the
majority [Bowen, 2010]. However, this makes it harder for fringe groups to get access to
such information. Again, Singleton and Krause [2009] points out how Spanish speaking
patients face barriers to accessing health care even in the US.12 We take this literature
a step further and show how ethnic distances might have a negative impact on child
mortality.
Our framework can be easily modified and related to the literature on ethnic diversity
and public goods. If like the Alesina et al. [1999] model we assume that the median
voter decides which public goods get provided, then as an individual’s distance from the
median voter (the average person around her) increases, the worse off she is. Again,
individuals who are very different from others can be easily identified and thus can be
easily discriminated against reducing their access to public goods [Blattman and Miguel,
2010, Caselli and Coleman, 2013, Fearon and Laitin, 1996, Miguel and Gugerty, 2005].
However, using these models we cannot explain why ethnic diversity has a positive effect
on health outcomes while ethnic distances have a negative effect. We thus stick to our
simple framework based on Ashraf and Galor [2013].
11Similar surveys with similar findings exist for other countries as well. See Montez [2011] for Tanzania,
for example.
12In Mexico indigenous people don’t go to the hospital in fear that their lan-
guage and customs will not be understood and due to lack of trust between groups.
http://www.nytimes.com/video/2013/08/13/world/americas/100000002373842/a-chiapas-medicine-
man.html
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Spatial Distribution of Ethnic groups
In order to construct the ethnic distance of the mother from people living around her,
we need the distribution of ethnic groups across space. Until very recently there was no
comprehensive database on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups available.13 Desmet
et al. [2013] (work in progress) fill this gap by constructing the most comprehensive
database on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups for the whole world at a resolution
of approximately 1km2. In order to do so they use two different sources of data. For
the spatial distribution of population they use the Landscan data. Landscan is the
finest resolution global population distribution data available for the entire world. The
resolution is 30 arc seconds by 30 arc seconds, which is approximately 1 km2 at the
equator.14 For the information on ethnic groups they use the 15th edition of Ethnologue
which maps over 7600 linguistic groups for the whole world. The linguistic groups are
represented in the form of polygons across space where each polygon represents the
homeland of a particular linguistic group. Areas where multiple languages are spoken
are represented via overlapping polygons. Moreover, the total population pertaining to
a particular linguistic polygon within a particular political boundary is also provided.15
Figure 3.1 gives the distribution of all African languages along with their corresponding
populations. Polygons of different colours represent different languages. Areas where
multiple languages are spoken are represented by overlapping polygons. But the over-
lapping polygons cannot be seen in this map. The blank areas have no information on
languages but are almost always sparsely populated (or unpopulated) desert areas. If
there is some population living in these areas then they are assigned to the language
of the nearest polygon. Figure 3.2 gives the population distribution at the 1 km2 level
coming from LandScan which gives us the number of people living in each square kilo-
metre of the world. Desmet et al. (2013) overlay these two maps on each other via some
programming in ArcGIS, Python, Matlab and Stata to construct a distribution of lin-
guistic groups for each of the Landscan cells. The final data on the spatial distribution
of ethnic groups gives us for each square km of the world the languages spoken and how
many people speak each of those languages in that square km.
13Alesina and Zhuravskaya [2011] construct a database of ethnic diversity at the sub-national level
but their database only goes down to the district level and only for 92 countries.
14For details see http://web.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/
15Alesina et al. [2013] use a similar methodology using the same data sources and calculate district
and country level averages of historical plough use by ancestors of different ethnic groups.
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Figure 3.1: African Languages
For example, let us consider the case of Ethiopia whose population distribution can be
seen in the Figure 3.3.16 Figure 3.4 gives the languages in Ethiopia once it is overlaid
on the population distribution. Then depending on the number of language polygons
overlying a particular population cell, the total language population, and the total pop-
ulation of the country, each cell gets a particular distribution of languages. This is
repeated for the whole world. We use the data for Africa.
3.3.2 Linguistic distance
In this paper we measure ethnic distances using distance between the languages which
the different ethnic groups speak. There are several different ways of measuring linguistic
distances. We follow Fearon [2003], Desmet et al. [2009], Desmet et al. [2012] and several
other recent papers which use linguistic tree diagrams to measure distance between
languages. The distance between two languages j and k using this approach is defined
as:
τjk = 1−
(
l
m
)δ
(3.2)
16If we zoom in into the capital Addis Ababa we can clearly notice how the population is concentrated
around the capital, see in Figure C.1.
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Figure 3.2: Africa Population
Figure 3.3: Ethiopia Population
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Figure 3.4: Ethiopia languages
where l is the number of shared branches between j and k, m is the maximum number of
branches between any two languages, and δ is the decay factor, which is a parameter that
determines how fast the distance declines as the number of shared branches increases.
Data on language trees come from the Ethnologue data.
For our final analysis we need to calculate the average linguistic distance of each mother
in our sample to all other individuals living around her in circles of different radii. The
linguistic distance for each mother j (who speaks language j) to all other individuals
in the circle is given by
n∑
k=1
τjk, where there are n individuals living in the circle and k
represents the language of each of those n individuals. The function τjk is defined by
the formula 3.2.
There are other ways of measuring linguistic distances. For example, Dyen et al. (1992)
measure linguistic distances based on lexicostatistical studies which focus on the pro-
portion of cognates in any two languages.17 The distance between any two languages is
usually defined as one minus the proportion of cognates they have. Again, Isphording
[2013] uses not only cognates but also the number of sounds that need to be changed
between two words that have the same meaning (say, Tu and You) in two different lan-
guages. However, distance calculated using language tree diagrams are more useful since
the data is a lot more comprehensive and exists for all countries.18
17Cognates are words in different languages that sound similar and mean the same thing.
18See Desmet et al. [2009] for a discussion.
Chapter 3. The Health Costs of Ethnic Distance 60
The decay factor δ measures, “how much more distant should we consider two lan-
guages from different families to be relative to languages that belong to the same family”
[Desmet et al., 2009]. Following Desmet et al. [2009] we use a δ of 0.5. Fearon [2003] on
the other hand uses a δ of 0.05. Let us consider the two Indo-European languages Greek
and Italian. Following the language tree from Ethnologue, these two languages share
one common branch and with a δ of 0.5, the distance between them is 0.74. Again, if
we consider Chinese and Italian which belong to completely different families and thus
share no branches in common, the distance between them is one. On the other hand if
like Fearon (2003), we take a δ of 0.5, the distance between Greek and Italian becomes
0.13, whereas that between Chinese and Italian continues to be one.19
3.3.3 Linguistic Diversity
Our primary measure of ethnic diversity is the commonly used measure of ethnic frac-
tionalization. Ethnic fractionalization has been found to be bad for a host of socio
economic outcomes [Alesina et al., 2003] and has often been blamed for Africa’s poor
economic performance [Easterly and Levine, 1997]. However, recent literature has em-
phasized that for certain outcomes like civil conflicts etc. ethnic polarization rather than
fractionalization is more relevant [Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005]. In some of our
specifications we also control for polarization. If the level of analysis is the country level,
then there is a distinction between these two measures of diversity. However, at very
fine levels of disaggregation, as is our case, both fractionalization and polarization are
highly correlated with a correlation of above 0.82, and yield similar results.
The fractionalization measure frac(j) gives the probability that two randomly selected
individuals from a given country speak two different languages. The polarization mea-
sure pol(j) on the other hand measures how far the distribution of the linguistic groups
is from the bipolar distribution (i.e. the (1/2, 0, 0, ... , 0, 1/2) distribution) which
represents the highest level of polarization [Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005]. The
fractionalization index is maximized when each individual in the country belongs to a
different linguistic group, while the polarization index is maximized when there are only
two groups in the country and they are equally sized.20 Formally, the two measures are
defined as follows:
Fractionalization: frac(j) = 1− Σ[Si(j)]2. (3.3)
19 Example from Desmet et al. [2009].
20The reader is directed to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] for a detailed discussion and comparison
of the two measures.
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Polarization: pol(j) = 4Σ[Si(j)]
2[1− Si(j)]. (3.4)
where Si(j) is the proportion of the population speaking language i at geographic region
j. The disaggregated nature of our data allows us to calculate diversity and different
levels of aggregation. We thus calculate our measures of diversity at both the circle
and district levels. Geographic region in the different specifications could refer to either
circles or districts. However, as we will see later this does not affect our results.
3.3.4 Child Mortality
Child mortality is the death of a child before reaching the age of five. If the child dies
before reaching the age of one then it is termed as infant mortality while if the child does
not survive for a month then it is termed as neo-natal mortality. The Demographic and
Health surveys (DHS) make available data on child mortality at the individual level for
many developing countries from across the world. Funded by the the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the DHS has been conducting surveys in several
developing countries since the 1980s. By interviewing a nationally representative sample
of women of child bearning age (15 to 49), the DHS collects data on all the children
they have ever given birth to in the past including the children who did not survive till
the time of the interview. The standardized components of the DHS questionanaire can
be used to compile cross country micro datasets. Each survey provides information on
life and health outcomes of individuals which allow us to construct measures of child
mortality and several other indiviudal level variables including the child’s gender, birth-
order, their mother’s weight, stature, years of education, and occupation, wealth level
etc. Moreover, in many of the surveys the mother’s ethnicity is also provided. Also,
using a GPS receiver, the geographic coordinate of each geographic cluster (village or
town) is also collected. In Figure 3.5 for example, we see the the spatial location of all
DHS clusters in Ethiopia. In Figure 3.6 we draw circles of 25 km radius around these
locations in order to calculate average ethnic distances.
We use fourteen countries in our analysis viz. Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso,
Malawi, Senegal, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Benin, Namibia and
Niger. To start with we consider all Sub-Saharan African countries for which DHS data
is available. Our analysis requires along with the regular DHS data on health outcomes,
the ethnicity and GPS coordinates of the mother’s location. Thus, countries which have
either of these two information missing have to be discarded. Then in order to calculate
the linguistic distance we need to be able to map the ethnicities to the languages. For
the matching between ethnicity and languages we closely follow Fearon [2003]. But our
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Figure 3.5: Ethiopia DHS example
matching is a lot more comprehensive than Fearon [2003]. He provides the matching for
the major ethnic groups in the country whereas we construct the matching for each and
every ethnic group in the country regardless of its size. We have also had to discard
countries for which this mapping is not good enough.21
3.3.5 Geographic Distance
The geographic isolation and distance from the capital are calculated by using the for-
mula for the great circle distance. The geographic distance between any two points in
space ` and k, denoted by |`, k|, is computed as the great circle distance:
|`, k| = rE arccos(sin(lat`) sin(latk) + cos(lat`) cos(latk) cos(long` − longk) (3.5)
Using the above formula we calculate the geographic isolation of any individual as the
average geographic distance betweeen that individual and all the other people in the
country. The highest distance between any two individuals in the country is normalized
to 1. The distance to the capital is simply the distance of the individual to the capital
21We have cross-checked our data using Fearon [2003].
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Figure 3.6: Ethiopia distance example
calculated using formula 3.5, where we take ` to be the individual’s location and k to
be the location of the capital.
3.3.6 Summary Statistics
Figure C.2 in the appendix gives the maps of all the countries included in the analysis.
We have fourteen countries and a total of thirty surveys with information on the births
and deaths of over 825,000 children. However, we can consider only the children who
have already reached the age of five by the day of the sampling, since we do not know
if the others are going to survive till the age of five or not. Thus, as can be seen from
Table C.1, in the child mortality sample we have information on the births of 658,755
children out of who about 23% do not survive till their fifth birthday. About 12% do not
survive till their first birthday. There is huge variability in the data over time and space.
From Table C.2 we can see that in Niger 35% of the children die before reaching the age
of five, whereas in Kenya the corresponding number is 13%. The linguistic distance and
fractionalization variables all lie between 0 and 1. 22% of the sample is urban and 49%
of the sample is female.
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3.4 Econometric Specification
Our primary relationship of interest is that between child mortality and the ethno-
linguistic distance of the mother from her neighbours. We would also like to understand
how ethnic diversity of the neighbourhood affects child mortality. The baseline specifi-
cation is given by equation ( 3.6 ). In our baseline specification we have child mortality
on the left hand side and our primary variables of interest on the right hand side along
with a host of control variables that have been found to be important for child mortality.
Prob(deathiet) = αR + αethnicity + αreligion + αC ∗ αt + β1 ethnic distanceie
+ β2 ELFi + β3 Xit + β4 Xi + iet
(3.6)
where Prob(deathiet) is the probability of death of child ‘i’ born to mother belonging to
ethnicity ‘e’ in year ‘t’. The ethnic distanceie variable is our primary variable of interest
and it gives the linguistic distance of the mother of child ‘i’ belonging to ethnicity ‘e’
from people living within circles of different radii around her. The ELFi variable gives
the ethno-linguistic fractionalization in the circles of different radii around the mother.
For calculating both the linguistic distance and the ELF we have used circles of different
radii, viz. 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 175, 200, 250 km around the mother. In some
specifications we also calculate ELF at the district level.
The variables Xit and Xi come from the literature on child mortality and have been
found to be important for child mortality.22 Xit includes birth specific variables viz.
female child dummy, age at birth, age at birth squared, multiple birth, birth order,
birth order squared, short birth space prior, short birth space post. Xi includes mother
specific variables viz. urban dummy, education years, and dummies for the wealth index.
We also control for the geographic distance, which gives the geographic isolation of the
mother from everybody else in the country and the distance of the mother’s location
from the capital, which are both included in Xi.
We include region fixed effects αR apart from country specific time effects αC ∗αt which
allows for the non-parametric evolution of time effects differently for each country. By
including ethnicity fixed effects, αethnicity, we control for unobserved heterogeneity across
ethnic groups, which allows us to identify the effect of ethnic distance on child mortality
that is not driven by ethnicity specific characteristics like ethnic dominance of certain
groups, cultural differences leading to differences in health practices between different
22See Kudamatsu [2009], Baird et al. [2011], Franck and Rainer [2012] for example.
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groups, etc. Likewise αreligion, the religion dummy controls for differences in religious
beliefs and practices across different individuals.
Since child mortality is a 0-1 binary variable we estimate it via pooled probit regres-
sions.23 β1 is our coefficient of interest since it gives the effect of linguistic distance of
the mother on the probability of death of the child. Given the possibilities of endo-
geneity giving a causal interpretation to β1 is not straightforward. Moreover, we cannot
use mother specific fixed effects since the ethnic distance variable does not vary across
time for the same mother. However, we are able to control for a host of maternal and
birth characteristics which alleviate endogeneity concerns to a great extent. Moreover,
we later do some analysis to gauge how much selection on unobservables is taking place
and this increases our faith in the causal interpretation of β1. The standard errors are
clustered at the Survey-Country level.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Ethnic distance and Child mortality
Most studies look at how ethnic diversity affects different economic outcomes including
infant/child mortality at the aggregate country/ district/ or town level. In this paper we
study the effects of individual level ethnic distance on child mortality at the individual
level while controlling for ethnic diversity at the aggregate level. We are able to construct
measures of ethnic diversity taking into account the exact location of the individual.
Also, Child mortality is an actual outcome variable and thus instead of just provision it
represents actual access to health services. Our focus is thus on access and not merely
provision.
Table 3.1 gives our baseline specification. In Table 3.1 we try to explain how the linguistic
distance of the mother from people living around her, affects the probability of her child
dying before reaching the age of five. In this baseline specification we consider the
average distance of the mother from all individuals living in a radius of 75 km around
her.
In the different columns of Table 3.1 we keep adding different control variables. In
column 1 we do not control for any other variables apart from the linguistic distance
variable. In column 2, we add a control for linguistic fractionalization. We notice that
without any other controls neither linguistic distance nor fractionalization is significant.
In column 3 we add individual level controls including wealth and education of the
23As a robustness check we also use linear probability models, but as we will see later our results
remain unchanged.
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Table 3.1: Child mortality: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
linguistic distance 75 0.0502 0.0511 0.0862* 0.0326 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.0779**
(0.0559) (0.0580) (0.0470) (0.0236) (0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0392)
fractionalization 75 -0.0113 -0.0646 -0.0149 -0.0375* -0.0442** -0.0233
(0.0741) (0.0642) (0.0210) (0.0197) (0.0217) (0.0244)
urban -0.0903*** -0.0692*** -0.0719*** -0.0690*** -0.0474*
(0.0317) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0246)
female -0.0654*** -0.0674*** -0.0678*** -0.0678*** -0.0701***
(0.00435) (0.00433) (0.00433) (0.00433) (0.00660)
education years -0.0363*** -0.0221*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.0180***
(0.00532) (0.00253) (0.00248) (0.00247) (0.00280)
wealth index 2 0.0313 0.0107 0.00733 0.00732 0.0253
(0.0190) (0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0195)
wealth index 3 0.0129 -0.00593 -0.0106 -0.0103 0.0131
(0.0210) (0.0219) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0283)
wealth index 4 -0.0235 -0.0552** -0.0592** -0.0587** -0.0218
(0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0313)
wealth index 5 -0.0996*** -0.152*** -0.156*** -0.152*** -0.105***
(0.0365) (0.0274) (0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0317)
log distance to capital 0.0172** 0.00699
(0.00774) (0.0164)
ln geog dist -0.0577 -0.0895*
(0.0413) (0.0507)
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
region No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
country*time No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity No No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 658755 658755 658505 649182 648468 648468 263730
pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.084 0.086 0.086 0.091
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions have been used.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-country level. The numbers after
linguistic distance and fractionalization variables indicate the radius of the circle around the mother
in which these variables have been calculated. The first 6 columns use the full sample i.e. all the
births in the maternal history of the mother. In column 7 we restrict the sample to only births
occurring within 10 years prior to the survey. The individual controls include age at birth, age at
birth squared, multiple births (twins, triplets etc.), birth order, birth order squared, short birth
space prior to birth, and short birth space post birth.
mother, sex of the child, location of the mother, and other individual specific variables
that affect child mortality like birth order etc.24 In column 4 we add region fixed effects
and country-time fixed effects. In column 5 we add religion and ethnicity fixed effects
and in column 6 we add controls for geographic isolation.
Column 6 is our most complete and preferred specification. The inclusion of ethnicity
fixed effects allows us to control for heterogeneity in unobservable characteristics across
ethnic groups including heterogeneity in health outcomes across ethnic groups, and dif-
ferences in cultural practices between different groups etc. We notice that once religion
and ethnicity fixed effects are controlled for (in both columns 5 and 6), our linguistic
distance variable becomes highly significant. The linguistic distance of the mother from
people living around her significantly increases the probability of her child dying before
24The wealth index variable is an ordinal index that takes five different values with a higher value
indicating a higher level of wealth.
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reaching the age of five. Contrary to previous findings in the literature, the fractional-
ization variable on the other hand significantly reduces the probability of a child dying
before reaching the age of five.
The rest of the variables all have the expected signs and effects. Female children, urban
children and children whose mothers are more educated have a lower probability of dying.
Again, children whose mothers belong to either of the two highest wealth quintiles have
a lower probability of dying. Geographic distance to the capital increases the probability
of dying, but geographic isolation does not significantly affect the probability of death.
In the first six columns of Table 3.1 we have included all the births in the maternal
history of the mother. The DHS are a rich source of data on individual level health
outcomes. However, like any other data sources there are some shortcomings of the
data which have been discussed in Baird et al. [2011] for example. One of the primary
concerns in using retrospective data is recall bias which stems from the fact that women
might be less likely to accurately remember more distant births and deaths. To minimize
recall bias in some of our specification we use births and deaths occuring in the preceding
ten years from the date of the survey. Both Baird et al. [2011] and Kudamatsu et al.
[2012] resort to this strategy as well.
Moreover, since some of the variables like wealth level are available only for the survey
year, they might more accurately represent current conditions than conditions long ago
in the past. As a robustness check in columns 7 we restrict the sample to only births
occurring within 10 years prior to the survey. The results become slightly less signifi-
cant but overall they remain qualitatively unchanged. The linguistic distance variable
continues to significantly increase the probability of child death. Fractionalization on
the other hand becomes insignificant.25
In the tables above, so far we have considered the coefficients from the regressions. It
is clear that the coefficient for the linguistic distance variable is statistically significant,
but is it economically significant as well? In order to gauge the magnitude of the effect of
linguistic distance on the probability of child death we now present the average marginal
effects. The average marginal effect of an increase in linguistic distance of the mother
from her neighbours within a circle of 75 km is of 2.8%. A one standard deviation
(0.267) increase in the linguistic distance of the mother from her neighbours increases
the probability of her children dying by around 0.75%. If we consider only the births
and deaths that took place within the last 10 years of the survey the marginal effects
are somewhat smaller. Considering the births that took place within the last 10 years,
the average marginal effect of an increase in linguistic distance of the mother from her
25 In appendix Table C.3 we replicate the first six columns of Table 3.1 using only the births occurring
in the last 10 years
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neighbours within a circle of 75 km is of 2.1%. In other words, a one standard deviation
increase in linguistic distance leads to a 0.57% increase in the child’s probability of dying.
Looking at the average marginal effects of fractionalization in the radius of 75 km we see
that if we move from the completely homogenous (fractionalization = 0) to a completely
heterogeneous (fractionalization = 1) location, the probability of child death falls by
1.1%. And a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization leads to a fall of 0.3%
in the probability of child death. Again considering only the births from the last 10
years prior to the survey, the average marginal effect of fractionalization is of 0.4% only.
And a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization leads to a fall of 0.1 % in the
probability of child death.
By themselves these marginal effects look very small. But to put them in perspective
let us compare these average marginal effects with those of some of the other important
variables. For instance a one year increase in the mother’s education leads to only a
0.5% decrease in the probability of child death. Moving from a rural to urban loca-
tion reduces the probability of child death by only 1.8%. Moving to live one standard
deviation closer to the capital decreases the probability of death by only 0.6%. Thus
we notice that relatively speaking the average marginal effect of linguistic distance is
economically important when compared to some of the other variables. The marginal
effect of fractionalization on the other hand is much smaller.
In all the analyses up to now we have only considered the radius of 75 km to calculate
the mother’s ethnic distance. Next in Table 3.2 we verify if our results are robust for
alternate radii or not. In the different panels of Table 3.2 we have exactly the identical
specifications as in Table 3.1 except that in each panel we have a different radius of the
circle around the mother. To start with in panel 1 we investigate the effects of linguistic
distance of the mother from people living in a radius of 25 km around her. Subsequently
in panel 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 the radii are 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 175, 200, 250 km
respectively.
As in the previous table we see that the linguistic distance of the mother from her
neighbours significantly increases the probability of death of the child before reaching the
age of five. This holds true for distance calculated in circles ranging from radius 25 km
to 125 km, beyond which the linguistic distance variable is not significant. The results
are robust to the inclusion of region, ethnicity, country-time fixed effects, individual
specific controls, geographic isolation and the popularly used measure of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization. Fractionalization whenever it is significant continues to reduce the
Chapter 3. The Health Costs of Ethnic Distance 69
Table 3.2: Child mortality: Alternative radii
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
linguistic distance 25 0.0439 0.0437 0.0833* 0.0290 0.0648*** 0.0648***
(0.0536) (0.0573) (0.0472) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0219)
fractionalization 25 0.00163 -0.0490 -0.0173 -0.0329** -0.0337**
(0.0514) (0.0443) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0149)
linguistic distance 50 0.0476 0.0473 0.0856* 0.0315 0.0860*** 0.0866***
(0.0555) (0.0584) (0.0476) (0.0231) (0.0276) (0.0274)
fractionalization 50 0.00275 -0.0544 -0.0112 -0.0290* -0.0325*
(0.0630) (0.0547) (0.0183) (0.0170) (0.0180)
linguistic distance 75 0.0502 0.0511 0.0862* 0.0326 0.102*** 0.103***
(0.0559) (0.0580) (0.0470) (0.0236) (0.0340) (0.0342)
fractionalization 75 -0.0113 -0.0646 -0.0149 -0.0375* -0.0442**
(0.0741) (0.0642) (0.0210) (0.0197) (0.0217)
linguistic distance 100 0.0519 0.0533 0.0846* 0.0302 0.102*** 0.105***
(0.0562) (0.0576) (0.0465) (0.0237) (0.0353) (0.0358)
fractionalization 100 -0.0225 -0.0748 -0.0162 -0.0432** -0.0525***
(0.0865) (0.0733) (0.0208) (0.0171) (0.0195)
linguistic distance 125 0.0526 0.0545 0.0826* 0.0289 0.102** 0.104**
(0.0557) (0.0567) (0.0456) (0.0235) (0.0429) (0.0434)
fractionalization 125 -0.0419 -0.0873 -0.0129 -0.0415** -0.0526***
(0.100) (0.0843) (0.0246) (0.0178) (0.0198)
linguistic distance 150 0.0510 0.0530 0.0798* 0.0257 0.0832 0.0856
(0.0560) (0.0566) (0.0454) (0.0235) (0.0530) (0.0535)
fractionalization 150 -0.0537 -0.0971 0.00527 -0.0246 -0.0366
(0.117) (0.0975) (0.0279) (0.0214) (0.0235)
linguistic distance 175 0.0496 0.0520 0.0779* 0.0236 0.0759 0.0779
(0.0563) (0.0565) (0.0450) (0.0233) (0.0634) (0.0642)
fractionalization 175 -0.0695 -0.109 0.0215 -0.0111 -0.0222
(0.137) (0.113) (0.0296) (0.0250) (0.0266)
linguistic distance 200 0.0489 0.0515 0.0768* 0.0219 0.0690 0.0700
(0.0569) (0.0566) (0.0451) (0.0230) (0.0730) (0.0739)
fractionalization 200 -0.0835 -0.124 0.0439 0.00843 -0.00197
(0.159) (0.130) (0.0334) (0.0305) (0.0315)
linguistic distance 250 0.0476 0.0487 0.0720 0.0228 0.0574 0.0566
(0.0591) (0.0575) (0.0459) (0.0231) (0.0827) (0.0837)
fractionalization 250 -0.123 -0.183 0.0142 -0.0399 -0.0486
(0.203) (0.162) (0.0553) (0.0578) (0.0558)
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
region No No No Yes Yes Yes
country*time No No No Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No No No Yes Yes
Ethnicity No No No No Yes Yes
N 658755 658755 658505 649182 648468 648468
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions
have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-
country level. The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables
indicate the radius of the circle around the mother in which these variables have been
calculated.
probability of child death.26
From the above analysis it is clear that the linguistic distance of the mother from people
living around her is a significant and robust predictor of child mortality. Contrary to the
findings in the previous literature, fractionalization on the other hand is not a robust
determinant of child mortality. Moreover, in specifications where the fractionalization
variable is significant it actually reduces the probability of child death.
26In appendix Table C.4 we restrict our sample to only births that took place in the last 10 years
prior to the interview. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged for the linguistic distance variable.
Fractionalization becomes insignificant.
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3.5.2 Fractionalization
Ethnic diversity usually measured by ELF or Ethno-linguistic fractionalization has re-
ceived a lot of attention in the literature. Such fractionalization has often been found to
have a negative effect on different socio-economic outcomes.27 However, as seen from the
previous sections, in our data, fractionalization if anything has a positive effect on child
mortality, i.e. it reduces child mortality. We relate this to the recent findings by Ashraf
and Galor [2013], who point out that diversity could have both beneficial and detrimen-
tal effects. Following them we argue that that diversity could potentially reflect a higher
stock of knowledge and information, and thus lead to better health outcomes. In this
section we focus specifically on verifying whether this is a robust result. In Table 3.3 we
use the identical specifications from the previous section but do not control for linguistic
distance. In all but the last panel of Table 3.3 we control for fractionalization calculated
for circles of different radii. As a robustness test in the last panel of Table 3.3 we also
control for fractionalization at the district level. We notice that even when we do not
explicitly control for linguistic distance, the effect of linguistic fractionalization on child
mortality is still negative and significant.
Table 3.3: Child mortality: Fractionalization in different radii
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5
fractionalization 25 0.00726 -0.0380 -0.0133 -0.0285** -0.0293**
(0.0484) (0.0418) (0.0164) (0.0144) (0.0148)
fractionalization 50 0.00762 -0.0453 -0.00738 -0.0232 -0.0266
(0.0610) (0.0534) (0.0189) (0.0164) (0.0174)
fractionalization 75 -0.00697 -0.0571 -0.0119 -0.0299 -0.0363*
(0.0729) (0.0636) (0.0216) (0.0188) (0.0208)
fractionalization 100 -0.0187 -0.0687 -0.0142 -0.0351** -0.0441**
(0.0858) (0.0732) (0.0205) (0.0165) (0.0188)
fractionalization 125 -0.0386 -0.0821 -0.0111 -0.0333* -0.0440**
(0.0999) (0.0845) (0.0238) (0.0173) (0.0193)
fractionalization 150 -0.0506 -0.0923 0.00733 -0.0179 -0.0294
(0.117) (0.0979) (0.0268) (0.0211) (0.0230)
fractionalization 175 -0.0664 -0.104 0.0241 -0.00494 -0.0156
(0.137) (0.114) (0.0283) (0.0257) (0.0271)
fractionalization 200 -0.0804 -0.119 0.0472 0.0143 0.00405
(0.159) (0.131) (0.0320) (0.0318) (0.0326)
fractionalization 250 -0.121 -0.181 0.0188 -0.0352 -0.0439
(0.203) (0.163) (0.0529) (0.0603) (0.0583)
frac district -0.00138 -0.0465 -0.0250 -0.0443** -0.0448**
(0.0445) (0.0408) (0.0234) (0.0204) (0.0204)
N 658755 658505 649182 648468 648468
pseudo R2 0.000 0.062 0.084 0.086 0.086
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit
regressions have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the DHS survey-country level. The numbers after linguistic distance
and fractionalization variables indicate the radius of the circle around the
mother in which these variables have been calculated.
27See Alesina et al. [2003], Alesina et al. [1999], Easterly and Levine [1997] for example. See Alesina
and La Ferrara [2000] for a review of the literature.
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Some recent papers like Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] stress the importance of
polarization rather than fractionalization particularly in the context of intergroup con-
flict. Thus, we try to understand whether the effects of polarization on child mortality
are different from those on fractionalization. In Appendix Table C.5 we control for po-
larization in the district along with the ethnic distance variable calculated at the circle
level for circles of different radii. We notice that the effects of polarization are quite
similar to those of fractionalization. In other words, regardless of whether we measure
diversity by the index of fractionalization or of polarization, ethnic diversity if anything
seems to reduce child mortality.
So far in all the above tables the two measures of diversity have entered separately in
the different specifications and we have found that both fractionalization and polariza-
tion have a negative and significant effect on child mortality. In Appendix Table C.7
we control for ELF and polarization together with the linguistic distance variable for
different radii and in Appendix Table C.6 we do the same without the linguistic dis-
tance variable. When both the measures of diversity enter the specifications together,
polarization becomes insignificant, while fractionalization continues to have a negative
and significant effect on child mortality.
3.5.3 Heterogenous effects
Up to this point we have assumed that the linguistic distance variable has a homogenous
effect on the children of all mothers. However, there are several reasons why this might
not be the case. For example, linguistic distance might have a different effect in places
which are more fractionalized than places which are not. Again wealthier and more
educated mothers might be better able to insulate their children from the negative
effects of linguistic distance. Again linguistic distance might have different implications
for male and female children. In this section we thus try to identify the heterogeneity in
impacts of linguistic distance by focussing on different variables like education, wealth,
gender, place of residence (urban or rural), and distance from the capital.
In Table 3.4, we first try to identify if linguistic distance variable has a heterogeneous
impact on the probability of child death by the wealth level of the mother. The wealth
index variable takes five different values with a higher value indicating a higher level of
wealth. In Table 3.4 we use our baseline specification of column 6 from Table 3.1 but
add to it the interaction term of linguistic distance and wealth level. We notice that
linguistic distance continues to be highly significant and positive in sign. Also higher
wealth reduces mortality. As expected we see the negative effects of linguistic distance
are partially reduced by higher wealth levels. This is particularly true for the wealth
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous effects of linguistic distance by Wealth level
ling dist 25 ling dist 50 ling dist 75 ling dist 100 ling dist 125
linguistic distance 0.1211*** 0.1439*** 0.1564*** 0.1547*** 0.1516***
(0.0362) (0.0407) (0.0469) (0.0487) (0.0566)
wealth index
2 0.0110 0.0112 0.0102 0.0098 0.0095
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151)
3 0.0002 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0222)
4 -0.0527** -0.0518** -0.0514** -0.0513** -0.0518**
(0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0258)
5 -0.1401*** -0.1402*** -0.1410*** -0.1416*** -0.1418***
(0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0258)
Interaction
2 -0.0282 -0.0294 -0.0218 -0.0186 -0.0153
(0.0248) (0.0242) (0.0233) (0.0228) (0.0227)
3 -0.0876** -0.0887** -0.0822** -0.0777** -0.0722**
(0.0435) (0.0419) (0.0406) (0.0397) (0.0388)
4 -0.0508 -0.0558 -0.0557 -0.0544 -0.0410
(0.0455) (0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0464) (0.0457)
5 -0.0964** -0.0918* -0.0829** -0.0755 -0.0715
(0.0473) (0.0493) (0.0496) (0.0498) (0.0507)
N 648468 648468 648468 648468 648468
pseudo R2 0.0861 0.0861 0.0861 0.0861 0.0861
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions
have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-
country level. The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables
indicate the radius of the circle around the mother in which these variables have been
calculated.
levels 3 and 5 compared to the omitted wealth category 1. This means the mothers reach
the level of wealth 3 they are able to reduce the negative effects of linguistic distance.
One possible explanation could be that if linguistic distance hinders access to public
information on healthcare practices or public health facilities, wealthier mothers could
perhaps still have access to privately provided health care.
In Table 3.5, we analyse the heterogeneity of the effects on linguistic distance by frac-
tionalization in the circles. We see that while the linguistic distance variable continues to
be significant, the fractionalization variable becomes insignificant. The interaction term
between the two variables mostly has a negative sign but is almost always insignificant.
In the results provided the interaction term is significant only for circles of 100 km.28
The negative sign of the interaction term implies that if anything in the fractionalized
places, the positive effects of fractionalization reduces the negative effects of linguistic
distance.
We also have various specifications in which we try to identify the heterogeneity in the
effects of linguistic distance by education, gender, place of residence (urban or rural),
28The interaction term is also negatively significant for circles of 150, 175 and 200 km at the 10%
level. Results not provided and are available upon request.
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Table 3.5: Heterogenous effects of linguitic distance by fractionalization
ling dist 25 ling dist 50 ling dist 75 ling dist 100 ling dist 125
linguistic distance 0.0606* 0.1000** 0.1511*** 0.1771*** 0.1871**
(0.0357) (0.04563) (0.0558) (0.0687) (0.0818)
fractionalization -0.03457* -0.0280 -0.0328 -0.0376 -0.0363
(0.0201) (0.0215) (0.0253) (0.0243) (0.0257)
Interaction 0.0126 -0.0326 -0.0993 -0.1406* -0.1563
(0.0710) (0.0813) (0.0774) (0.0833) (0.0981)
N 648468 648468 648468 648468 648468
pseudo R2 0.0861 0.0861 0.0861 0.0861 0.0861
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions
have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-
country level. The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables
indicate the radius of the circle around the mother in which these variables have been
calculated.
and distance from the capital. We do not find any heterogeneity in terms of these
variables.29
3.5.4 Migration
A possible concern in estimating the effects of ethnic distance on child mortality is the
possibility of individuals to migrate. One could argue that if individuals know that they
incur a cost by living with people who are ethnically distant from them then they might
choose to move to neighbourhoods which have people who are ethnically more similar
to them. Thus there might be some sort of Tiebout sorting of individuals. However,
quite realistically if we introduce some sort of transportation costs in the individual’s
decision to move then perfect sorting would not happen. In fact perfect sorting is also not
observed in reality since there are various barriers to movement. However, if individuals
actually are able to move to places where they are less distant to others then if anything
we are underestimating the effects of ethnic distance on child mortality and the effects
of distance would be stronger.
In order to ensure that migration is not driving our results, in Table 3.6 we provide
specifications restricting our sample to mothers who have always lived in their current
place of residence. Thus we are looking at the variation in linguistic distance within the
sample of those individuals who have never migrated.30 However, this information is not
available for all countries and we lose a lot of our observations when we use the variable
that indicates for how long the individuals have been residing in the current place of
residence. Our results remain qualitatively similar. Linguistic distance of the mother
29 Results not provided and are available upon request.
30Of course this sample itself might not be random since if there is the possibility of migration, this
sample represents individuals who have not been able to make use of the that possibility.
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Table 3.6: Child mortality: No migration sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6
linguistic distance 25 0.0173 0.00895 0.0431 0.0373* 0.0945*** 0.0944***
(0.0475) (0.0527) (0.0414) (0.0221) (0.0366) (0.0353)
fractionalization 25 0.0421 -0.0103 0.00194 -0.0117 -0.0101
(0.0618) (0.0534) (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.0197)
linguistic distance 50 0.0221 0.0158 0.0470 0.0397* 0.126*** 0.127***
(0.0485) (0.0526) (0.0415) (0.0236) (0.0452) (0.0438)
fractionalization 50 0.0426 -0.0122 0.0170 -0.00758 -0.00852
(0.0727) (0.0632) (0.0236) (0.0225) (0.0228)
linguistic distance 75 0.0265 0.0233 0.0510 0.0457* 0.164*** 0.167***
(0.0483) (0.0508) (0.0403) (0.0248) (0.0612) (0.0600)
fractionalization 75 0.0323 -0.0192 0.0292 -0.00901 -0.0139
(0.0854) (0.0745) (0.0307) (0.0259) (0.0268)
linguistic distance 100 0.0273 0.0258 0.0497 0.0440* 0.158*** 0.163***
(0.0483) (0.0499) (0.0398) (0.0251) (0.0611) (0.0606)
fractionalization 100 0.0225 -0.0283 0.0415 0.000472 -0.00883
(0.0979) (0.0843) (0.0354) (0.0275) (0.0288)
linguistic distance 125 0.0293 0.0290 0.0498 0.0463* 0.182** 0.188**
(0.0481) (0.0492) (0.0397) (0.0255) (0.0769) (0.0763)
fractionalization 125 0.00729 -0.0382 0.0351 -0.00534 -0.0197
(0.112) (0.0956) (0.0468) (0.0356) (0.0365)
linguistic distance 175 0.0293 0.0294 0.0481 0.0419 0.194* 0.201*
(0.0482) (0.0488) (0.0397) (0.0255) (0.116) (0.116)
fractionalization 175 -0.00415 -0.0501 0.0464 0.00711 -0.0120
(0.150) (0.127) (0.0617) (0.0460) (0.0478)
linguistic distance 200 0.0306 0.0307 0.0484 0.0388 0.189 0.193
(0.0484) (0.0488) (0.0400) (0.0251) (0.139) (0.139)
fractionalization 200 -0.00187 -0.0540 0.0686 0.0265 0.00895
(0.174) (0.146) (0.0743) (0.0575) (0.0591)
linguistic distance 250 0.0320 0.0319 0.0465 0.0376 0.160 0.159
(0.0500) (0.0498) (0.0415) (0.0259) (0.150) (0.150)
fractionalization 250 -0.00582 -0.0839 -0.00314 -0.0620 -0.0737
(0.220) (0.181) (0.118) (0.0992) (0.0953)
N 239852 239852 239735 235642 235311 235311
pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.084 0.086 0.086
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions have
been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-country level.
The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables indicate the radius
of the circle around the mother in which these variables have been calculated.
continues to significantly increase the probability of child mortality. Fractionalization
on the other hand becomes insignificant.
3.5.5 Selection on Unobservables
Like most empirical studies, the single biggest challenge in the literature on ethnic
diversity has been to establish a causal relationship of ethnic diversity with the different
socio-economic variables of interest. Like in our case, ethnic diversity is almost always a
time invariant measure and observed at a particular point of time. Moreover, there are
issues of measurement and omitted variable bias leading to non-causal estimates. Thus
most of the literature has to content with finding a correlation.31
31See Ahlerup [2009] for a discussion on the endogeneity of ethnic diversity.
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The biggest challenge in our paper is the possibility of endogeneity arising out of omit-
ted variable bias due to unobserved maternal and family characteristics. We cannot
incorporate mother fixed effects since our main variable of interest “linguistic distance”
remains unchanged for the mother over time. We are however, able to control for a wide
range of individual specific variables that allow us to control for a number of factors
that could lead to endogeneity. We also follow the methodology developed by Altonji
et al. [2005] and Bellows and Miguel [2009] who present new estimation strategies that
can be used when strong prior information regarding the exogeneity of the variable of
interest is unavailable. They use the selection on the observables to gauge how strong
the selection is on unobservables.
We do not have any clearly exogenous instruments at our disposal which would allow
us to cleanly identify the effects of linguistic distance on child mortality. Thus like
several recent papers e.g. Nunn and Wantchekon [2009], we exploit the measure and
intuition provided by Altonji et al. [2005] and use the strength of selection on observables
to assess the potential bias arising from selection on unobservables. In fact, following
the methodology developed by Altonji et al. [2005], we can arrive at ratio that tells
us how much stronger the selection on unobservables must be, relative to selection on
observables, to explain away the full estimated effect of linguistic distance on child
mortality. Table 3.7 gives us the corresponding ratios for circles of radii 25 km to 125
km for both the full sample and the sample consisting of births and deaths in the last
ten years prior to the survey.
To calculate each of the ratios in Table 3.7 we need two regressions. We need one
regression with a restricted set of controls (or no controls) and another with a full set
of controls. Let βR be the coefficient of linguistic distance from the restricted regression
and βF be the coefficient from the regression with the full set of controls. Then the
ratio βF /(βR − βF ) is our ratio of interest. The smaller the denominator, the less the
selection on observables and thus the selection on unobservables need to be stronger
in order to explain away the entire effect of linguistic distance. Again, the selection on
unobservables has to explain away more the higher the numerator is in magnitude [Nunn
and Wantchekon, 2009].
Table 3.7: Selection on Unobservables/Observables
Full Sample Last 10 years
25 -4.24 4.70
50 -2.64 12.99
75 -2.22 -10.42
100 -2.27 -50.89
125 -2.32 4.44
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In the restricted regression we consider no controls while regressing child mortality on
linguistic distance. In the unrestricted regression on the other hand we consider the full
set of controls from our baseline regression. All the ratios in Table 3.7 are quite big.
In the full sample we notice that the selection on unobservables have to be at least two
times larger than that on observables while in some cases it would need to be at least
more than four times larger. Again, in the sample from the last ten years we see that
the selection on unobservables has to be at least more than four and a half times larger
than that on observables while in some cases it would need to be at least more than fifty
times. Thus it is highly unlikely that selection on unobservables will explain away the
entire effect that we are currently attributing to our linguistic distance variables. Thus,
we can argue that linguistic distance indeed increases the probability of child death and
this relation is not driven by omitted variable bias.
3.5.6 Other Robustness checks
In this section we subject our results to several additional robustness checks. Our pri-
mary variable of interest is the probability of child death which is a 0-1 binary variable.
Thus, so far we have used probit regressions in order to estimate the effects of lin-
guistic distance of the mother on child mortality. First, we verify if our results hold
true if we use Linear Probability Model (LPM) instead. Hence we rerun our baseline
regressions from Table 3.1 using OLS instead of probit regressions. The results from
LPM are presented in Table C.10. We notice that our results remain qualitatively un-
changed. Linguistic distance continues to significantly increase the probability of child
death whereas fractionalization continues to reduce it.
Next, we try to identify if either the linguistic distance variable or the fractionalization
variable have a non-linear effect on child mortality. In Table C.8 we present the identical
specification used in the complete specifications of the baseline table, but add to it non-
linear terms for both fractionalization and linguistic distance in different combinations.
We notice that on including nonlinear terms, while the results become less significant
in some of the specifications, but overall the results remain similar to what we found in
the previous sections. Linguistic distance continues to increase the probability of child
death and there is some weak evidence that this effect might be nonlinear and after a
certain level it might actually reduce mortality. We do not observe any consistent results
for fractionalization.32
So far our focus has been on child mortality which is the event that the child dies
before reaching the age of five. However, a lot of the literature has focused on Infant
32In Table C.9 we consider only the births from the last 10 years. The results remain qualitatively
similar.
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mortality which is defined as the child dying before reaching the age of 1. In Table C.11
we try out our baseline specifications of child mortality on infant mortality to verify
whether linguistic distance has similar negative effects on infant mortality as it does on
child mortality. Qualitatively the impact of the linguistic distance of the mother on the
probability of mortality of the child before reaching the age of one is similar to that
on the probability of mortality of the child before reaching the age of five. However,
the results are a lot less significant. When we consider circles of 75 km radius around
the mother the linguistic distance variable is significant at level of significance 10%. In
Table C.11 apart from this we also see that the fractionalization variable in the complete
specification of column 6 continues to reduce infant mortality as it did child mortality
There might be two interpretations for why the linguistic distance variable is a lot less
significant for infant mortality. First, “Infant mortality is a rare event and estimating it
requires a large number of observations” [Kudamatsu, 2009]. Second, infant mortality
has a lot to do with conditions during birth and need not have anything to do with
ethnic distance. However, as the child grows the access to certain services might become
more crucial and thus child mortality has more to do with linguistic distance than infant
mortality.
3.6 Conclusion
There exist huge disparities in child mortality rates across ethnic groups in Africa. The
literature so far has not convincingly addressed the reasons behind such ethnic inequal-
ity in child mortality rates in Africa. Using high quality DHS data on individual level
health outcomes and combining it with a novel dataset on the spatial distribution of eth-
nic groups at the 1 km2 level, we estimate the effects individual level ethnic distance and
diversity on individual level child health outcomes. The exact ethnic distance variable
is calculated using the linguistic distance between individuals. We find that children of
mothers who are ethnically distant from their neighbours have a higher probability of dy-
ing before reaching the age of five, whereas children of mothers living in more ethnically
fractionalized places on the other hand have a lower probability of dying before reaching
the age of five. Since we control for ethnicity specific fixed effects our results are not
driven by heterogeneity in unobservable characteristics across ethnic groups including
heterogeneity in health outcomes across ethnic groups or cultural differences between
ethnic groups. To alleviate endogeneity concerns we control for a host of variables that
reduce the possibilities of omitted variable bias. Then using recently developed methods
by Altonji et al. [2005] we use the selection on the observables to gauge how strong
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the selection is on unobservables. We do not find evidence of a strong selection on
unobservables.
While there are several possible explanations for our results, we follow Ashraf and Galor
[2013] and argue that on the one hand, diversity implies a higher stock of knowledge
and information, and thus leads to better health outcomes. On the other hand, such
knowledge does not flow smoothly to groups which are linguistically distant and thus
such groups lose out. One of the biggest issues in child rearing and child deaths is the
lack of information. The probability of the survival of the child depends on the number
of mistakes the mother makes in taking care of the child. Thus if an individual is very
distant linguistically she has less access to the information on how to take care of her
child thus commits more mistakes. However, there are several other ways to interpret
our results. Our data does not allow us to pin down the exact mechanisms via which
linguistic distances affect child mortality. Identifying these channels precisely would be
a good avenue of future research.
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Data appendix
Naxalite/Maoist incidents:
The data on the Maoist incidents comes from four different sources:
• Global Terrorism Database (GTD) I: 1970-1997 & II: 1998-2004: In fact now there
is one consolidated GTD which has data till 2007.
• Rand-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998- present)
• Worldwide Incidents tracking system (WITS), National Counter Terrorism Centre
(2004-2007)
• South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) maintains a comprehensive web portal track-
ing all terrorism incidents in South Asia. It has most detailed accounts of the
major Naxalite incidents from 2005 onwards.
All the above mentioned sources track data on terrorist/violent incidents from different
sources like newspapers, official reports etc.1 The data is across countries often with
the village/city/district name of the place where each particular incident took place
specified. We have filtered out all the data pertaining to India and then kept only the
incidents that were clearly identifiable as Maoist/Naxalite in nature. To do so we used
the name of perpetrator unless it was clearly mentioned as being a Maoist/Naxalite
incident. Then except for the cases where the district is clearly mentioned the town or
village mentioned was placed in its corresponding district. More often than not we were
successful in doing so. However, we had to leave out the cases where it was not possible
1The first three sources have been used by Iyer [2009]
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to do identify the districts. Finally, we have consolidated all the above data sources to
construct a comprehensive consolidated district level Maoist incidents database. Thus,
there is information on presence, incidents and the number of deaths and injuries at the
district level from 1979-2009.
Consumption: District-specific indicators of income or expenditure are not available
for India. Instead, per capita consumption expenditure is calculated from the National
Sample Survey (hereafter NSS) data. The NSS conducts every 5 years the Consumption
expenditure survey (among other surveys) whence district specific per capita consump-
tion expenditures are calculated. The last four NSS thick rounds 2 were undertaken in
1987-88 (43rd), 1993-94 (50th), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). Given that district spe-
cific data is used, the 50th round is unusable since there are no district identifiers. For
the purposes of this paper we use the other three rounds. The per capita consumption
expenditure is calculated for all the districts using the Marginal per capita consumption
(MPC hereafter), using the 30 day recall period since the 30 day recall period is the only
one that is common across rounds. The MPC is used as a proxy for per capita income.
Demography: Apart from the Sample surveys by the NSS, India conducts a country
wide census every 10 years. The data on demography and public goods are stored in
the so called village directory data and is available for each census year since 1961. The
2001 census is used, whence we have data on total population, Schedule tribe and Caste
population, population by religious groups. All the above information is available at the
village level which has been used to construct the corresponding district level numbers.
Geography: We control for geographical terrain by the fraction of the districts unculti-
vated area that is barren rocky, sandy and steep sloping. We also control for remoteness
by the log of the distance from the state capital. Such data is made available in the
Wasteland atlas of India, Department of Land Resources (Ministry of Rural develop-
ment) in collaboration with the National Remote Sensing agency, (Department of Space).
These variables by definition do not vary over time. We also have data on forest cover in
the different districts. The data comes from the various ”State of forest cover” reports of
the Forest Survey of India (FSI) and gives the percentage of forest cover in each district.
The 2005 data is used.
Land distribution: The data on operational holdings of agricultural land comes from
the Agricultural census of India which collects such data every 5 years. The data gives
the number of operated landholdings in the different size classes (viz. Small, semi
medium, medium and, large). Both the 1991 and the 2001 censuses are available. The
gini coefficient for land inequality is calculated using this data. The computed gini co-
efficient varies from 0.12 to 0.78 and 0.14 to 0.79 in 1991 and 2001 respectively. The
average inequality has gone up from 0.47 in 1991 to 0.5 in the year 2001 (data on Bihar
not available in 2001). The land inequalities across the 2 years are highly correlated
2only the thick rounds can be used since the thin rounds have too few observations
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with Correlation coefficient of 0.97. We use the 1991 data since that way we have data
prior to the high conflict years and also no major state is missing.
Colonial Land Institutions: This data comes from Banerjee and Iyer [2005]. This
data is available only for 233 districts, i.e. for districts which were directly under British
control.
A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Naxalite affected areas in India (Source: SATP)
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Figure A.2: Landlord & non Landlord districts in India (Source: Banerjee & Iyer,
AER 2005)
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A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Summary: All 3 rounds
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
maoist 1085 0.170507 0.376251 0 1
deadwounded 1085 6.322581 59.3128 0 1837
nincidents 1085 2.41106 15.79039 0 428
maoist 1 1085 0.087558 0.282781 0 1
gini 1046 0.266298 0.060809 0.103525 0.525915
mpc 87 1030 5.052897 0.244983 4.410083 5.777959
General MPC 87 1030 5.132978 0.249794 4.498148 6.014436
SCST MPC 87 1028 4.870675 0.250028 4.180412 5.941787
land inequality in 91 1055 0.47359 0.178855 0.120449 0.788384
proportion forest 1082 0.167094 0.18037 0.000699 0.832942
population density 1082 0.006383 0.022805 0.000692 0.416596
log mpc 1046 5.849775 0.628196 4.410083 7.352093
log gen mpc 1043 6.002583 0.696857 4.498148 8.501844
log scst mpc 1045 5.674889 0.628981 4.180412 7.374076
log area 1082 8.721257 0.696394 6.475433 10.7288
proportion sandy 1040 0.006336 0.040049 0 0.688315
proportion barrenrocky 1040 0.00799 0.020191 0 0.265584
proportion steepaloping 1040 0.002556 0.010052 0 0.129534
log state capital distance 1031 5.485296 0.811263 0 6.899219
SCST percent 1082 0.292082 0.15533 0.016113 0.946497
log mpc lag 686 5.608404 0.620172 4.410083 6.848523
log gen mpc lag 685 5.727645 0.666179 4.498148 7.336274
log scst mpc lag 685 5.440889 0.634257 4.180412 7.374076
p nland 698 0.522766 0.429809 0 1
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Table A.2: Correlation Matrix
maoist maoist 1 log mpc proportion
sandy
log state
capital
distance
proportion
barren
rocky
proportion
steep
sloping
proportion
forest
SC per-
cent
ST per-
cent
population
density
maoist 1
maoist 1 0.5449 1
log mpc -0.2713 -0.0596 1
prop sandy 0.1275 0.0804 0.1252 1
log state capital distance 0.1327 0.1216 -0.0443 -0.1017 1
proportion barren rocky 0.0462 0.0597 0.1443 -0.0774 0.0162 1
proportion steep sloping -0.1567 -0.0983 0.3246 -0.0626 -0.0396 0.1753 1
proportion forest 0.114 0.0574 0.0694 -0.1653 0.2297 -0.0088 0.2107 1
SC percent -0.0293 -0.0003 0.1513 0.1606 -0.4011 -0.1188 0.0439 -0.2466 1
ST percent 0.0197 -0.0132 -0.2652 -0.1673 0.1996 0.2404 0.0084 0.3179 -0.507 1
population density 0.0463 0.0192 -0.0216 0.2251 -0.3502 -0.4447 -0.2079 -0.4327 0.1952 -0.5248 1
log area 0.2169 0.1613 -0.2474 -0.2124 0.2529 0.1663 -0.1171 0.1413 -0.1718 0.3598 -0.5955
gini 0.0218 0.1937 0.4101 -0.0043 0.119 -0.0208 0.0338 0.1363 -0.0309 0.0506 -0.0973
land inequality 0.1982 0.1453 0.0285 0.1137 -0.1999 -0.0849 0.0174 -0.0965 0.169 -0.437 0.661
MPC 87 -0.1784 -0.0812 0.6891 0.0768 -0.1229 0.1648 0.3058 0.0201 0.2413 -0.198 -0.0544
prop no landlord -0.35 -0.2043 0.4941 -0.1214 0.1642 0.1929 0.3112 0.1289 -0.0381 0.0082 -0.3227
log general MPC -0.2192 -0.0029 0.7489 0.0151 -0.0204 0.1275 0.1908 0.154 0.108 -0.0567 -0.0953
log SC MPC -0.247 -0.0699 0.8392 0.1908 -0.0318 0.1126 0.3283 0.1087 0.0935 -0.0788 -0.0874
log ST MPC -0.2613 -0.027 0.6032 0.0468 -0.1384 0.1341 0.2576 -0.0831 0.1407 -0.2957 0.1105
General MPC growth -0.1843 -0.1657 -0.0077 -0.0175 0.0385 0.0135 -0.0405 0.1162 0.0213 -0.0096 -0.0512
SC MPC growth -0.1742 -0.1985 -0.0731 0.0554 0.0077 0.0356 -0.0382 -0.1022 -0.0173 -0.0148 -0.0049
ST MPC growth -0.1482 -0.0598 -0.0384 -0.0101 -0.1007 -0.0254 -0.0358 -0.1512 0.073 -0.1668 0.1571
MPC growth -0.1861 -0.2043 -0.0069 0.05 0.0083 0.005 -0.0052 -0.0522 0.0139 -0.098 0.0441
log area gini land in-
equality
MPC 87 prop non
landlord
log gen-
eral
MPC
log SC
MPC
log ST
MPC
General
MPC
growth
SC MPC
growth
ST MPC
growth
log area 1
gini 0.1235 1
land inequality -0.4394 -0.077 1
MPC 87 -0.2575 0.101 -0.0619 1
prop no landlord 0.1053 0.1455 -0.253 0.4601 1
log general MPC -0.1714 0.4456 -0.0005 0.5304 0.3819 1
log SC MPC -0.1468 0.3167 -0.0384 0.5509 0.3794 0.5422 1
log ST MPC -0.3048 0.1431 0.1097 0.4364 0.2944 0.4418 0.4632 1
General MPC growth -0.0727 -0.3791 0.0565 -0.0156 -0.0025 0.2722 -0.0521 -0.0138 1
SC MPC growth 0.0245 -0.525 -0.0146 -0.0818 -0.0073 -0.2372 0.1186 -0.0525 0.5474 1
ST MPC growth -0.1332 -0.4111 0.1093 -0.0482 -0.0132 -0.1229 -0.0685 0.4045 0.4145 0.5549 1
Mpc growth -0.0554 -0.5205 0.0658 -0.0829 -0.0028 -0.1254 0.0142 -0.0078 0.7043 0.8869 0.6367
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Table A.3: Same sample as Table 1.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita -1.282*** -1.371*** -1.143 -2.956** -2.144** -3.625
(0.434) (0.500) (0.822) (1.234) (1.034) (2.812)
land inequality 2.743*** 2.537*** 4.552*** 9.854*** 9.773*** 14.32***
(0.631) (0.875) (0.863) (1.971) (2.086) (2.550)
proportion sandy 19.20*** 25.04*** 30.47** 38.95 -1.637 43.93
(7.300) (6.797) (13.77) (70.41) (59.24) (59.49)
log state capital distance 0.127 0.155 0.139 0.199 0.220 -0.0377
(0.197) (0.213) (0.210) (0.483) (0.352) (0.338)
proportion barrenrocky 17.07*** 24.39*** 20.34*** 46.46*** 51.86*** 37.59***
(3.299) (4.083) (5.448) (16.97) (13.40) (9.129)
proportion steepsloping -70.86** -113.6*** -155.9*** -201.2*** -331.1*** -389.2***
(33.45) (42.47) (44.47) (60.66) (116.6) (95.12)
proportion forest cover 1.211* 1.817*** 2.645*** 5.579*** 6.019*** 7.412***
(0.651) (0.686) (0.563) (2.041) (1.960) (1.737)
%Scheduled Castes -0.862 -0.386 4.110*** -2.788 -3.855 11.19***
(1.565) (1.704) (1.416) (4.282) (3.971) (3.395)
%Scheduled Tribes 4.071 5.503** 1.813 1.400 3.974 0.939
(2.475) (2.588) (1.288) (6.599) (8.201) (2.815)
%Scheduled Tribes square -6.590 -9.555** -1.620 -5.864 -14.50 1.763
(4.192) (3.910) (2.259) (9.987) (13.57) (3.586)
population density 0.536** 0.789** 0.401 1.327** 0.836 0.291
(0.208) (0.329) (0.309) (0.551) (0.526) (0.626)
log area 0.768*** 0.870*** 0.894*** 3.006*** 2.669*** 2.698***
(0.198) (0.289) (0.144) (0.544) (0.478) (0.338)
income inequality -3.148* -5.625*** -0.423 -15.45** -18.13*** -2.350
(1.780) (1.848) (1.794) (6.189) (6.455) (6.539)
initial consumption per capita -0.116 -3.275***
(0.797) (0.945)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 655 431 655 655 431 655
ll -186.0 -138.6 -142.8 -651.3 -540.6 -592.8
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In this table we have the same sample as in Table 2 but without the institutions variable. The
table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the author
combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS
rounds.
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Table A.4: The role of income differences across ethnic groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
General Castes consumption pc -0.818** -0.990*** -1.273*** -1.871** -1.951*** -2.109***
(0.319) (0.363) (0.202) (0.874) (0.756) (0.680)
Scheduled Castes consumption pc -0.444 -0.743*** -0.675*** -1.324 -1.338 -1.874*
(0.348) (0.245) (0.186) (0.832) (0.831) (0.986)
Scheduled Tribes consumption pc -0.218 -0.135 -0.117 -0.670 -0.814 -0.690
(0.484) (0.578) (0.695) (1.407) (1.223) (1.051)
proportion sandy -3.882 -1.202 3.041 -83.26*** -84.37*** -34.19***
(5.447) (5.517) (3.221) (30.86) (29.02) (9.921)
log state capital distance -0.141 -0.00183 -0.0944 -0.916*** -0.695** -0.458**
(0.163) (0.118) (0.250) (0.247) (0.323) (0.194)
proportion barrenrocky 7.414* 16.08*** 15.35*** 29.98 28.05 17.40***
(4.261) (5.217) (4.608) (21.45) (23.02) (4.523)
proportion steepsloping -115.0*** -116.2** -156.6** -347.1*** -296.4*** -338.8***
(39.00) (55.10) (60.87) (126.2) (101.8) (131.5)
proportion forest cover 0.846 2.221** 3.682*** 1.011 0.141 6.027***
(0.891) (1.036) (0.728) (1.287) (1.691) (1.437)
%Scheduled Castes -0.0988 0.504 2.450 -3.464 -6.589* 4.253
(1.420) (1.185) (1.839) (4.206) (3.377) (5.513)
%Scheduled Tribes 2.080 1.098 1.576 4.489 2.564 0.210
(1.369) (2.007) (1.472) (3.617) (4.295) (2.729)
%Scheduled Tribes square -1.991 -0.00427 0.158 -3.798 -1.908 2.840
(2.278) (2.286) (2.294) (3.626) (4.174) (3.320)
population density -0.166 0.344 0.351 -1.684 -1.549 -1.117
(0.379) (0.363) (0.368) (1.040) (1.092) (0.737)
log area 0.806*** 0.949*** 0.828*** 2.784*** 2.553*** 2.536***
(0.198) (0.282) (0.208) (0.379) (0.383) (0.315)
income inequality 1.504 -0.945 2.555* -5.349 -7.974* -5.269
(1.635) (2.433) (1.552) (3.958) (4.254) (4.035)
land inequality 5.412*** 5.575*** 4.555*** 20.47*** 18.98*** 16.20***
(0.902) (1.062) (0.841) (5.315) (5.471) (4.213)
initial consumption per capita -0.788* 0.163
(0.423) (1.013)
State dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 567 356 552 567 356 567
ll -163.0 -99.64 -118.5 -761.9 -616.9 -698.6
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the
author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS
rounds.
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Table A.5: The role of income differences across ethnic groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
General Castes Consumption pc -0.474* -0.570** -0.702*** -0.234 -0.575 -1.021
(0.245) (0.253) (0.211) (0.978) (0.973) (0.965)
Scheduled Castes Consumption pc -0.463 -0.943** -0.370 -1.123 -1.605* -1.912**
(0.371) (0.417) (0.389) (0.908) (0.874) (0.945)
Scheduled Tribes Consumption pc -0.747** -0.539** -0.664* -1.319* -0.867* -1.726*
(0.311) (0.267) (0.388) (0.739) (0.525) (1.038)
proportion sandy 16.08** 25.89*** 27.67** -40.88 -62.09*** 2.766
(6.513) (4.803) (11.69) (28.14) (23.65) (25.29)
log state capital distance 0.262 0.266 0.194 0.152 0.308 -0.0104
(0.233) (0.259) (0.259) (0.570) (0.408) (0.465)
proportion barrenrocky 22.12*** 26.58*** 26.58*** 57.78*** 45.52*** 43.53***
(4.907) (5.385) (8.323) (18.87) (11.36) (12.02)
proportion steepsloping -110.4*** -81.10** -199.9*** -364.8*** -313.7*** -519.4***
(33.05) (40.31) (66.74) (129.3) (92.62) (168.1)
proportion forest cover 1.657*** 2.248*** 2.808*** 5.460*** 4.763*** 7.177***
(0.559) (0.719) (0.757) (1.282) (1.303) (1.739)
%Scheduled Castes -0.0800 0.531 4.503*** -2.296 -3.157 8.422***
(1.607) (1.757) (1.599) (3.912) (3.723) (3.202)
%Scheduled Tribes 0.305 2.021 0.352 -5.308 -5.231 -2.864
(1.999) (2.027) (1.304) (3.827) (4.501) (3.940)
%Scheduled Tribes square -2.050 -5.541 0.640 0.270 -1.772 4.277
(3.880) (3.674) (2.411) (7.383) (9.236) (5.165)
population density 0.282 0.616* 0.260 0.0281 -0.0317 -0.392
(0.248) (0.364) (0.359) (0.720) (0.769) (0.612)
log area 0.836*** 1.060*** 0.834*** 3.482*** 3.329*** 2.772***
(0.226) (0.363) (0.162) (0.535) (0.452) (0.434)
income inequality -0.247 -2.970* 1.169 -15.78*** -18.36*** -5.041
(1.626) (1.693) (1.572) (5.502) (5.540) (6.186)
land inequality 3.062*** 2.605*** 4.118*** 12.64*** 10.91*** 14.10***
(0.459) (0.742) (0.901) (2.648) (2.363) (2.595)
proportion Non landlord -0.973*** -1.041*** -1.216** -2.377*** -1.982*** -1.023
(0.254) (0.263) (0.533) (0.644) (0.503) (0.828)
initial consumption per capita 0.298 -0.741
(0.601) (0.614)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 507 319 507 507 319 507
ll -139.9 -101.8 -113.7 -535.3 -440.7 -498.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table is same as Table 4 in the paper but also controls for historical institutions. The table
reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the author
combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS
rounds.
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Table A.6: The role of income differences across ethnic groups: SC&ST vs. General
Castes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
General Caste consumption pc -0.492* -0.566** -0.722*** -2.169*** -1.418** -1.808***
(0.279) (0.229) (0.181) (0.575) (0.721) (0.553)
SC & ST consumption pc -1.037*** -1.039** -0.625 -2.222** -2.099* -2.449*
(0.389) (0.502) (0.547) (0.927) (1.165) (1.472)
land inequality 2.837*** 2.902** 4.486*** 14.51*** 12.97*** 14.77***
(1.084) (1.218) (1.004) (3.438) (3.905) (3.438)
proportion sandy -1.091 -0.771 -0.0382 -46.54 -49.09** -15.83
(2.636) (2.417) (1.379) (28.97) (24.44) (11.55)
log state capital distance -0.0494 0.0640 -0.0234 -0.610*** -0.309* -0.346
(0.124) (0.118) (0.200) (0.166) (0.184) (0.249)
proportion barrenrocky 10.27*** 14.06*** 11.88*** 30.11** 38.16** 23.97***
(2.192) (3.016) (4.389) (14.30) (15.75) (5.205)
proportion steepsloping -65.18*** -90.58*** -125.6*** -238.9*** -206.4*** -324.7***
(19.23) (35.12) (34.34) (40.98) (52.41) (75.77)
proportion forest cover 1.388* 1.823** 2.300*** 2.452 2.511 5.491***
(0.718) (0.783) (0.548) (1.875) (1.697) (1.526)
%Scheduled Castes & Tribes 0.982 1.704** 1.976*** 3.192* 3.604** 4.314***
(0.608) (0.734) (0.330) (1.849) (1.614) (1.331)
population density 0.340 0.625** 0.329 -0.472 -0.235 -0.140
(0.222) (0.299) (0.286) (0.622) (0.544) (0.491)
log area 0.696*** 0.784*** 0.703*** 2.357*** 2.335*** 2.504***
(0.216) (0.304) (0.144) (0.387) (0.322) (0.291)
income inequality -0.581 -4.248** 1.396 -4.110 -10.37** -3.628
(1.937) (1.874) (1.281) (3.588) (4.289) (3.982)
Initial consumption per capita No Yes No No Yes No
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 993 651 993 993 651 993
ll -272.4 -180.9 -193.8 -1013.9 -825.3 -912.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In this table we combine the incomes of the Scheduled Castes and tribes together and compare its
impact on conflict vis a vis the income of general castes. The table reports coefficients and not
marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the author combining myriad databases.
All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in
parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the
district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (the no. of
dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions. There are 3 time periods
used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The conflict
data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds.
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Table A.7: The Effect of Growth on Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
Consumption growth -0.0213 -0.0335* -0.00481 0.0365 -0.00927 -0.0203
(0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0371) (0.0389) (0.0408)
proportion sandy -0.991 -1.386 0.488 -31.55* -42.08** -16.08
(2.787) (2.807) (1.521) (17.17) (20.78) (13.19)
log state capital distance 0.0572 0.0510 0.167 -0.527** -0.492** 0.102
(0.161) (0.150) (0.195) (0.207) (0.191) (0.272)
proportion barrenrocky 12.03** 15.55*** 13.29** 47.66*** 52.54*** 27.48***
(5.028) (3.658) (6.089) (15.12) (14.98) (9.349)
proportion steepsloping -69.79*** -92.50*** -97.17*** -194.3*** -247.5*** -248.7***
(22.75) (31.15) (37.30) (30.34) (68.15) (70.50)
proportion forest cover 1.094 1.526** 2.430*** 2.730 3.006 5.793***
(0.812) (0.732) (0.782) (2.373) (2.187) (1.982)
%Scheduled Castes 0.296 0.219 3.189** -3.939 -4.777* 4.423
(1.201) (1.399) (1.479) (3.478) (2.841) (3.665)
%Scheduled Tribes 5.777*** 4.969*** 3.853*** 10.47*** 10.78*** 9.167***
(1.550) (1.786) (0.835) (3.743) (3.135) (3.442)
%Scheduled Tribes square -5.987*** -5.526** -2.844* -10.77** -13.80*** -8.308
(1.971) (2.170) (1.726) (4.668) (4.550) (5.261)
population density 0.727*** 0.619** 0.649* 0.108 -0.0894 0.858
(0.258) (0.304) (0.373) (0.689) (0.643) (0.792)
log area 0.871*** 0.784*** 0.913*** 2.367*** 2.432*** 2.687***
(0.278) (0.270) (0.199) (0.323) (0.329) (0.575)
income inequality -6.188*** -4.961*** -2.238** -21.51*** -17.64*** -10.17***
(1.951) (1.883) (1.058) (4.989) (5.166) (3.142)
land inequality 3.561*** 3.686*** 4.187*** 13.81*** 14.21*** 9.756***
(0.970) (1.164) (1.028) (2.946) (3.278) (3.178)
initial consumption per capita -1.401** -4.263***
(0.608) (0.932)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 640 638 640 640 638 640
ll -193.5 -185.3 -143.5 -844.2 -828.3 -770.9
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the
author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The growth rates correspond to the 2 latter rounds. The conflict data is for the years
1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds.
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Table A.8: The Effect of Growth on Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
Consumption growth -0.00951 -0.0102 -0.00426 0.0213 0.00485 -0.0304
(0.0178) (0.0163) (0.0192) (0.0416) (0.0446) (0.0601)
proportion sandy 21.75*** 19.16*** 49.08** -6.925 -21.67 5.918
(6.644) (6.258) (24.75) (45.93) (32.90) (26.62)
log state capital distance 0.211 0.247 0.243 -0.204 -0.0299 0.258
(0.213) (0.216) (0.249) (0.356) (0.335) (0.552)
proportion barrenrocky 22.84*** 25.71*** 26.42*** 41.98** 50.00*** 36.16***
(5.202) (4.944) (7.329) (18.18) (16.85) (12.15)
proportion steepsloping -47.14* -100.8*** -105.4** -137.2*** -291.2** -203.7***
(28.57) (36.85) (50.28) (53.07) (120.0) (62.36)
proportion forest cover 2.138*** 2.158*** 3.158*** 3.942* 5.177** 7.002***
(0.720) (0.673) (0.979) (2.211) (2.169) (1.942)
%Scheduled Castes -0.614 -0.609 4.886*** -6.801* -7.115 6.799**
(1.319) (1.453) (1.837) (3.815) (4.564) (3.162)
%Scheduled Tribes 4.870** 4.791* 4.472** -0.980 -0.794 0.641
(2.386) (2.721) (2.019) (6.152) (6.837) (5.397)
%Scheduled Tribes square -8.931** -8.838** -6.013** -6.719 -9.050 -0.467
(3.735) (3.945) (2.740) (11.11) (12.37) (6.949)
population density 0.846*** 0.806** 0.734* -0.367 -0.181 1.175
(0.297) (0.334) (0.444) (1.021) (0.776) (0.978)
log area 1.059*** 1.059*** 1.217*** 3.041*** 3.107*** 3.312***
(0.269) (0.322) (0.213) (0.579) (0.483) (0.558)
income inequality -7.272*** -7.164*** -4.630*** -26.04*** -23.95*** -12.25**
(1.467) (1.574) (1.503) (5.552) (6.529) (5.949)
land inequality 2.013** 2.216** 3.041** 9.880*** 10.24*** 6.677***
(0.833) (0.893) (1.285) (3.227) (2.894) (1.629)
proportion Non landlord -1.162*** -1.114*** -1.552*** -2.702*** -2.298*** -2.191***
(0.290) (0.244) (0.427) (0.572) (0.543) (0.650)
initial consumption per capita -0.151 -2.409***
(0.731) (0.616)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 422 420 422 422 420 422
ll -135.4 -132.9 -105.6 -544.4 -535.4 -500.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table is same as Table 5 in the paper but also controls for historical institutions. The table
reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the author
combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS
rounds.
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Table A.9: Change in causes of conflict over time by subgroups
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
General Caste consumption pc 0.863 -1.620*** -0.464 -0.246 -2.258 -0.607
(1.418) (0.534) (0.501) (4.885) (1.486) (0.858)
Scheduled Caste consumption pc 0.322 -1.302* -0.459 3.526 -0.370 -1.219
(0.870) (0.685) (0.882) (4.910) (0.887) (0.996)
Scheduled Tribe consumption pc -0.730 -0.487 -1.028 -2.752* -1.881 -1.694
(0.534) (0.706) (1.216) (1.539) (1.671) (1.567)
land inequality 5.158*** 8.944*** 5.965*** 21.03*** 26.51*** 15.70***
(1.296) (1.701) (1.419) (3.429) (6.472) (3.588)
%Scheduled Tribes 1.691 -3.502 4.303 3.225 1.630 6.614
(3.532) (2.235) (4.225) (10.65) (5.616) (4.066)
%Scheduled Tribes square -3.811 6.782*** -3.609 -7.120 1.148 -11.35*
(6.525) (2.241) (4.572) (13.58) (5.354) (5.930)
%Scheduled Castes -2.530 -0.871 5.477*** -6.067 -8.409 -5.112
(2.727) (1.377) (1.856) (8.469) (6.048) (4.129)
proportion sandy -21.10 -3.417 -1.458 -130.7** -327.9*** -57.31***
(25.46) (6.103) (5.286) (64.37) (81.03) (16.78)
proportion barrenrocky 1.241 20.94** 16.39** 52.56 22.67 36.79*
(4.836) (8.550) (8.266) (44.10) (25.40) (20.62)
proportion steepsloping -119.2*** -334.7** -64.11* -709.7*** -407.0** -280.5***
(42.79) (132.8) (34.31) (240.5) (194.0) (82.66)
log state capital distance -0.291 0.139 0.199 -0.934*** -0.911*** -0.108
(0.180) (0.339) (0.256) (0.297) (0.282) (0.282)
proportion forest cover -0.174 2.228** 1.979 2.856 -3.910** 1.147
(1.346) (1.053) (1.873) (2.781) (1.606) (1.937)
log area 1.043*** 0.899** 1.376*** 6.405*** 3.707*** 4.014***
(0.375) (0.444) (0.493) (1.855) (0.826) (0.451)
population density -0.518 -0.358 1.037** 0.859 -2.691 0.389
(0.569) (0.529) (0.466) (1.596) (1.688) (0.508)
income inequality 4.769 -1.449 -3.852 -0.849 -8.148 -14.10***
(3.376) (4.559) (4.060) (13.98) (11.81) (5.003)
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 289 136 145 289 152 145
ll -58.81 -39.90 -33.24 -144.8 -215.9 -329.0
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients and not marginal effects. The data is from a database built by the
author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with robust standard errors,
clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the probability of conflict
(the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the
intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative Binomial regressions.
There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-
05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS
rounds.
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Table A.10: The determinants of the Maoist Conflict in India - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita -0.197*** -0.221*** -0.167** -880.9 -1,677 -150.6
(0.0744) (0.0854) (0.0809) (3,312) (5,862) (238.8)
land inequality 0.537*** 0.548** 0.474*** 4,387 14,816 521.5
(0.166) (0.216) (0.0924) (26,932) (82,892) (960.1)
proportion sandy -0.227 -0.0928 0.0354 -9,231 -46,591** -364.1
(0.393) (0.414) (0.149) (6,140) (23,624) (314.0)
log state capital distance -0.0122 0.00801 -0.00215 -232.3 -516.8 -10.78
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0190) (912.5) (1,822) (11.69)
proportion barrenrocky 1.560*** 2.451*** 1.402*** 11,975** 52,262*** 956.7***
(0.393) (0.564) (0.478) (4,889) (18,305) (165.4)
proportion steepsloping -10.01*** -13.30*** -13.52*** -79,012*** -265,409*** -12,303***
(3.134) (5.046) (3.518) (10,693) (62,016) (2,579)
proportion forest cover 0.132 0.241** 0.256*** 780.0 3,250 215.3
(0.0913) (0.110) (0.0587) (4,868) (18,743) (402.7)
%Scheduled Castes -0.0934 0.00725 0.312** -1,311 -5,522* 249.3
(0.203) (0.233) (0.130) (1,205) (3,028) (213.5)
%Scheduled Tribes 0.651*** 0.650** 0.308*** 2,934 10,971 221.4
(0.250) (0.273) (0.0782) (17,846) (61,060) (375.5)
%Scheduled Tribes square -0.836* -0.742** -0.220 -3,551* -14,782*** -136.1
(0.443) (0.327) (0.151) (1,910) (5,624) (143.4)
population density 0.0436 0.0950* 0.0352 -43.97 -3.608 -1.358
(0.0315) (0.0486) (0.0314) (194.6) (562.5) (19.10)
log area 0.0997*** 0.115*** 0.0728*** 706.3 2,608 84.86
(0.0376) (0.0394) (0.0142) (2,147) (7,103) (101.6)
income inequality -0.0195 -0.545* 0.177 -2,147 -15,470** -68.80
(0.304) (0.309) (0.161) (1,469) (6,083) (109.4)
initial consumption per capita -0.0755 -4,109
(0.101) (15,599)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 656 996 996 656 996
ll -269.1 -181.9 -192.9 -1013.1 -829.0 -913.4
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This replicates Table 1.1 but reports marginal effects instead of coefficients. The data is from a
database built by the author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level with
robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3 explain the
probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns 4,
5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district) using Negative
Binomial regressions. There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd),
1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to
corresponding NSS rounds.
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Table A.11: The role of historical institutions - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity
consumption per capita -0.130 -0.163 -0.110 -32.90 -52.38 -43.04
(0.0810) (0.0994) (0.105) (36.32) (52.51) (54.94)
land inequality 0.367*** 0.370** 0.458*** 213.7 374.9 184.6
(0.0972) (0.163) (0.104) (175.4) (484.5) (116.2)
proportion Non landlord -0.141*** -0.178*** -0.139*** -47.61 -79.37 -19.38*
(0.0438) (0.0411) (0.0527) (40.24) (64.89) (11.53)
proportion sandy 2.660** 3.553*** 3.756** 853.9 -651.6 584.2
(1.176) (1.170) (1.779) (779.1) (1,455) (765.5)
log state capital distance 0.0287 0.0415 0.0190 -0.413 5.091 -1.758
(0.0313) (0.0387) (0.0246) (6.548) (15.56) (5.088)
proportion barrenrocky 2.864*** 4.482*** 2.682*** 1,048*** 1,966*** 550.0***
(0.586) (0.870) (0.721) (312.9) (565.7) (130.6)
proportion steepsloping -8.065** -16.29*** -15.46*** -3,955*** -12,601*** -5,069***
(4.109) (6.010) (5.091) (1,503) (4,408) (1,409)
proportion forest cover 0.232** 0.360*** 0.319*** 101.5 207.4 101.3*
(0.0924) (0.111) (0.0728) (84.53) (301.1) (59.62)
%Scheduled Castes -0.146 -0.101 0.497*** -91.61 -250.6 146.7
(0.208) (0.257) (0.150) (149.2) (303.8) (134.4)
%Scheduled Tribes 0.414 0.729* 0.168 -64.81 -62.32 -1.700
(0.346) (0.372) (0.133) (97.03) (237.3) (44.98)
%Scheduled Tribes square -0.838 -1.482** -0.140 -49.12 -339.6 30.47
(0.612) (0.586) (0.233) (138.2) (662.5) (56.36)
population density 0.0728** 0.130** 0.0482 3.793 1.168 1.851
(0.0317) (0.0537) (0.0376) (12.51) (25.27) (8.893)
log area 0.127*** 0.172*** 0.105*** 63.27 115.1 38.45*
(0.0353) (0.0507) (0.0152) (58.15) (97.92) (21.72)
income inequality -0.423 -0.997*** -0.130 -295.1*** -780.4*** -49.52
(0.264) (0.318) (0.228) (94.35) (251.3) (88.28)
initial consumption per capita 0.0413 -87.98
(0.135) (79.11)
State dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 655 431 655 655 431 655
ll -177.9 -131.6 -138.2 -642.2 -535.5 -590.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table replicates Table 1.2 but reports marginal effects instead of coefficients. The data is
from a database built by the author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district
level with robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1,2 and 3
explain the probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (the no. of dead & wounded in the district)
using Negative Binomial regressions. There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds,
1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00 (55th), 2004-05 (61st). The conflict data is for the years 1979-2009, which
are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds.
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Table A.12: The growth in income of different ethnic groups- Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability Probability Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity
General Castes growth -0.00374*** -0.00360*** 0.644 -0.144 0.424 -0.0560
(0.00144) (0.00129) (1.817) (1.022) (0.897) (0.143)
Scheduled Castes growth -0.00202 0.000597 4.429 2.327 0.668 0.320
(0.00168) (0.00118) (6.008) (2.247) (1.319) (0.339)
Scheduled Tribes growth -0.00222 -0.00223 -10.91 -4.194 -2.801 -0.576
(0.00268) (0.00306) (14.31) (5.183) (5.914) (0.618)
proportion sandy -0.674 -0.00138 -9,948*** -2,376** -1,094** -171.9***
(0.834) (0.317) (3,766) (1,080) (503.8) (59.30)
log state capital distance 0.0168 0.0143 -40.77 1.388 -14.24 0.0401
(0.0137) (0.0229) (71.60) (20.08) (27.44) (3.481)
proportion barrenrocky 2.272*** 2.387*** 3,583 1,632*** 1,001 277.0**
(0.799) (0.924) (3,061) (583.8) (697.2) (119.4)
proportion steepsloping -26.35*** -27.89*** -51,950*** -21,257*** -11,366*** -2,607***
(7.623) (10.64) (15,232) (7,885) (3,416) (982.7)
proportion forest cover 0.350*** 0.541*** -136.4 271.6 64.22 71.17
(0.106) (0.0843) (181.0) (383.7) (260.1) (57.07)
%Scheduled Castes 0.135 0.395 -886.6* 100.5 -85.24 41.03
(0.190) (0.294) (537.6) (316.1) (145.1) (79.93)
%Scheduled Tribes 0.220 0.0707 1,056 420.3 214.9 37.44
(0.334) (0.202) (2,533) (417.8) (819.1) (33.02)
%Scheduled Tribes square -0.143 0.0256 -1,510 -501.2 -280.7 -23.95
(0.389) (0.228) (1,181) (562.7) (287.2) (37.40)
population density 0.0274 0.0292 -82.29 5.585 -4.091 8.718
(0.0627) (0.0529) (123.9) (55.85) (29.14) (9.350)
log area 0.177*** 0.110*** 434.7 190.1 125.0 31.17*
(0.0436) (0.0279) (510.6) (176.2) (220.9) (17.38)
income inequality -0.785** -0.677*** -1,845*** -866.5*** -556.8*** -129.8**
(0.366) (0.219) (544.7) (324.9) (146.2) (53.56)
land inequality 1.092*** 0.844*** 2,240 758.5 568.7 97.92
(0.188) (0.186) (4,744) (879.8) (1,968) (81.92)
initial consumption per capita No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Conflict 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 290 284 290 290 290 290
ll -74.40 -57.41 -544.7 -511.9 -493.8 -453.0
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table replicates Table 1.4 but reports marginal effects instead of coefficients. The data is from
a database built by the author combining myriad databases. All regressions at the district level
with robust standard errors, clustered at the state level (in parentheses). Columns 1 and 2 explain
the probability of conflict (the presence of conflict in the district) using Probit regressions. Columns
3, 4, 5 and 6 explain the intensity of conflict (columns 3 and 4 - the no. of dead & wounded in
the district; columns 5 and 6 - the number of incidents in the district) using Negative Binomial
regressions. There are 3 time periods used corresponding to 3 NSS rounds, 1987-88 (43rd), 1999-00
(55th), 2004-05 (61st). The growth rates correspond to the 2 latter rounds. The conflict data is for
the years 1979-2009, which are clubbed to corresponding NSS rounds.
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B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Histogram: Religious Fractionalization (Aggrgegation Level 1)
Figure B.2: Histogram: Religious Fractionalization (Aggrgegation Level 2)
Figure B.3: Histogram: Religious Fractionalization (Aggrgegation Level 3)
95
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter2 96
Figure B.4: Histogram: Religious Polarization (Aggrgegation Level 1)
Figure B.5: Histogram: Religious Polarization (Aggrgegation Level 2)
Figure B.6: Histogram: Religious Polarization (Aggrgegation Level 3)
Figure B.7: Density: Religious Fractionalization
Figure B.8: Density: Religious Polarization
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Figure B.9: Scatter Plot: Religious Diversity (Aggrgegation Level 1)
Figure B.10: Scatter Plot: Religious Diversity (Aggrgegation Level 2)
Figure B.11: Scatter Plot: Religious Diversity (Aggrgegation Level 3)
Figure B.12: Religious Intolerance (no data for the U.S.)
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Figure B.13: Religious Fractionalization at Level 1
Figure B.14: Religious Fractionalization at Level 2
Figure B.15: Religious Fractionalization at Level 3
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter2 99
Figure B.16: Religious Polarization at Level 1
Figure B.17: Religious Polarization at Level 2
Figure B.18: Religious Polarization at Level 3
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Cross-correlation table Religious diversity and Intolerance (197 obs)
Variables rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3 rpol3
rpol1 0.991
rfrac2 0.823 0.813
rpol2 0.782 0.791 0.967
rfrac3 0.547 0.550 0.585 0.572
rpol3 0.502 0.515 0.586 0.628 0.782
Religious Intolerance -0.266 -0.286 -0.107 -0.118 -0.395 -0.244
Table B.2: Correlation with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] measures (137 obs)
rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3 rpol3
ethpol 0.0256 0.0175 0.1026 0.0648 0.1542 0.1013
ethfrac 0.2659 0.2728 0.4165 0.381 0.2798 0.2539
relpol 0.5898 0.5957 0.6666 0.6564 0.487 0.5801
relfrac 0.6684 0.6597 0.7466 0.7133 0.499 0.5746
Table B.3: Correlation of religious diversity with Desmet et al. [2012] measures (208
obs)
rfrac1 rpol1 rfrac2 rpol2 rfrac3 rpol3
elf1 0.1445 0.1421 0.1782 0.1682 0.1363 0.1627
elf2 0.0706 0.069 0.1855 0.1797 0.1052 0.1741
elf3 0.1238 0.1088 0.2362 0.21 0.1015 0.1814
elf4 0.1439 0.1276 0.2745 0.2324 0.1352 0.1891
elf5 0.1334 0.1186 0.2805 0.2405 0.1113 0.1703
elf6 0.1036 0.0921 0.2664 0.2292 0.074 0.1621
elf7 0.1233 0.112 0.2829 0.2389 0.0803 0.1549
elf8 0.1115 0.1007 0.2733 0.2312 0.0754 0.1456
elf9 0.1822 0.178 0.3463 0.3034 0.1492 0.1865
elf10 0.2109 0.2099 0.3712 0.3297 0.2059 0.2091
elf11 0.2103 0.2111 0.3702 0.3288 0.2214 0.2102
elf12 0.2094 0.2103 0.3676 0.3265 0.2228 0.2129
elf13 0.2093 0.2102 0.3674 0.3264 0.2229 0.2129
elf14 0.2098 0.211 0.3665 0.326 0.2244 0.2167
elf15 0.2098 0.211 0.3664 0.3259 0.2244 0.2168
pol1 0.1324 0.1317 0.1742 0.1692 0.1245 0.1585
pol2 0.043 0.0431 0.1546 0.1532 0.0715 0.1568
pol3 0.0642 0.0548 0.1728 0.161 0.0684 0.1618
pol4 0.0898 0.0791 0.2064 0.1788 0.1063 0.172
pol5 0.0708 0.0587 0.1855 0.1655 0.0579 0.1363
pol6 0.0271 0.0168 0.1419 0.1267 0.0101 0.1114
pol7 -0.0025 -0.0138 0.1033 0.0936 -0.0232 0.0753
pol8 -0.0358 -0.047 0.0469 0.0371 -0.0781 0.0168
pol9 0.0208 0.0127 0.1123 0.1042 -0.0204 0.0537
pol10 0.0131 0.0034 0.0981 0.0939 -0.0456 0.0461
pol11 -0.0169 -0.0281 0.0529 0.0479 -0.1202 -0.0015
pol12 -0.0175 -0.029 0.0549 0.0495 -0.1269 -0.0085
pol13 -0.0173 -0.0288 0.0551 0.0498 -0.1274 -0.0087
pol14 -0.0169 -0.0284 0.0547 0.0496 -0.1266 -0.007
pol15 -0.017 -0.0285 0.0548 0.0496 -0.1268 -0.0075
Table B.4: Cross-correlation table between groups and intolerance (197 obs)
Variables %Muslims %Christians %None/Atheists
%Christians -0.739
%None/Atheists -0.254 -0.118
Religious intolerance 0.560 -0.519 -0.057
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Table B.5: Religious diversity and incidence of Conflict without intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3 rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
Religious Diversity -1.014 -0.347 -0.110 -0.483 -0.104 0.490
(0.650) (0.620) (0.511) (0.362) (0.405) (0.464)
Lagged civil war 6.261*** 6.270*** 6.275*** 6.263*** 6.272*** 6.259***
(0.214) (0.214) (0.213) (0.213) (0.214) (0.211)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.328** -0.323** -0.312** -0.330** -0.321** -0.319**
(0.144) (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.141)
Log lagged population 0.317*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.327***
(0.0640) (0.0642) (0.0646) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0658)
% mountainous 0.00964** 0.00996*** 0.0101*** 0.00961** 0.0100*** 0.00959**
(0.00385) (0.00387) (0.00382) (0.00387) (0.00384) (0.00390)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.472 0.497 0.507 0.486 0.506 0.484
(0.335) (0.330) (0.333) (0.334) (0.332) (0.336)
Oil exporter dummy 0.273 0.266 0.262 0.276 0.266 0.243
(0.272) (0.268) (0.269) (0.270) (0.269) (0.259)
New state dummy 1.825*** 1.820*** 1.821*** 1.825*** 1.820*** 1.820***
(0.381) (0.379) (0.379) (0.381) (0.379) (0.381)
Instability dummy -0.00683 -0.00135 -0.00429 -0.00515 -0.00240 0.0000379
(0.279) (0.278) (0.277) (0.278) (0.277) (0.277)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0132 0.0122 0.0123 0.0132 0.0122 0.0131
(0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0203)
French legal origin dummy 2.304*** 2.530*** 2.597*** 2.332*** 2.566*** 2.829***
(0.546) (0.539) (0.526) (0.553) (0.558) (0.546)
UK legal origin dummy 2.233*** 2.396*** 2.455*** 2.253*** 2.417*** 2.611***
(0.551) (0.534) (0.529) (0.556) (0.547) (0.544)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.850*** 1.984*** 2.013*** 1.845*** 1.995*** 2.116***
(0.576) (0.560) (0.565) (0.582) (0.562) (0.570)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.169 0.0961 0.125 0.162 0.107 0.0381
(0.339) (0.326) (0.347) (0.338) (0.323) (0.354)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.610** 0.511 0.465 0.591* 0.466 0.318
(0.306) (0.329) (0.344) (0.308) (0.325) (0.300)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.533 0.399 0.372 0.486 0.371 0.337
(0.336) (0.317) (0.313) (0.327) (0.312) (0.306)
Constant -7.224*** -7.495*** -7.674*** -7.213*** -7.569*** -8.123***
(1.345) (1.366) (1.377) (1.354) (1.386) (1.426)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743
ll -594.8 -595.8 -596.0 -595.1 -595.9 -595.1
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust Standard errors clustered at the Country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the Incidence of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to
religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from
Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based
on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.6: Religious diversity and incidence of Conflict without intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r1 r2 r3 rr1 rr2 rr3
Religious Diversity -0.964 -0.441 0.161 -0.443 -0.137 0.569
(0.671) (0.609) (0.525) (0.371) (0.397) (0.455)
Religious intolerance 0.164* 0.175* 0.175* 0.163 0.170* 0.178*
(0.0995) (0.0990) (0.105) (0.0995) (0.1000) (0.101)
Lagged civil war 6.205*** 6.211*** 6.212*** 6.208*** 6.215*** 6.197***
(0.209) (0.210) (0.207) (0.209) (0.209) (0.205)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.234 -0.225 -0.228 -0.235* -0.226 -0.218
(0.143) (0.144) (0.141) (0.142) (0.143) (0.141)
Log lagged population 0.287*** 0.285*** 0.289*** 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.292***
(0.0735) (0.0743) (0.0753) (0.0739) (0.0746) (0.0761)
% mountainous 0.00912** 0.00939** 0.00919** 0.00910** 0.00945** 0.00884**
(0.00394) (0.00394) (0.00386) (0.00396) (0.00390) (0.00394)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.606* 0.630* 0.632* 0.619* 0.639* 0.607*
(0.336) (0.332) (0.331) (0.334) (0.333) (0.335)
Oil exporter dummy 0.106 0.0878 0.0790 0.109 0.0918 0.0520
(0.298) (0.295) (0.292) (0.295) (0.294) (0.284)
New state dummy 1.776*** 1.771*** 1.772*** 1.777*** 1.772*** 1.773***
(0.393) (0.391) (0.391) (0.393) (0.390) (0.392)
Instability dummy -0.00590 -0.000832 -0.00272 -0.00418 -0.00177 0.00314
(0.280) (0.280) (0.278) (0.279) (0.279) (0.279)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0184 0.0178 0.0179 0.0183 0.0177 0.0193
(0.0207) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0205) (0.0209)
French legal origin dummy 2.139*** 2.308*** 2.456*** 2.177*** 2.354*** 2.657***
(0.595) (0.589) (0.575) (0.602) (0.605) (0.609)
UK legal origin dummy 2.034*** 2.145*** 2.232*** 2.061*** 2.173*** 2.381***
(0.616) (0.608) (0.604) (0.621) (0.617) (0.625)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.751*** 1.856*** 1.912*** 1.754*** 1.871*** 2.009***
(0.614) (0.604) (0.612) (0.621) (0.606) (0.624)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.440 0.383 0.391 0.430 0.388 0.304
(0.371) (0.367) (0.369) (0.370) (0.365) (0.385)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.990*** 0.948** 0.789** 0.964** 0.881** 0.719*
(0.375) (0.395) (0.387) (0.376) (0.392) (0.385)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.645* 0.538 0.460 0.593* 0.495 0.455
(0.362) (0.345) (0.344) (0.353) (0.342) (0.344)
Constant -7.682*** -7.886*** -8.134*** -7.682*** -7.952*** -8.606***
(1.423) (1.453) (1.456) (1.431) (1.470) (1.516)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.743 0.743 0.744 0.743 0.744
ll -591.0 -591.7 -592.0 -591.3 -592.0 -590.9
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust Standard errors clustered at the Country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the Incidence of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to
religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from
Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based
on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.7: Religious diversity and Onset of Conflict without intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3 rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
Religious Diversity -1.022 -0.548 0.0277 -0.485 -0.206 0.652
(0.714) (0.837) (0.728) (0.416) (0.554) (0.674)
Lagged civil war -0.850*** -0.854*** -0.851*** -0.847*** -0.847*** -0.866***
(0.256) (0.261) (0.259) (0.256) (0.259) (0.258)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.616*** -0.621*** -0.617*** -0.618*** -0.621*** -0.605***
(0.149) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.146)
Log lagged population 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.295*** 0.292*** 0.294*** 0.299***
(0.0727) (0.0726) (0.0704) (0.0717) (0.0708) (0.0708)
% mountainous 0.00853* 0.00895* 0.00883* 0.00849* 0.00903* 0.00785
(0.00494) (0.00479) (0.00491) (0.00495) (0.00482) (0.00507)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.487 0.520 0.514 0.507 0.531 0.456
(0.354) (0.358) (0.361) (0.353) (0.364) (0.358)
Oil exporter dummy 0.724*** 0.751*** 0.728*** 0.730*** 0.746*** 0.721***
(0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.239) (0.241) (0.234)
New state dummy 1.777*** 1.769*** 1.775*** 1.777*** 1.770*** 1.785***
(0.371) (0.368) (0.370) (0.371) (0.367) (0.374)
Instability dummy 0.625*** 0.630*** 0.646*** 0.631*** 0.637*** 0.657***
(0.219) (0.216) (0.218) (0.219) (0.217) (0.217)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0207 0.0195 0.0195 0.0206 0.0195 0.0203
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0211)
French legal origin dummy 1.160* 1.324* 1.478** 1.194* 1.363* 1.757**
(0.701) (0.697) (0.676) (0.711) (0.723) (0.723)
UK legal origin dummy 0.958 1.079 1.172* 0.981 1.091 1.380**
(0.698) (0.684) (0.660) (0.705) (0.701) (0.693)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.096 1.212* 1.245* 1.095 1.210* 1.322*
(0.719) (0.710) (0.703) (0.726) (0.713) (0.705)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.183 0.111 0.0969 0.171 0.105 -0.0132
(0.403) (0.395) (0.421) (0.402) (0.390) (0.422)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.394 0.335 0.143 0.369 0.257 -0.0494
(0.384) (0.475) (0.482) (0.390) (0.476) (0.413)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.461 0.353 0.267 0.414 0.309 0.232
(0.347) (0.351) (0.335) (0.340) (0.342) (0.318)
Constant -3.904** -4.014** -4.203*** -3.873** -4.024** -4.800***
(1.629) (1.622) (1.610) (1.641) (1.650) (1.710)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.098 0.097 0.098
ll -454.5 -455.1 -455.5 -454.8 -455.4 -454.6
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter2 104
Table B.8: Religious diversity and Onset of Conflict with intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3 rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
Religious Diversity -0.878 -0.525 0.377 -0.385 -0.147 0.758
(0.760) (0.812) (0.732) (0.441) (0.539) (0.633)
Rel intolerance 0.209** 0.221** 0.240** 0.210** 0.221** 0.241**
(0.104) (0.103) (0.111) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106)
Lagged civil war -0.900*** -0.902*** -0.899*** -0.897*** -0.896*** -0.913***
(0.246) (0.250) (0.244) (0.246) (0.247) (0.243)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.537*** -0.538*** -0.537*** -0.538*** -0.539*** -0.517***
(0.159) (0.158) (0.156) (0.159) (0.158) (0.157)
Log lagged population 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.227*** 0.233*** 0.231*** 0.230***
(0.0853) (0.0861) (0.0824) (0.0842) (0.0841) (0.0827)
%mountainous 0.00755 0.00795 0.00735 0.00754 0.00795 0.00645
(0.00562) (0.00547) (0.00567) (0.00563) (0.00550) (0.00573)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.609* 0.648* 0.643* 0.628* 0.656* 0.600*
(0.353) (0.354) (0.348) (0.351) (0.357) (0.349)
Oil exporter dummy 0.543** 0.566** 0.530** 0.550** 0.558** 0.522**
(0.256) (0.250) (0.248) (0.254) (0.251) (0.241)
New state dummy 1.728*** 1.720*** 1.726*** 1.728*** 1.723*** 1.736***
(0.381) (0.377) (0.380) (0.381) (0.377) (0.383)
Instability dummy 0.624*** 0.626*** 0.645*** 0.629*** 0.634*** 0.647***
(0.220) (0.217) (0.219) (0.220) (0.217) (0.219)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.0272 0.0265 0.0267 0.0271 0.0265 0.0284
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0209)
French legal origin dummy 0.996 1.102 1.297* 1.038 1.155 1.532*
(0.782) (0.776) (0.755) (0.789) (0.791) (0.820)
UK legal origin dummy 0.696 0.762 0.826 0.721 0.780 1.029
(0.789) (0.780) (0.758) (0.793) (0.789) (0.804)
Socialist legal origin dummy 1.011 1.091 1.102 1.015 1.090 1.186
(0.785) (0.780) (0.768) (0.789) (0.779) (0.786)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.549 0.512 0.491 0.538 0.506 0.411
(0.409) (0.400) (0.403) (0.408) (0.395) (0.423)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.825* 0.829* 0.555 0.794* 0.729 0.479
(0.424) (0.492) (0.466) (0.428) (0.488) (0.443)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.595 0.516 0.389 0.542 0.456 0.379
(0.385) (0.379) (0.360) (0.376) (0.372) (0.352)
Constant -4.029** -4.105** -4.337** -4.012** -4.120** -4.916***
(1.721) (1.723) (1.717) (1.732) (1.735) (1.826)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.103
ll -451.7 -452.1 -452.2 -452.0 -452.3 -451.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.9: Percentage of different groups (Aggregation Level 2) with Intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religious fractionalization -3.805* -3.834* -3.782* -3.794* -3.844* -3.879* -3.908*
(2.187) (2.190) (2.150) (2.176) (2.219) (2.172) (2.198)
Religious polarization 2.363* 2.231* 2.215 2.333* 2.353* 2.114 2.218
(1.358) (1.343) (1.353) (1.360) (1.361) (1.374) (1.379)
Rel intolerance 0.236** 0.268** 0.240** 0.219* 0.253** 0.273** 0.257**
(0.108) (0.120) (0.112) (0.117) (0.123) (0.121) (0.124)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists -0.00753 -0.00825 -0.00751 -0.00945
(0.00945) (0.00949) (0.00947) (0.00954)
Percentage Muslims -0.00118 -0.00115 -0.00364 -0.00454
(0.00417) (0.00413) (0.00635) (0.00612)
Percentage Christians -0.000990 -0.00166 -0.00339 -0.00472
(0.00419) (0.00422) (0.00639) (0.00630)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.105
ll -450.7 -450.9 -450.9 -450.6 -450.6 -450.8 -450.3
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. This Table uses Religious Diversity calculated at aggregation
level 1. All the data are from Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious
intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail
in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged),
the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state
dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East
and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. [1999].
Table B.10: Percentage of different groups (Aggregation Level 2) without Intolerance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Religious fractionalization -2.891 -2.932 -2.979 -3.048 -2.966 -2.982 -3.048
(2.130) (2.095) (2.076) (2.100) (2.124) (2.077) (2.101)
Religious polarization 1.783 1.760 1.584 1.802 1.919 1.651 1.793
(1.341) (1.298) (1.284) (1.304) (1.326) (1.337) (1.343)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists -0.00995 -0.0112 -0.00922 -0.0112
(0.00957) (0.00918) (0.00958) (0.00956)
Percentage Muslims 0.00359 0.00325 0.00127 -0.000181
(0.00356) (0.00359) (0.00579) (0.00561)
Percentage Christians -0.00433 -0.00478 -0.00335 -0.00492
(0.00388) (0.00386) (0.00628) (0.00608)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733 5733
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.101 0.100 0.099 0.101
ll -454.0 -454.1 -453.9 -453.2 -453.6 -453.9 -453.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al.
[2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s
own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls
are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is
mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy
lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America
and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. [1999].
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Table B.11: Components of intolerance in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] spec-
ification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -47.53** -14.44*** -2.859
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (20.52) (4.464) (2.223)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 23.14** 8.855*** 3.566*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (10.86) (2.866) (2.002)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 2.051* 1.935* 2.134*
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.134) (1.148) (1.192)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 0.996 1.440 0.602
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (0.986) (0.988) (1.044)
Government Regulation Index 0.179* 0.201** 0.151*
(0.0947) (0.0937) (0.0915)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.210 0.191 0.176
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -281.8 -288.4 -293.8
religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -50.09** -12.80*** -2.030
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (24.49) (4.140) (1.966)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 24.60* 7.932*** 3.207*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (12.83) (2.731) (1.709)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 1.927* 1.908* 1.850*
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.086) (1.075) (1.115)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 1.020 1.248 0.480
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (1.019) (0.984) (1.038)
Social Regulation Index 0.222** 0.248*** 0.246***
(0.0986) (0.0916) (0.0910)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.226 0.217 0.211
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -275.7 -279.2 -281.3
religious fractionalization -33.14*** -11.39*** -3.563* -39.72*** -12.80*** -2.720
(12.55) (3.765) (1.923) (14.68) (4.038) (2.005)
Religious polarization 15.68** 6.924*** 3.809** 19.30** 8.068*** 3.505*
(6.803) (2.296) (1.806) (7.938) (2.633) (1.875)
ETHPOL 2.175** 2.276** 2.360** 2.139* 2.135* 2.190*
(1.088) (1.109) (1.132) (1.162) (1.161) (1.162)
ETHFRAC 0.257 0.526 0.270 0.553 0.981 0.461
(0.920) (0.968) (1.004) (0.961) (0.997) (1.023)
Government Favoritism Index 0.0802 0.114 0.0990
(0.0962) (0.0962) (0.0999)
N 846 846 846 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.178 0.154 0.157 0.191 0.171 0.164
ll -294.1 -302.7 -301.5 -288.5 -295.6 -297.9
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the incidence of civil war (intermediate and high-intensity civil wars
of PRIO). Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st,
2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
[2005] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
The sample is divided into 5 year periods. The other controls are: a constant term, the log of
per capita GDP, the log of population (both at the beginning of the period), the percentage of the
country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, level of democracy (Polity IV dataset).
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Table B.12: Controlling ETHFRAC and ETHPOL in Desmet et al. [2012] (Incidence)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
Religious fractionalization 2 -4.150* -4.130* -3.998* -3.879 -3.360 -3.642
(2.261) (2.247) (2.264) (2.582) (2.474) (2.729)
Religious polarization 2 2.426* 2.402* 2.302* 2.029 1.733 1.884
(1.388) (1.380) (1.396) (1.700) (1.642) (1.765)
elf1 0.972* -2.818
(0.573) (3.200)
Religious intolerance 0.221** 0.219** 0.222** 0.196 0.172 0.179
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.120) (0.127)
pol1 0.607* 2.208
(0.330) (1.748)
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ 0.508 0.333
(0.546) (0.761)
Ethnic polarization MRQ 0.531 0.345
(0.549) (0.769)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 4898 4898 4898
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.104 0.104 0.104
ll -449.7 -449.5 -449.3 -391.6 -391.6 -391.5
Religious fractionalization 3 -1.113 -1.099 -1.044 -2.304* -2.272* -2.266*
(1.287) (1.292) (1.301) (1.248) (1.212) (1.210)
Religious polarization 3 1.402 1.377 1.322 2.488** 2.435** 2.435**
(0.966) (0.970) (0.975) (1.055) (1.030) (1.027)
elf1 0.768 -2.744
(0.593) (3.398)
Religious intolerance 0.184 0.182 0.189* 0.141 0.119 0.118
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.117) (0.118)
pol1 0.487 2.045
(0.340) (1.873)
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ 0.199 -0.0508
(0.522) (0.720)
Ethnic polarization MRQ 0.472 0.501
(0.598) (0.802)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 4898 4898 4898
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.108 0.108
ll -450.0 -449.8 -449.6 -390.0 -389.7 -389.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust Standard errors clustered at the Country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the Incidence of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6)
correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation
respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using
data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.13: Controlling ETHFRAC and ETHPOL in Desmet et al. [2012] (Onset)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
Religious fractionalization 2 -4.150* -4.130* -3.998* -3.879 -3.360 -3.642
(2.261) (2.247) (2.264) (2.582) (2.474) (2.729)
Religious polarization 2 2.426* 2.402* 2.302* 2.029 1.733 1.884
(1.388) (1.380) (1.396) (1.700) (1.642) (1.765)
elf1 0.972* -2.818
(0.573) (3.200)
Religious intolerance 0.221** 0.219** 0.222** 0.196 0.172 0.179
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.120) (0.120) (0.127)
pol1 0.607* 2.208
(0.330) (1.748)
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ 0.508 0.333
(0.546) (0.761)
Ethnic polarization MRQ 0.531 0.345
(0.549) (0.769)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 4898 4898 4898
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.104 0.104 0.104
ll -449.7 -449.5 -449.3 -391.6 -391.6 -391.5
Religious fractionalization 3 -1.113 -1.099 -1.044 -2.304* -2.272* -2.266*
(1.287) (1.292) (1.301) (1.248) (1.212) (1.210)
Religious polarization 3 1.402 1.377 1.322 2.488** 2.435** 2.435**
(0.966) (0.970) (0.975) (1.055) (1.030) (1.027)
elf1 0.768 -2.744
(0.593) (3.398)
Religious intolerance 0.184 0.182 0.189* 0.141 0.119 0.118
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.117) (0.118)
pol1 0.487 2.045
(0.340) (1.873)
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ 0.199 -0.0508
(0.522) (0.720)
Ethnic polarization MRQ 0.472 0.501
(0.598) (0.802)
Observations 5678 5678 5678 4898 4898 4898
Pseudo R2 0.105 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.108 0.108
ll -450.0 -449.8 -449.6 -390.0 -389.7 -389.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust Standard errors clustered at the Country level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6)
correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation
respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious
diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using
data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.14: Controlling for percentage of different groups in Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol [2005] (Aggregation Level 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7
Religious polarization 8.151*** 8.948*** 8.970*** 8.237*** 8.978*** 8.155*** 8.165***
(2.808) (2.914) (2.871) (2.782) (2.877) (2.776) (2.717)
religious fractionalization -12.58*** -14.56*** -14.19*** -12.57*** -14.45*** -12.90*** -12.88***
(4.117) (4.462) (4.370) (4.109) (4.566) (4.108) (4.200)
LGDPC -0.124 -0.286 -0.283 -0.159 -0.294 -0.168 -0.169
(0.242) (0.235) (0.258) (0.263) (0.248) (0.237) (0.250)
LPOP 0.438*** 0.306* 0.335** 0.445*** 0.316* 0.419** 0.420**
(0.166) (0.171) (0.168) (0.167) (0.187) (0.166) (0.178)
PRIMEXP -1.559 -1.036 -1.117 -1.516 -1.046 -1.408 -1.409
(1.731) (1.622) (1.709) (1.761) (1.633) (1.658) (1.658)
MOUNTAINS -0.00765 -0.00886 -0.00846 -0.00935 -0.00920 -0.0107 -0.0108
(0.0105) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0118)
NONCONT 0.0218 0.0257 0.00640 -0.0121 0.0105 -0.00224 -0.00513
(0.573) (0.545) (0.547) (0.575) (0.545) (0.568) (0.572)
DEMOCRACY 0.242 0.229 0.285 0.214 0.239 0.119 0.121
(0.382) (0.396) (0.410) (0.393) (0.383) (0.380) (0.368)
ETHPOL 2.264* 1.783 1.853 2.301** 1.819 2.265* 2.270*
(1.191) (1.142) (1.137) (1.173) (1.163) (1.172) (1.195)
ETHFRAC 1.097 1.485 1.358 0.979 1.417 1.082 1.069
(1.040) (1.000) (1.015) (1.049) (1.071) (1.023) (1.116)
Rel intolerance 0.366* 0.525** 0.519*** 0.433** 0.540*** 0.464** 0.467**
(0.187) (0.229) (0.188) (0.182) (0.209) (0.221) (0.201)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists -0.0336* -0.0337 -0.0362* -0.0361*
(0.0202) (0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0212)
Percentage Muslims -0.00489 -0.00345 -0.00656 -0.00629
(0.00697) (0.0105) (0.00712) (0.0103)
Percentage Christians 0.00454 0.00421 0.00243 0.000458
(0.00659) (0.00629) (0.0101) (0.00960)
cons -9.723*** -6.240* -7.181** -9.748*** -6.537* -8.733*** -8.781**
(3.159) (3.197) (2.925) (3.153) (3.509) (3.317) (3.517)
N 838 838 838 838 838 838 838
pseudo R2 0.213 0.204 0.204 0.215 0.204 0.217 0.217
ll -280.5 -283.8 -283.9 -279.9 -283.7 -279.2 -279.2
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond
to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the
data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] except for the measures of religious diversity
and religious intolerance which are based on the author’s own calculations using data from myriad
sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.15: Correlates of Incidence of Civil wars - Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level1 Level2 Level3 Level1 Level2 Level3
Religious fractionalization -0.185* -0.0749* -0.0368* -0.234** -0.100** -0.0265
(0.105) (0.0446) (0.0210) (0.106) (0.0447) (0.0218)
Religious polarization 0.0894 0.0460 0.0369** 0.117** 0.0614** 0.0313*
(0.0582) (0.0282) (0.0164) (0.0586) (0.0284) (0.0167)
Lagged civil war 0.826*** 0.831*** 0.827*** 0.816*** 0.822*** 0.821***
(0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0214)
Log lagged GDP/cap -0.00718** -0.00707** -0.00538* -0.00456 -0.00428 -0.00410
(0.00335) (0.00336) (0.00323) (0.00335) (0.00336) (0.00327)
Log lagged population 0.00810*** 0.00791*** 0.00743*** 0.00749*** 0.00707*** 0.00689***
(0.00188) (0.00164) (0.00166) (0.00200) (0.00178) (0.00188)
% mountainous 0.000242*** 0.000217** 0.000246*** 0.000234** 0.000199** 0.000227**
(9.08e-05) (9.41e-05) (9.06e-05) (9.31e-05) (9.80e-05) (9.12e-05)
Noncontiguos state dummy 0.00967 0.00981 0.0124 0.0130 0.0129 0.0150
(0.00882) (0.00864) (0.00884) (0.00918) (0.00890) (0.00925)
Oil exporter dummy 0.00568 0.00536 0.00473 0.000684 3.34e-05 0.00129
(0.00684) (0.00646) (0.00625) (0.00716) (0.00660) (0.00672)
New state dummy 0.0678*** 0.0688*** 0.0685*** 0.0645*** 0.0657*** 0.0661***
(0.0236) (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0236) (0.0240) (0.0240)
Instability dummy -0.000385 -0.000293 0.000298 -0.000471 -0.000337 0.000210
(0.00653) (0.00647) (0.00658) (0.00662) (0.00657) (0.00666)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2) 0.000292 0.000286 0.000378 0.000435 0.000453 0.000485
(0.000479) (0.000475) (0.000479) (0.000495) (0.000490) (0.000496)
French legal origin dummy 0.0895*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.0786** 0.105** 0.111**
(0.0339) (0.0410) (0.0455) (0.0334) (0.0414) (0.0452)
UK legal origin dummy 0.0959** 0.127** 0.141** 0.0805** 0.111** 0.118**
(0.0407) (0.0496) (0.0591) (0.0402) (0.0509) (0.0590)
Socialist legal origin dummy 0.0852** 0.0939** 0.0975* 0.0798* 0.0863* 0.0881*
(0.0425) (0.0435) (0.0507) (0.0428) (0.0441) (0.0498)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy 0.00386 0.00246 -0.000749 0.0120 0.0110 0.00514
(0.00829) (0.00785) (0.00841) (0.0101) (0.00969) (0.00968)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.0137* 0.0116 0.0147 0.0265** 0.0263** 0.0223*
(0.00819) (0.00854) (0.00964) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0119)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy 0.0189* 0.0122 0.0123 0.0254* 0.0185* 0.0140
(0.0115) (0.00890) (0.00904) (0.0140) (0.0107) (0.0101)
Religious intolerance 0.00454* 0.00488** 0.00352
(0.00237) (0.00227) (0.00254)
Observations 5733 5733 5733 5678 5678 5678
Pseudo R2 0.744 0.743 0.744 0.745 0.744 0.744
ll -593.8 -594.7 -592.6 -589.4 -590.0 -589.7
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, clustered at the level of countries, in parentheses.
This table replicates the Table 2.4, but reports the marginal effects instead of the coefficients. The
dependent variable is the incidence of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious
diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet
et al. [2012] except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the
author’s own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.
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Table B.16: List of Religions
Religion Level 1 Religion Level 2 Religion Level 3
Abrahamic Baha’i Baha’i
Abrahamic Christian African Christian
Abrahamic Christian African Methodist Episcopal
Abrahamic Christian African Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Aglipayan
Abrahamic Christian Albanian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Anglican
Abrahamic Christian Apostolic Faith
Abrahamic Christian Armenian Apostolic (Orthodox)
Abrahamic Christian Armenian Gregorian
Abrahamic Christian Assemblies of God
Abrahamic Christian Baptist
Abrahamic Christian Belarusian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Black Independent Churches
Abrahamic Christian Bulgarian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Roman Catholic
Abrahamic Christian Christian
Abrahamic Christian Christian unaffiliated
Abrahamic Christian Church of Christ
Abrahamic Christian Congregational
Abrahamic Christian Coptic Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Czechoslovak Hussite
Abrahamic Christian Dutch Reformed Church
Abrahamic Christian Eastern Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Eritrean Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Estonian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Ethiopian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren
Abrahamic Christian Evangelical Lutheran
Abrahamic Christian Evangelical Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Free Wesleyan
Abrahamic Christian Full Gospel
Abrahamic Christian Georgian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Greek Catholic (Melchite)
Abrahamic Christian Greek Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Independent
Abrahamic Christian Kimbanguist
Abrahamic Christian Lutheran
Abrahamic Christian Methodist
Abrahamic Christian Mormon
Abrahamic Christian New Apostolic
Abrahamic Christian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Other Apostolic
Abrahamic Christian Other Black Independent
Abrahamic Christian Other Christian
Abrahamic Christian other Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Pentecostal
Abrahamic Christian Polish Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Presbyterian
Abrahamic Christian Protestant
Abrahamic Christian Reformed Churches
Abrahamic Christian Romanian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Russian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Salvation Army
Abrahamic Christian Serbian Orthodox
Abrahamic Christian Seventh Day Adventist
Abrahamic Christian Silesian Evangelical
Abrahamic Christian Slovak Evangelical
Abrahamic Christian Swiss Christian
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Table B.17: List of Religions
Religion Level 1 Religion Level 2 Religion Level 3
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Catholic
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalous)
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Orthodox (Kiev)
Abrahamic Christian Ukrainian Orthodox (Russian)
Abrahamic Christian United Congregational
Abrahamic Christian Uniting Church
Abrahamic Druze Druze
Abrahamic Jewish Jewish
Abrahamic Muslim Ibadiyah Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim other Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim Shii Muslim
Abrahamic Muslim Sunni Muslim
Indian Buddhist Buddhist
Indian Buddhist Hoa Hao
Indian Buddhist Lamaistic Buddhist
Indian Buddhist Tantric Buddhist
Indian Hindu Hindu
Indian Jain Jain
Indian Sikh Sikh
Indigenous Animist Animist
Indigenous Buddhist and Taoism Buddhist and Taoism
Indigenous Burkinan Traditional Burkinan Traditional
Indigenous Chinese Folk Chinese Folk
Indigenous Chondogyo Chondogyo
Indigenous Confucian Confucian
Indigenous Ethnic Religionist Ethnic Religionist
Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous
Indigenous GB Traditional GB Traditional
Indigenous Hsuan Yuan Chiao Hsuan Yuan Chiao
Indigenous Indigenous Cao Dai
Indigenous Indigenous I Kuan Tao
Indigenous Indigenous Tien Te Chiao
Indigenous Ivoirian Traditional Ivoirian Traditional
Indigenous Laos Traditional Laos Traditional
Indigenous Madagascar Traditional Madagascar Traditional
Indigenous Malawi Traditional Malawi Traditional
Indigenous Modekngei (Indigenous) Modekngei (Indigenous)
Indigenous Mozambique Traditional Mozambique Traditional
Indigenous Myanmar Traditional Myanmar Traditional
Indigenous Niger Traditional Niger Traditional
Indigenous Nigeria Traditional Nigeria Traditional
Indigenous NK Traditional NK Traditional
Indigenous Ratana Ratana
Indigenous Senegal Traditional Senegal Traditional
Indigenous Shintoist Shintoist
Indigenous SL Traditional SL Traditional
Indigenous Swaziland Traditional Swaziland Traditional
Indigenous Tanzania Traditional Tanzania Traditional
Indigenous Taoist Taoist
Indigenous Togo Traditional Togo Traditional
Indigenous Traditional Traditional
Indigenous Voodoo Voodoo
Indigenous Wonbulgyo Wonbulgyo
Indigenous Zambia Traditional Zambia Traditional
Indigenous Zimbabwe Traditional Zimbabwe Traditional
Iranian Zoroastrian Zoroastrian
Other New Religionist New Religionist
Other Other Other
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Table B.18: Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
1 Macau Benin Jamaica
2 China Singapore Antigua and Barbuda
3 Mongolia Taiwan Papua New Guinea
4 Singapore Malawi New Zealand
5 Taiwan Cote d’Ivoire Trinidad and Tobago
6 Laos Tanzania South Africa
7 Japan Nigeria Guyana
8 Vietnam Suriname Malawi
9 Mauritius Macau Ghana
10 Korea, South Mauritius Vanuatu
11 Trinidad and Tobago Zimbabwe Benin
12 Togo Cameroon Solomon Islands
13 Angola Central African Republic United States
14 Estonia Togo Samoa
15 French Guiana China American Samoa
16 Benin Guinea-Bissau Lebanon
17 Tonga Malaysia Bahamas, The
18 Guinea-Bissau Mongolia Bermuda
19 Malawi Trinidad and Tobago Zambia
20 Isle of Man Lebanon Saint Kitts and Nevis
21 Guyana Chad Barbados
22 Suriname Korea, North Kenya
23 Madagascar Guyana Fiji
24 Central African Republic Burkina Faso Suriname
25 Tanzania Brunei Australia
26 Botswana Laos Mozambique
27 Brunei Japan Moldova
28 Kenya Sierra Leone Nigeria
29 Cuba Vietnam Cameroon
30 Congo, Republic of the Kenya Botswana
31 Malaysia Korea, South Central African Republic
32 Sierra Leone Eritrea Lesotho
33 Lesotho Madagascar Swaziland
34 Slovenia Angola Ukraine
35 Hong Kong Estonia Grenadine
36 Fiji French Guiana Cote d’Ivoire
37 Czech Republic Fiji Tanzania
38 American Samoa Bosnia and Herzegovina Nauru
39 Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia Singapore
40 New Zealand Liberia Congo, Democratic Republic of the
41 Zimbabwe Burundi Taiwan
42 Cameroon Sri Lanka Virgin Islands
43 Nigeria Tonga Mauritius
44 Burundi Russia Uganda
45 Northern Mariana Islands Isle of Man Netherlands
46 Namibia Mozambique Belize
47 Liberia Macedonia Zimbabwe
48 Sudan Congo, Republic of the Congo, Republic of the
49 Jamaica Botswana Namibia
50 CZECHOSLOVAKIA Slovenia Gabon
51 Liechtenstein Cuba Ethiopia
52 Vanuatu Sudan Togo
53 Faroe Islands Ghana Palau
54 Burkina Faso East Timor Macau
55 Belize Kuwait Guernsey
56 India Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina
57 Sri Lanka Lesotho Jersey
58 Bermuda Hong Kong Germany
59 Nauru New Zealand Latvia
60 Palau Czech Republic Vietnam
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Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
61 Zambia American Samoa Chad
62 Qatar Israel Grenada
63 Saint Kitts and Nevis Gabon Korea, South
64 Kuwait Bhutan Canada
65 Hungary Qatar Tonga
66 Guam Yugoslavia Estonia
67 Sweden Congo, Democratic Republic of the Angola
68 Dominican Republic Moldova Marshall Islands
69 Bangladesh Northern Mariana Islands Kuwait
70 Niger India New Caledonia
71 Moldova Namibia China
72 Swaziland Montenegro Eritrea
73 French Polynesia West Bank Rwanda
74 Gabon Bahrain Guinea-Bissau
75 Burma (Myanmar) Zambia Uruguay
76 Guernsey Kazakhstan Switzerland
77 Chad Cyprus Hungary
78 Congo, Democratic Republic of the Jamaica Malaysia
79 Ghana CZECHOSLOVAKIA Mongolia
80 San Marino Nepal Burkina Faso
81 Mali Liechtenstein Northern Mariana Islands
82 Mozambique Sweden Kiribati
83 Oman Vanuatu Korea, North
84 Norway Faroe Islands Bahrain
85 Panama Belize United Kingdom
86 Bahrain Guinea French Polynesia
87 Guinea Bermuda Dominica
88 Virgin Islands Nauru Brunei
89 Korea, North Palau Burundi
90 Grenadine Netherlands Laos
91 Australia Uganda Micronesia
92 Lithuania Panama Japan
93 Barbados Saint Kitts and Nevis Sierra Leone
94 Thailand Indonesia Cuba
95 Aruba Hungary Russia
96 Nepal Oman Madagascar
97 Costa Rica Guam Guatemala
98 Chile Palestine Yemen
99 New Caledonia Bulgaria Slovenia
100 Equatorial Guinea Swaziland Czech Republic
101 Ecuador Bangladesh French Guiana
102 Austria Dominican Republic Azerbaijan
103 United Arab Emirates Syria Belarus
104 Iceland Niger Liberia
105 Micronesia Burma (Myanmar) Sri Lanka
106 Sao Tome Reunion Iraq
107 Israel Georgia Isle of Man
108 Netherlands French Polynesia Macedonia
109 Seychelles Grenadine Saint Lucia
110 Slovakia Gambia, The El Salvador
111 Cambodia Mali CZECHOSLOVAKIA
112 Peru Norway Albania
113 Canada Guernsey Nicaragua
114 Ethiopia Egypt Panama
115 Papua New Guinea San Marino Yugoslavia
116 Indonesia France Oman
117 Pakistan Austria Sudan
118 Lebanon Australia East Timor
119 Haiti Kosovo Hong Kong
120 Guatemala Equatorial Guinea Guam
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Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
121 Martinique Jordan Puerto Rico
122 Honduras New Caledonia Israel
123 El Salvador Belgium Sweden
124 Argentina Kyrgyzstan Chile
125 Solomon Islands Virgin Islands Liechtenstein
126 Brazil Philippines Syria
127 United States Azerbaijan Pakistan
128 Ireland Switzerland Bhutan
129 Guadeloupe Lithuania Qatar
130 Antigua and Barbuda Senegal Montenegro
131 Puerto Rico Barbados Slovakia
132 Nicaragua United States Cyprus
133 Gambia, The Djibouti Costa Rica
134 Venezuela Germany Brazil
135 Denmark Canada Haiti
136 Jordan Aruba Bolivia
137 Iran Thailand United Arab Emirates
138 Eritrea Pakistan Philippines
139 Paraguay Denmark India
140 Samoa Costa Rica Afghanistan
141 Philippines Chile Dominican Republic
142 Colombia Seychelles West Bank
143 Azerbaijan Argentina Kazakhstan
144 Kiribati Rwanda Bulgaria
145 Uganda Grenada Seychelles
146 Dominica Serbia and Montenegro Nepal
147 Macedonia United Kingdom Equatorial Guinea
148 Grenada Ecuador Netherlands Antilles
149 United Kingdom Kiribati Peru
150 France United Arab Emirates Aruba
151 Netherlands Antilles Iceland Georgia
152 Uruguay Libya Faroe Islands
153 Mayotte Micronesia Guinea
154 Armenia Sao Tome Austria
155 Libya Slovakia Norway
156 Switzerland Papua New Guinea Martinique
157 Portugal Mayotte Romania
158 Saint Lucia Cambodia Honduras
159 Andorra Saint Lucia Sao Tome
160 Marshall Islands Peru Indonesia
161 Tunisia Serbia Lithuania
162 Senegal Saudi Arabia Argentina
163 Afghanistan Dominica Belgium
164 Croatia Puerto Rico Palestine
165 Yemen Haiti Bangladesh
166 Bahamas, The Guatemala France
167 Georgia Martinique Serbia and Montenegro
168 Greece Iraq Iceland
169 Jersey Honduras San Marino
170 South Africa El Salvador Niger
171 Montenegro Turkmenistan Guadeloupe
172 Mauritania Luxembourg Iran
173 Tuvalu Solomon Islands Burma (Myanmar)
174 Bolivia Croatia Reunion
175 Malta Brazil Serbia
176 Germany Monaco Gambia, The
177 Mexico Ireland Mali
178 Saudi Arabia Netherlands Antilles Egypt
179 Turkey Guadeloupe Paraguay
180 Morocco Antigua and Barbuda Kosovo
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Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)
Ranks rfrac1 rfrac2 rfrac3
181 Somalia Ukraine Mexico
182 Finland Nicaragua Jordan
183 Rwanda Tunisia Colombia
184 Serbia and Montenegro Greece Ecuador
185 Gaza Strip Colombia Tajikistan
186 Poland Venezuela Croatia
187 Tajikistan Iran Ireland
188 Serbia Comoros Kyrgyzstan
189 Egypt Paraguay Saudi Arabia
190 Palestine Samoa Portugal
191 Bulgaria Uruguay Monaco
192 Syria Spain Andorra
193 Cyprus Andorra Luxembourg
194 Russia Tajikistan Senegal
195 Western Sahara Tuvalu Djibouti
196 Maldives Italy Thailand
197 Algeria Armenia Armenia
198 Uzbekistan South Africa Denmark
199 Italy Belarus Malta
200 Spain Portugal Venezuela
201 Comoros Yemen Cape Verde
202 Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Libya
203 Cape Verde Marshall Islands Mayotte
204 Luxembourg Malta Cambodia
205 Djibouti Afghanistan Tuvalu
206 Monaco Mauritania Turkmenistan
207 Kyrgyzstan Romania Finland
208 Kosovo Bahamas, The Poland
209 Reunion Gaza Strip Tunisia
210 Belgium Jersey Greece
211 Romania Bolivia Comoros
212 West Bank Mexico Spain
213 Kazakhstan Algeria Italy
214 Belarus Turkey Uzbekistan
215 Ukraine Morocco Mauritania
216 Yugoslavia Somalia Algeria
217 Bhutan Finland Gaza Strip
218 Albania Poland Turkey
219 Bosnia and Herzegovina Western Sahara Morocco
220 East Timor Maldives Somalia
221 Iraq Cape Verde Western Sahara
222 Latvia Latvia Maldives
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Table B.19: Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
1 Togo Angola French Guiana
2 Angola Estonia Yemen
3 Estonia French Guiana Isle of Man
4 French Guiana Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala
5 Mauritius Eritrea Korea, North
6 Korea, South Korea, South Japan
7 Tonga Tonga Micronesia
8 Guinea-Bissau Isle of Man Guinea-Bissau
9 Isle of Man Korea, North Switzerland
10 Taiwan Japan Russia
11 Japan Russia Tonga
12 Vietnam Guinea-Bissau Mongolia
13 Madagascar Vietnam Angola
14 Mongolia Botswana Eritrea
15 Central African Republic Mongolia Latvia
16 Tanzania Central African Republic Iraq
17 Botswana Togo Laos
18 Macau Ethiopia Cuba
19 Laos Macau Macedonia
20 Singapore Laos Kiribati
21 Cuba Chad Korea, South
22 Congo, Republic of the Tanzania French Polynesia
23 China Cuba Congo, Republic of the
24 Kenya Macedonia Sierra Leone
25 Guyana Congo, Republic of the Macau
26 Sierra Leone Lebanon East Timor
27 Lesotho Cameroon Bosnia and Herzegovina
28 Slovenia Sierra Leone Ethiopia
29 Suriname Zimbabwe Uruguay
30 Fiji Mauritius Germany
31 Czech Republic Nigeria Slovenia
32 American Samoa Kenya Vietnam
33 Trinidad and Tobago East Timor Estonia
34 Malaysia Albania Tanzania
35 Malawi Slovenia Virgin Islands
36 Benin Guyana Canada
37 Zimbabwe Lesotho Czech Republic
38 Cameroon Fiji Azerbaijan
39 Burundi Cote d’Ivoire Rwanda
40 Cote d’Ivoire Madagascar Northern Mariana Islands
41 Hong Kong Suriname China
42 New Zealand Burkina Faso Gabon
43 Brunei China Uganda
44 Nigeria Taiwan Nauru
45 Northern Mariana Islands Czech Republic Madagascar
46 Namibia American Samoa Jersey
47 Liberia Trinidad and Tobago Guernsey
48 Jamaica Malawi Burundi
49 CZECHOSLOVAKIA Burundi Togo
50 Sudan Benin El Salvador
51 Liechtenstein Mozambique Marshall Islands
52 Faroe Islands Liberia Nicaragua
53 Belize Malaysia Burkina Faso
54 Burkina Faso Bhutan Palau
55 Bermuda Singapore Taiwan
56 Nauru Sri Lanka Mauritius
57 India Brunei Chad
58 Sri Lanka New Zealand Bahrain
59 Zambia Ghana Central African Republic
60 Vanuatu Hong Kong Liberia
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Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
61 Saint Kitts and Nevis Sudan Cote d’Ivoire
62 Qatar Yugoslavia Cameroon
63 Palau Kuwait Zimbabwe
64 Kuwait Israel New Caledonia
65 Hungary Northern Mariana Islands Hungary
66 Guam Gabon Namibia
67 Sweden Qatar Albania
68 Dominican Republic Namibia Malaysia
69 Bangladesh Montenegro Bhutan
70 Niger Kazakhstan Lesotho
71 Moldova Cyprus Botswana
72 Swaziland Congo, Democratic Republic of the Yugoslavia
73 French Polynesia Jamaica Ukraine
74 Gabon CZECHOSLOVAKIA Congo, Democratic Republic of the
75 Guernsey Moldova Belarus
76 Congo, Democratic Republic of the Liechtenstein United Kingdom
77 Burma (Myanmar) Zambia Swaziland
78 Ghana India Netherlands
79 San Marino Faroe Islands Kuwait
80 Chad West Bank Sri Lanka
81 Mali Belize Brunei
82 Mozambique Bahrain Grenadine
83 Oman Bermuda Grenada
84 Norway Nauru Singapore
85 Panama Nepal Suriname
86 Virgin Islands Sweden Sudan
87 Guinea Vanuatu CZECHOSLOVAKIA
88 Bahrain Saint Kitts and Nevis Moldova
89 Korea, North Guinea Hong Kong
90 Grenadine Uganda Belize
91 Australia Palau Mozambique
92 Lithuania Hungary Guam
93 Barbados Netherlands Saint Kitts and Nevis
94 Thailand Guam Pakistan
95 Aruba Bulgaria Panama
96 Nepal Indonesia Nigeria
97 Costa Rica Panama Oman
98 Chile Swaziland Liechtenstein
99 New Caledonia Dominican Republic Bermuda
100 Equatorial Guinea Oman Dominica
101 Ecuador Bangladesh Israel
102 Austria Niger Kenya
103 United Arab Emirates Palestine Montenegro
104 Iceland Reunion American Samoa
105 Micronesia Syria Chile
106 Sao Tome French Polynesia Cyprus
107 Israel Georgia Fiji
108 Netherlands Guernsey Australia
109 Slovakia Egypt Zambia
110 Seychelles Burma (Myanmar) Saint Lucia
111 Peru Mali Puerto Rico
112 Cambodia Gambia, The Qatar
113 Papua New Guinea Norway Barbados
114 Canada San Marino Afghanistan
115 Ethiopia Grenadine United States
116 Indonesia Kosovo Lebanon
117 Lebanon France Brazil
118 Haiti Austria Bahamas, The
119 Pakistan Australia Sweden
120 Martinique Equatorial Guinea Costa Rica
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Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
121 Guatemala Jordan Bolivia
122 Honduras New Caledonia Samoa
123 El Salvador Belgium Syria
124 Argentina Kyrgyzstan Solomon Islands
125 Solomon Islands Virgin Islands United Arab Emirates
126 Brazil Philippines Benin
127 Ireland Azerbaijan Malawi
128 United States Switzerland Ghana
129 Guadeloupe Lithuania Vanuatu
130 Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Slovakia
131 Puerto Rico Djibouti Kazakhstan
132 Nicaragua Germany Dominican Republic
133 Gambia, The Senegal Haiti
134 Venezuela United States Faroe Islands
135 Eritrea Aruba West Bank
136 Iran Canada Guyana
137 Denmark Thailand Bulgaria
138 Jordan Costa Rica India
139 Paraguay Chile New Zealand
140 Samoa Pakistan Peru
141 Philippines Denmark Trinidad and Tobago
142 Azerbaijan Rwanda Philippines
143 Colombia Seychelles Nepal
144 Kiribati Argentina South Africa
145 Dominica Serbia and Montenegro Papua New Guinea
146 Uganda Grenada Georgia
147 Macedonia United Kingdom Guinea
148 Grenada Ecuador Seychelles
149 United Kingdom United Arab Emirates Netherlands Antilles
150 France Iceland Equatorial Guinea
151 Netherlands Antilles Kiribati Antigua and Barbuda
152 Uruguay Micronesia Aruba
153 Mayotte Sao Tome Austria
154 Armenia Libya Norway
155 Libya Slovakia Honduras
156 Switzerland Papua New Guinea Martinique
157 Saint Lucia Mayotte Romania
158 Portugal Peru Lithuania
159 Andorra Serbia Indonesia
160 Marshall Islands Saint Lucia Sao Tome
161 Afghanistan Cambodia Belgium
162 Senegal Saudi Arabia Bangladesh
163 Tunisia Dominica Argentina
164 Croatia Haiti Niger
165 Yemen Puerto Rico Palestine
166 Bahamas, The Martinique Reunion
167 Georgia Iraq San Marino
168 Greece Guatemala Jamaica
169 Jersey Honduras Iran
170 South Africa El Salvador Serbia and Montenegro
171 Montenegro Turkmenistan France
172 Tuvalu Luxembourg Iceland
173 Mauritania Solomon Islands Guadeloupe
174 Bolivia Croatia Egypt
175 Malta Brazil Mali
176 Germany Monaco Burma (Myanmar)
177 Mexico Ireland Serbia
178 Saudi Arabia Netherlands Antilles Gambia, The
179 Turkey Guadeloupe Paraguay
180 Morocco Antigua and Barbuda Kosovo
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Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)
Ranks rpol1 rpol2 rpol3
181 Somalia Ukraine Jordan
182 Finland Nicaragua Mexico
183 Rwanda Venezuela Tajikistan
184 Serbia and Montenegro Iran Kyrgyzstan
185 Poland Comoros Ecuador
186 Gaza Strip Colombia Colombia
187 Serbia Greece Croatia
188 Tajikistan Tunisia Ireland
189 Cyprus Paraguay Saudi Arabia
190 Russia Samoa Portugal
191 Bulgaria Spain Monaco
192 Egypt Uruguay Andorra
193 Palestine Andorra Djibouti
194 Syria Tajikistan Senegal
195 Kazakhstan Tuvalu Luxembourg
196 Belarus Italy Thailand
197 Iraq Armenia Armenia
198 Belgium South Africa Denmark
199 Monaco Belarus Malta
200 Albania Portugal Cape Verde
201 Reunion Yemen Venezuela
202 Cape Verde Uzbekistan Libya
203 Spain Marshall Islands Mayotte
204 Luxembourg Malta Cambodia
205 Djibouti Afghanistan Tuvalu
206 Italy Romania Turkmenistan
207 Algeria Mauritania Finland
208 Ukraine Bahamas, The Poland
209 Bosnia and Herzegovina Gaza Strip Comoros
210 Latvia Jersey Greece
211 Yugoslavia Bolivia Tunisia
212 East Timor Mexico Spain
213 Bhutan Algeria Italy
214 West Bank Turkey Uzbekistan
215 Romania Morocco Algeria
216 Kosovo Somalia Mauritania
217 Kyrgyzstan Finland Gaza Strip
218 Turkmenistan Poland Turkey
219 Comoros Cape Verde Morocco
220 Uzbekistan Latvia Somalia
221 Western Sahara Western Sahara Western Sahara
222 Maldives Maldives Maldives
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Table B.20: Ranking of countries by religious intolerance (High to Low)
Rank Country Religious intolerance Govt. Regulation Social regulation Govt. Favouritism
1 Saudi Arabia 3.2583 9.444 9.556 9.278
2 Iran 3.2449 8.796 10 9.389
3 Pakistan 3.1382 8.796 10 8.811
4 Burma (Myanmar) 2.8537 9.259 8.667 8.289
5 Afghanistan 2.8437 7.685 9.778 8.644
6 Egypt 2.7928 8.333 9.556 7.933
7 Iraq 2.6477 7.315 9.333 8.478
8 Uzbekistan 2.5316 8.982 7.778 7.844
9 Kuwait 2.4743 7.87 8.445 7.956
10 Maldives 2.4462 9.722 6 8.611
11 Armenia 2.4217 7.87 7.556 8.678
12 Algeria 2.3786 6.759 8.222 8.867
13 Jordan 2.3708 8.333 6.889 8.667
14 Sudan 2.3605 8.056 9.111 6.389
15 Indonesia 2.3583 6.667 9.556 7.344
16 Comoros 2.2839 8.796 8.445 5.944
17 Belarus 2.2443 7.963 7.778 7.367
18 Georgia 2.2312 7.037 8.445 7.522
19 Bhutan 2.2106 8.056 6.667 8.344
20 Bahrain 2.1737 7.5 6.667 8.733
21 Malaysia 2.1726 7.593 7.556 7.622
22 Qatar 2.1101 8.796 5.111 8.778
23 India 2.1059 6.296 10 5.867
24 Romania 2.0645 6.296 8.222 7.656
25 Greece 2.0601 6.759 7.111 8.4
26 Israel 2.0222 4.815 9.111 7.989
27 Turkmenistan 2.0127 8.982 4.667 8.556
28 Palestine 1.9677 4.352 9.333 7.933
29 Bangladesh 1.9431 7.13 7.333 7.122
30 Mauritania 1.9167 7.778 5.334 8.556
31 Brunei 1.9149 9.445 5.778 6.278
32 Nigeria 1.9040 6.852 7.111 7.456
33 Turkey 1.8874 5.185 9.111 6.867
34 China 1.8830 8.796 5.556 7.044
35 Morocco 1.8495 6.482 7.334 7.3
36 Azerbaijan 1.8170 8.056 8.444 4.2
37 Tunisia 1.7436 5.926 6.445 8.322
38 Russia 1.7297 6.482 7.556 6.4
39 Nepal 1.7056 6.389 9.333 4.356
40 Sri Lanka 1.6337 5.556 9.111 5.1
41 United Arab Emirates 1.6217 6.389 5.556 8.178
42 Cyprus 1.5932 4.63 7.556 7.622
43 Oman 1.5858 6.759 6 7.089
44 Yemen 1.5792 5.926 7.778 5.922
45 Chad 1.5471 6.574 5.556 7.578
46 Somalia 1.5221 7.222 8 3.989
47 Yugoslavia 1.4264 6.111 5.333 7.667
48 Bulgaria 1.2264 7.5 4 6.622
49 Lebanon 1.1631 5.741 6.667 5.122
50 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.1402 5.833 5.333 6.411
51 Libya 1.1284 6.667 4.222 6.722
52 Syria 1.0031 5.741 6 5.011
53 Ethiopia 0.9920 4.167 6.889 5.611
54 Colombia 0.9720 4.167 4.889 7.767
55 Laos 0.9150 8.889 3.556 3.967
56 Kazakhstan 0.7505 6.574 5.111 3.767
57 Moldova 0.6914 4.445 3.778 7.211
58 Kosovo 0.6853 3.056 6 6.133
59 Singapore 0.6560 7.87 1.778 5.656
60 Eritrea 0.6557 8.148 4.667 2.089
61 Kyrgyzstan 0.6111 6.019 6.445 2.089
62 Vietnam 0.6083 8.241 4 2.489
63 Djibouti 0.5956 5.833 4.445 4.467
64 Ukraine 0.5778 4.722 4.889 5.044
65 Cote d’Ivoire 0.5504 4.259 3.778 6.644
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Ranking of countries by religious religious intolerance (High to Low)
Rank Country Religious intolerance Govt. Regulation Social regulation Govt. Favouritism
66 Thailand 0.5261 4.815 2.445 7.433
67 Belgium 0.5068 3.148 4 7.333
68 Cuba 0.4870 7.222 4.667 2.156
69 France 0.4650 4.445 4.667 4.978
70 Macedonia 0.4453 5.278 4.667 3.989
71 Argentina 0.4003 2.037 4 7.933
72 Guinea 0.3986 2.315 4.222 7.378
73 Vanuatu 0.3920 1.667 5.111 7.022
74 Serbia and Montenegro 0.3913 2.222 4.667 6.933
75 Germany 0.3905 3.333 4.222 6.256
76 Kenya 0.3398 3.333 4 6.233
77 Austria 0.3385 1.945 4.889 6.689
78 Tajikistan 0.3230 5 5.333 2.867
79 Mongolia 0.3207 5.556 2.889 5.033
80 Croatia 0.2610 1.667 3.778 7.822
81 Tanzania 0.2126 5.185 3.111 4.589
82 Lithuania 0.1507 3.889 2.222 6.633
83 Western Sahara 0.1146 5.278 2.889 4.211
84 Spain 0.1023 1.019 3.556 7.9
85 Italy 0.0904 1.204 4.445 6.633
86 Latvia 0.0879 3.889 2 6.544
87 Mexico 0.0846 3.333 5.556 3.089
88 Liberia 0.0330 3.056 3.556 5.367
89 Korea, North 0.0215 8.889 2 0.889
90 Zimbabwe -0.0040 3.056 2.889 5.922
91 Peru -0.0086 2.778 0.889 8.456
92 Nicaragua -0.0144 0.741 3.778 7.311
93 Venezuela -0.0527 1.204 2.445 8.122
94 Norway -0.1221 1.759 2.889 6.656
95 Hungary -0.1424 1.389 2.667 7.189
96 Central African Republic -0.1571 5.278 3.778 1.733
97 Niger -0.1581 2.5 4.222 4.167
98 Guatemala -0.1633 1.204 4.222 5.511
99 Nauru -0.1732 5.185 3.778 1.744
100 Slovakia -0.1761 1.204 3.111 6.7
101 Iceland -0.2247 0.926 2 7.989
102 Uganda -0.2403 3.889 5.111 1.244
103 Cameroon -0.2864 2.778 4.889 2.422
104 Equatorial Guinea -0.3115 4.259 2 3.989
105 Philippines -0.3207 1.759 4.667 3.567
106 Dominican Republic -0.3207 1.574 1.111 7.789
107 Cambodia -0.3227 2.315 0.222 8
108 Monaco -0.3418 5.185 2.667 2.089
109 Switzerland -0.3469 1.019 2.889 6.222
110 Czech Republic -0.3689 0.185 2.445 7.489
111 Finland -0.3749 1.574 2 6.489
112 Denmark -0.3899 1.759 1.333 6.967
113 Slovenia -0.4111 0.926 4.445 4.211
114 Chile -0.4477 2.222 1.556 5.911
115 East Timor -0.4888 1.667 5.333 2
116 United Kingdom -0.4920 1.204 3.111 4.989
117 Costa Rica -0.5578 1.019 0.889 7.344
118 Ghana -0.5688 2.037 1.778 5.2
119 Poland -0.5769 0 3.556 5.3
120 Netherlands -0.5819 0 3.778 5.022
121 Portugal -0.6084 1.574 0 7.489
122 Mauritius -0.6351 0.556 3.111 4.9
123 Panama -0.6529 1.296 1.333 6.033
124 Bolivia -0.6700 0 0.667 8.067
125 Japan -0.6704 2.315 2.445 3.6
126 Malta -0.7644 0 0 8.311
127 Andorra -0.8143 0.741 0 7.256
128 Haiti -0.8287 0.278 2.445 4.9
129 Canada -0.8677 0.278 1.778 5.444
130 Luxembourg -0.8800 0.185 0 7.489
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Ranking of countries by religious religious intolerance (High to Low)
Rank Country Religious intolerance Govt. Regulation Social regulation Govt. Favouritism
131 Hong Kong -0.9017 1.019 0.667 5.733
132 Saint Lucia -0.9167 1.019 4 1.878
133 Rwanda -0.9295 4.074 1.111 1.844
134 Malawi -0.9339 0 2.889 4.122
135 Congo, Democratic Republic -0.9706 3.704 2.889 0
136 Solomon Islands -0.9707 0.556 2.222 4.089
137 San Marino -0.9776 0 0 7.156
138 Fiji -1.0125 0.741 3.556 2.156
139 Swaziland -1.0228 2.963 0.222 3.522
140 Madagascar -1.0508 1.204 0.889 4.478
141 Liechtenstein -1.0595 0.463 0 6.222
142 Tuvalu -1.0987 0.741 3.556 1.689
143 Papua New Guinea -1.1082 0 2.222 3.933
144 Palau -1.1830 0.648 1.778 3.344
145 Honduras -1.2031 1.296 0.222 4.311
146 South Africa -1.2341 0 3.778 1.489
147 Korea, South -1.2461 0.463 0.667 4.456
148 Cape Verde -1.2930 0 0.445 4.944
149 Senegal -1.3079 0 0 5.367
150 Gabon -1.3127 1.759 0 3.478
151 Brazil -1.3158 0.833 3.334 0.667
152 Belize -1.3643 0.278 0 4.767
153 Suriname -1.3921 0 0.667 4.156
154 Zambia -1.4113 0.185 0 4.611
155 Sweden -1.4194 0.278 1.111 3.211
156 Trinidad and Tobago -1.4277 0.833 1.111 2.578
157 Seychelles -1.4434 0 0 4.633
158 Jamaica -1.4979 1.482 2.445 0
159 Gambia, The -1.5163 0.278 0 3.944
160 Tonga -1.5313 1.019 0 3.078
161 Samoa -1.5458 0.37 2.667 0.667
162 Bahamas, The -1.5595 0.463 0.444 3.011
163 Lesotho -1.5787 0 0 3.9
164 Estonia -1.6004 0.278 0.667 2.733
165 El Salvador -1.6384 1.111 0 2.4
166 Grenadine -1.6407 0 2 1.3
167 Angola -1.7055 0.741 1.556 0.667
168 Mozambique -1.7153 1.111 1.556 0.222
169 Sierra Leone -1.7386 0.278 1.556 0.978
170 Australia -1.7492 0.463 2 0.222
171 Paraguay -1.7596 0 1.333 1.411
172 Albania -1.7626 0.463 1.111 1.156
173 New Zealand -1.7703 0 0.222 2.611
174 Dominica -1.8285 0.741 0.222 1.511
175 Guyana -1.8294 0.278 0.445 1.744
176 Ireland -1.8626 0 0.222 2.111
177 Barbados -1.8729 0 0.889 1.3
178 Macau -1.8758 1.296 0.222 0.667
179 Mali -1.8861 0 1.778 0.222
180 Congo, Republic of the -1.9271 0 1.778 0
181 Saint Kitts and Nevis -1.9846 0 1.111 0.444
182 Guinea-Bissau -2.0042 0.556 0.889 0
183 Ecuador -2.0115 0 0 1.556
184 Togo -2.0259 0.556 0 0.889
185 Taiwan -2.0639 0.278 0 0.978
186 Burundi -2.0745 0.463 0.444 0.222
187 Burkina Faso -2.1129 0 0.889 0
188 Uruguay -2.1129 0 0.889 0
189 Botswana -2.1437 0.556 0.222 0
190 Benin -2.1551 0 0 0.778
191 Antigua and Barbuda -2.1629 0.695 0 0
192 Namibia -2.2578 0 0 0.222
193 Sao Tome -2.2578 0 0 0.222
194 Grenada -2.2988 0 0 0
195 Kiribati -2.2988 0 0 0
196 Marshall Islands -2.2988 0 0 0
197 Micronesia -2.2988 0 0 0
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Figure C.1: Addis Abbaba Population
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Figure C.2: Countries Used
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C.2 Tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
child death 0.229 0.42 0 1 658755
infant death 0.12 0.325 0 1 821918
linguistic distance 25 0.121 0.266 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 50 0.125 0.265 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 75 0.128 0.266 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 100 0.131 0.267 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 125 0.133 0.27 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 150 0.135 0.271 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 175 0.138 0.272 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 200 0.14 0.274 0 1 868629
linguistic distance 250 0.145 0.276 0 1 868629
fractionalization district 0.399 0.289 0 0.997 868629
fractionalization 25 0.388 0.298 0 0.905 868761
fractionalization 50 0.467 0.284 0 0.921 868761
fractionalization 75 0.52 0.268 0 0.935 868761
fractionalization 100 0.556 0.252 0 0.929 868761
fractionalization 125 0.584 0.238 0 0.933 868761
fractionalization 150 0.608 0.225 0 0.935 868761
fractionalization 175 0.629 0.21 0 0.933 868761
fractionalization 200 0.648 0.195 0 0.933 868761
fractionalization 250 0.676 0.172 0.093 0.930 868761
polarization district 0.464 0.299 0 1 868629
urban 0.225 0.417 0 1 868629
female 0.49 0.5 0 1 868629
age at birth 24.991 6.422 8 50 868629
age at birth sqaured 665.786 348.351 64 2500 868629
multiple birth 0.032 0.177 0 1 868629
birth order 3.442 2.316 1 18 868629
birth order squared 17.216 22.533 1 324 868629
short birth space prior 0.209 0.407 0 1 868629
short birth space post 0.209 0.406 0 1 868629
education years 2.013 3.415 0 26 868306
wealth index 2.871 1.401 1 5 868629
birth year 1992.261 9.364 1955 2011 868629
log of distance to capital 5.123 1.217 -2.614 7.188 868629
log of geographic distance 5.656 0.39 4.662 7.028 868629
Table C.2: Summary statistics Child mortality
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Benin 0.246 0.43 28,184
Burkina Faso 0.241 0.428 93,972
Ethiopia 0.215 0.411 95,686
Ghana 0.162 0.369 35,612
Guinea 0.265 0.442 37,924
Kenya 0.130 0.337 31,867
Malawi 0.228 0.420 103,901
Mali 0.310 0.462 96,365
Namibia 0.089 0.285 10,646
Niger 0.358 0.479 21,879
Senegal 0.168 0.374 54,651
Sierra Leone 0.226 0.419 13,780
Uganda 0.165 0.371 18,253
Zambia 0.185 0.389 15,038
All 0.229 0.420 657758
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Table C.3: Child mortality: Baseline-last 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
linguistic distance 75 0.0599 0.0598 0.0992* 0.0649** 0.0770** 0.0779**
(0.0621) (0.0653) (0.0571) (0.0267) (0.0375) (0.0392)
fractionalization 75 0.000408 -0.0608 -0.0101 -0.0243 -0.0233
(0.0871) (0.0744) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0244)
urban -0.0642* -0.0451* -0.0481** -0.0474*
(0.0366) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0246)
female -0.0675*** -0.0697*** -0.0701*** -0.0701***
(0.00709) (0.00655) (0.00660) (0.00660)
education years -0.0292*** -0.0179*** -0.0180*** -0.0180***
(0.00569) (0.00282) (0.00279) (0.00280)
wealth index 2 0.0587** 0.0321 0.0255 0.0253
(0.0229) (0.0204) (0.0195) (0.0195)
wealth index 3 0.0505** 0.0218 0.0128 0.0131
(0.0246) (0.0301) (0.0284) (0.0283)
wealth index 4 0.0229 -0.0142 -0.0219 -0.0218
(0.0291) (0.0329) (0.0314) (0.0313)
wealth index 5 -0.0459 -0.0941*** -0.106*** -0.105***
(0.0423) (0.0354) (0.0326) (0.0317)
lndist2cap 0.00699
(0.0164)
ln geog dist -0.0895*
(0.0507)
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
region No No No Yes Yes Yes
country*time No No No Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No No No Yes Yes
Ethnicity No No No No Yes Yes
N 273822 273822 273706 264046 263730 263730
pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.089 0.091 0.091
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions have
been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-country level.
The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables indicate the radius of
the circle around the mother in which these variables have been calculated.
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Table C.4: Child mortality: Alternative radii, last 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
linguistic distance 25 0.0505 0.0473 0.0921 0.0573** 0.0483 0.0489
(0.0610) (0.0656) (0.0584) (0.0254) (0.0310) (0.0320)
fractionalization 25 0.0198 -0.0386 -0.0118 -0.0235 -0.0213
(0.0608) (0.0503) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0201)
linguistic distance 50 0.0566 0.0545 0.0973* 0.0612** 0.0611* 0.0618*
(0.0627) (0.0666) (0.0587) (0.0255) (0.0345) (0.0355)
fractionalization 50 0.0184 -0.0459 0.00163 -0.00916 -0.00743
(0.0739) (0.0627) (0.0193) (0.0199) (0.0218)
linguistic distance 75 0.0599 0.0598 0.0992* 0.0649** 0.0770** 0.0779**
(0.0621) (0.0653) (0.0571) (0.0267) (0.0375) (0.0392)
fractionalization 75 0.000408 -0.0608 -0.0101 -0.0243 -0.0233
(0.0871) (0.0744) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0244)
linguistic distance 100 0.0607 0.0615 0.0970* 0.0624** 0.0719** 0.0729*
(0.0615) (0.0641) (0.0556) (0.0265) (0.0362) (0.0378)
fractionalization 100 -0.0113 -0.0733 -0.0213 -0.0384* -0.0383
(0.102) (0.0859) (0.0226) (0.0200) (0.0233)
linguistic distance 125 0.0606 0.0618 0.0941* 0.0598** 0.0578 0.0581
(0.0606) (0.0628) (0.0541) (0.0261) (0.0446) (0.0463)
fractionalization 125 -0.0252 -0.0821 -0.0117 -0.0272 -0.0285
(0.118) (0.0997) (0.0262) (0.0243) (0.0296)
linguistic distance 150 0.0588 0.0599 0.0909* 0.0568** 0.0410 0.0407
(0.0600) (0.0620) (0.0530) (0.0260) (0.0604) (0.0620)
fractionalization 150 -0.0289 -0.0857 0.0216 0.00721 0.00540
(0.139) (0.116) (0.0315) (0.0312) (0.0370)
linguistic distance 175 0.0575 0.0589 0.0890* 0.0555** 0.0460 0.0445
(0.0596) (0.0613) (0.0520) (0.0257) (0.0779) (0.0799)
fractionalization 175 -0.0378 -0.0932 0.0462 0.0322 0.0304
(0.163) (0.135) (0.0375) (0.0408) (0.0458)
linguistic distance 200 0.0570 0.0584 0.0877* 0.0537** 0.0450 0.0413
(0.0596) (0.0611) (0.0515) (0.0251) (0.0940) (0.0964)
fractionalization 200 -0.0456 -0.105 0.0820* 0.0715 0.0706
(0.190) (0.157) (0.0469) (0.0492) (0.0535)
linguistic distance 250 0.0567 0.0573 0.0846* 0.0561** 0.0763 0.0693
(0.0609) (0.0606) (0.0507) (0.0246) (0.119) (0.122)
fractionalization 250 -0.0807 -0.163 0.0551 0.0397 0.0404
(0.244) (0.198) (0.0769) (0.0772) (0.0755)
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
region No No No Yes Yes Yes
country*time No No No Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No No No Yes Yes
Ethnicity No No No No Yes Yes
N 273822 273822 273706 264046 263730 263730
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit regressions
have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-
country level. The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables
indicate the radius of the circle around the mother in which these variables have been
calculated.
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Table C.5: Child mortality: Polarization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5
ling dist 25 0.0359 0.0756 0.0279 0.0622*** 0.0620***
(0.0559) (0.0466) (0.0218) (0.0213) (0.0210)
pol district 0.0625 -0.00121 -0.0253 -0.0360* -0.0360*
(0.0511) (0.0429) (0.0213) (0.0188) (0.0189)
ling dist 50 0.0399 0.0793* 0.0319 0.0853*** 0.0850***
(0.0576) (0.0475) (0.0231) (0.0257) (0.0253)
pol district 0.0623 -0.00140 -0.0254 -0.0364* -0.0364*
(0.0511) (0.0428) (0.0213) (0.0188) (0.0189)
ling dist 75 0.0428 0.0808* 0.0331 0.0977*** 0.0974***
(0.0580) (0.0474) (0.0238) (0.0318) (0.0317)
pol district 0.0621 -0.00126 -0.0252 -0.0361* -0.0361*
(0.0510) (0.0427) (0.0214) (0.0189) (0.0190)
ling dist 100 0.0449 0.0800* 0.0309 0.0970*** 0.0968***
(0.0582) (0.0473) (0.0239) (0.0336) (0.0335)
pol district 0.0621 -0.000898 -0.0249 -0.0356* -0.0356*
(0.0509) (0.0426) (0.0214) (0.0190) (0.0190)
ling dist 125 0.0458 0.0785* 0.0297 0.0976** 0.0971**
(0.0577) (0.0468) (0.0237) (0.0422) (0.0422)
pol district 0.0621 -0.000610 -0.0248 -0.0353* -0.0354*
(0.0508) (0.0426) (0.0213) (0.0190) (0.0190)
ling dist 150 0.0444 0.0759 0.0270 0.0842 0.0837
(0.0579) (0.0469) (0.0237) (0.0533) (0.0534)
pol district 0.0623 -0.000275 -0.0247 -0.0350* -0.0350*
(0.0508) (0.0425) (0.0213) (0.0190) (0.0191)
ling dist 175 0.0431 0.0740 0.0254 0.0806 0.0801
(0.0581) (0.0469) (0.0235) (0.0654) (0.0656)
pol district 0.0625 0.0000177 -0.0246 -0.0347* -0.0348*
(0.0507) (0.0425) (0.0213) (0.0190) (0.0191)
ling dist 200 0.0427 0.0728 0.0245 0.0778 0.0767
(0.0586) (0.0474) (0.0233) (0.0764) (0.0767)
pol district 0.0626 0.000249 -0.0245 -0.0345* -0.0345*
(0.0507) (0.0424) (0.0213) (0.0189) (0.0190)
ling dist 250 0.0419 0.0700 0.0240 0.0553 0.0535
(0.0606) (0.0494) (0.0233) (0.0884) (0.0891)
pol district 0.0629 0.000880 -0.0244 -0.0339* -0.0339*
(0.0506) (0.0423) (0.0213) (0.0188) (0.0189)
N 658755 658505 649182 648468 648468
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit
regressions have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the DHS survey-country level. The numbers after linguistic distance
and polarization variables indicate the radius of the circle around the
mother in which these variables have been calculated.
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Table C.6: Child mortality: Fractionalization & Polarization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5
frac district -0.174* -0.156** -0.0136 -0.0414 -0.0426*
(0.0950) (0.0784) (0.0283) (0.0255) (0.0253)
pol district 0.203** 0.130 -0.0137 -0.00328 -0.00258
(0.102) (0.0797) (0.0252) (0.0229) (0.0228)
urban -0.0904*** -0.0691*** -0.0715*** -0.0688***
(0.0325) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0148)
female -0.0655*** -0.0674*** -0.0679*** -0.0678***
(0.00433) (0.00433) (0.00433) (0.00433)
education years -0.0351*** -0.0221*** -0.0212*** -0.0211***
(0.00514) (0.00254) (0.00248) (0.00247)
Iwealth in 2 0.0295 0.0104 0.00763 0.00763
(0.0188) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0141)
Iwealth in 3 0.0125 -0.00602 -0.0102 -0.00990
(0.0211) (0.0220) (0.0212) (0.0212)
Iwealth in 4 -0.0238 -0.0554** -0.0588** -0.0584**
(0.0252) (0.0261) (0.0249) (0.0249)
Iwealth in 5 -0.101*** -0.153*** -0.155*** -0.152***
(0.0376) (0.0274) (0.0255) (0.0251)
lndist2cap 0.0158**
(0.00758)
ln geog dist -0.0517
(0.0413)
N 658755 658505 649182 648468 648468
pseudo R2 0.001 0.062 0.084 0.086 0.086
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit re-
gressions have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
DHS survey-country level.
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Table C.7: Child mortality: Fractionalization & Polarization with distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5
ling dist 25 0.0503 0.0894* 0.0294 0.0655*** 0.0654***
(0.0576) (0.0477) (0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0213)
frac district -0.184* -0.175** -0.0191 -0.0449* -0.0460*
(0.0973) (0.0796) (0.0276) (0.0254) (0.0253)
pol district 0.206** 0.135* -0.0113 -0.00343 -0.00272
(0.102) (0.0790) (0.0249) (0.0222) (0.0222)
ling dist 50 0.0540 0.0928* 0.0334 0.0893*** 0.0889***
(0.0592) (0.0485) (0.0238) (0.0265) (0.0262)
frac district -0.185* -0.175** -0.0194 -0.0455* -0.0466*
(0.0970) (0.0794) (0.0277) (0.0254) (0.0252)
pol district 0.206** 0.134* -0.0111 -0.00335 -0.00264
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0249) (0.0222) (0.0221)
ling dist 75 0.0562 0.0936* 0.0345 0.102*** 0.102***
(0.0593) (0.0483) (0.0244) (0.0328) (0.0327)
frac district -0.185* -0.174** -0.0191 -0.0455* -0.0466*
(0.0966) (0.0791) (0.0276) (0.0253) (0.0252)
pol district 0.206** 0.134* -0.0111 -0.00302 -0.00231
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0249) (0.0223) (0.0223)
ling dist 100 0.0578 0.0922* 0.0321 0.102*** 0.102***
(0.0592) (0.0479) (0.0245) (0.0350) (0.0350)
frac district -0.185* -0.173** -0.0183 -0.0452* -0.0463*
(0.0964) (0.0789) (0.0276) (0.0255) (0.0253)
pol district 0.206** 0.134* -0.0114 -0.00277 -0.00207
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0249) (0.0225) (0.0224)
ling dist 125 0.0581 0.0900* 0.0308 0.102** 0.102**
(0.0584) (0.0471) (0.0241) (0.0435) (0.0434)
frac district -0.184* -0.172** -0.0178 -0.0446* -0.0458*
(0.0961) (0.0787) (0.0274) (0.0255) (0.0253)
pol district 0.206** 0.134* -0.0117 -0.00287 -0.00218
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0249) (0.0226) (0.0225)
ling dist 150 0.0560 0.0868* 0.0280 0.0889 0.0885
(0.0584) (0.0470) (0.0240) (0.0544) (0.0545)
frac district -0.184* -0.171** -0.0172 -0.0438* -0.0450*
(0.0959) (0.0784) (0.0274) (0.0256) (0.0254)
pol district 0.205** 0.133* -0.0121 -0.00312 -0.00243
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0250) (0.0227) (0.0226)
ling dist 175 0.0542 0.0843* 0.0263 0.0848 0.0845
(0.0585) (0.0469) (0.0239) (0.0661) (0.0663)
frac district -0.183* -0.170** -0.0167 -0.0432* -0.0443*
(0.0957) (0.0783) (0.0273) (0.0256) (0.0254)
pol district 0.205** 0.133* -0.0123 -0.00329 -0.00261
(0.102) (0.0790) (0.0250) (0.0227) (0.0227)
ling dist 200 0.0533 0.0827* 0.0253 0.0811 0.0802
(0.0588) (0.0472) (0.0236) (0.0767) (0.0770)
frac district -0.183* -0.170** -0.0164 -0.0426* -0.0437*
(0.0956) (0.0781) (0.0273) (0.0255) (0.0253)
pol district 0.205** 0.133* -0.0124 -0.00346 -0.00278
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0250) (0.0228) (0.0227)
ling dist 250 0.0519 0.0793 0.0247 0.0565 0.0549
(0.0605) (0.0490) (0.0235) (0.0878) (0.0884)
frac district -0.182* -0.169** -0.0161 -0.0417 -0.0428*
(0.0954) (0.0779) (0.0272) (0.0255) (0.0253)
pol district 0.205** 0.133* -0.0125 -0.00350 -0.00281
(0.102) (0.0789) (0.0250) (0.0228) (0.0228)
N 658755 658505 649182 648468 648468
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled
probit regressions have been used. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the DHS survey-country level. The numbers after
linguistic distance and fractionalization variables indicate the radius
of the circle around the mother in which these variables have been
calculated.
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Table C.8: Child mortality: Non-linearities (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5
linguistic distance 25 0.0860 0.205* 0.0648*** 0.217**
(0.0896) (0.106) (0.0219) (0.104)
linguistic distance 25 2 -0.0326 -0.150 -0.163
(0.0931) (0.108) (0.105)
fractionalization 25 -0.0451*** 0.0319 0.0276 0.0219
(0.0166) (0.0537) (0.0530) (0.0533)
fractionalization 25 2 -0.0797 -0.0798 -0.0886
(0.0666) (0.0653) (0.0626)
linguistic distance 50 0.175* 0.272** 0.0876*** 0.291**
(0.105) (0.126) (0.0280) (0.127)
linguistic distance 50 2 -0.106 -0.199 -0.219*
(0.110) (0.128) (0.128)
fractionalization 50 -0.0454** 0.106 0.102 0.0945
(0.0199) (0.0665) (0.0653) (0.0644)
fractionalization 50 2 -0.164** -0.166** -0.174**
(0.0762) (0.0747) (0.0744)
linguistic distance 75 0.118 0.208 0.106*** 0.221*
(0.114) (0.133) (0.0350) (0.133)
linguistic distance 75 2 -0.0292 -0.113 -0.124
(0.128) (0.141) (0.140)
fractionalization 75 -0.0505** 0.139* 0.134* 0.129*
(0.0231) (0.0723) (0.0709) (0.0717)
fractionalization 75 2 -0.206** -0.211** -0.213***
(0.0835) (0.0819) (0.0817)
linguistic distance 100 0.107 0.202 0.106*** 0.207
(0.111) (0.129) (0.0361) (0.130)
linguistic distance 100 2 -0.0179 -0.104 -0.108
(0.123) (0.137) (0.137)
fractionalization 100 -0.0580*** 0.0800 0.0737 0.0689
(0.0208) (0.0831) (0.0825) (0.0832)
fractionalization 100 2 -0.137 -0.140 -0.141
(0.0934) (0.0929) (0.0925)
linguistic distance 125 -0.00560 0.0817 0.104** 0.0816
(0.125) (0.148) (0.0433) (0.149)
linguistic distance 125 2 0.103 0.0238 0.0237
(0.128) (0.147) (0.147)
fractionalization 125 -0.0512** -0.00564 -0.0164 -0.0151
(0.0217) (0.0845) (0.0844) (0.0856)
fractionalization 125 2 -0.0398 -0.0375 -0.0375
(0.0905) (0.0902) (0.0901)
linguistic distance 150 -0.116 -0.0707 0.0861 -0.0693
(0.167) (0.184) (0.0535) (0.183)
linguistic distance 150 2 0.204 0.163 0.162
(0.161) (0.175) (0.174)
fractionalization 150 -0.0265 -0.0712 -0.0813 -0.0697
(0.0243) (0.0761) (0.0761) (0.0765)
fractionalization 150 2 0.0411 0.0440 0.0425
(0.0830) (0.0827) (0.0820)
N 648468 648468 648468 648468 648468
pseudo R2 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit re-
gressions have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
DHS survey-country level.
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Table C.9: Child mortality:Non-linearities (Last 10 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5
linguistic distance 25 0.126 0.220* 0.0492 0.241*
(0.114) (0.131) (0.0321) (0.132)
linguistic distance 25 2 -0.0904 -0.183 -0.205*
(0.111) (0.123) (0.124)
fractionalization 25 -0.0353* 0.0854 0.0824 0.0757
(0.0212) (0.0783) (0.0776) (0.0759)
fractionalization 25 2 -0.135 -0.135 -0.147
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
linguistic distance 50 0.215* 0.262** 0.0636* 0.286**
(0.124) (0.131) (0.0365) (0.133)
linguistic distance 50 2 -0.170 -0.215* -0.240*
(0.122) (0.124) (0.126)
fractionalization 50 -0.0215 0.163 0.160 0.152
(0.0214) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105)
fractionalization 50 2 -0.205 -0.207* -0.216*
(0.126) (0.126) (0.125)
linguistic distance 75 0.127 0.181 0.0811** 0.195
(0.148) (0.162) (0.0399) (0.162)
linguistic distance 75 2 -0.0611 -0.111 -0.123
(0.152) (0.163) (0.162)
fractionalization 75 -0.0294 0.180 0.177 0.172
(0.0258) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124)
fractionalization 75 2 -0.232* -0.236* -0.238*
(0.139) (0.138) (0.138)
linguistic distance 100 0.0861 0.158 0.0745** 0.164
(0.141) (0.150) (0.0377) (0.151)
linguistic distance 100 2 -0.0262 -0.0912 -0.0957
(0.143) (0.152) (0.153)
fractionalization 100 -0.0431* 0.134 0.130 0.126
(0.0247) (0.137) (0.136) (0.137)
fractionalization 100 2 -0.184 -0.186 -0.187
(0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
linguistic distance 125 0.0113 0.0610 0.0577 0.0607
(0.133) (0.142) (0.0461) (0.143)
linguistic distance 125 2 0.0420 -0.00303 -0.00313
(0.136) (0.146) (0.147)
fractionalization 125 -0.0286 0.0394 0.0336 0.0334
(0.0312) (0.128) (0.129) (0.130)
fractionalization 125 2 -0.0653 -0.0642 -0.0642
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144)
linguistic distance 150 -0.0765 -0.102 0.0413 -0.100
(0.121) (0.122) (0.0624) (0.121)
linguistic distance 150 2 0.126 0.150 0.148
(0.136) (0.140) (0.138)
fractionalization 150 0.0147 -0.0510 -0.0558 -0.0454
(0.0386) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116)
fractionalization 150 2 0.0588 0.0601 0.0589
(0.127) (0.127) (0.126)
N 263730 263730 263730 263730 263730
pseudo R2 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. Pooled probit re-
gressions have been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
DHS survey-country level. The numbers after linguistic distance and fraction-
alization variables indicate the radius of the circle around the mother in which
these variables have been calculated.
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Table C.10: Child mortality: Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7
linguistic distance 25 0.0134 0.0133 0.00706 0.0233* 0.00723 0.0145** 0.0146***
(0.0165) (0.0177) (0.00544) (0.0135) (0.00569) (0.00536) (0.00530)
fractionalization 25 0.000458 -0.00205 -0.0139 -0.00489 -0.00888** -0.00902**
(0.0155) (0.00636) (0.0125) (0.00430) (0.00398) (0.00404)
linguistic distance 50 0.0145 0.0144 0.00912 0.0238* 0.00803 0.0194*** 0.0196***
(0.0171) (0.0180) (0.00584) (0.0137) (0.00590) (0.00660) (0.00657)
fractionalization 50 0.000790 -0.000581 -0.0155 -0.00308 -0.00777* -0.00863*
(0.0190) (0.00779) (0.0156) (0.00479) (0.00452) (0.00477)
linguistic distance 75 0.0153 0.0156 0.0104 0.0239* 0.00834 0.0222** 0.0226**
(0.0173) (0.0179) (0.00620) (0.0136) (0.00604) (0.00822) (0.00829)
fractionalization 75 -0.00345 -0.00241 -0.0186 -0.00436 -0.0103* -0.0120**
(0.0224) (0.00918) (0.0184) (0.00564) (0.00534) (0.00582)
linguistic distance 100 0.0159 0.0163 0.0110* 0.0234* 0.00778 0.0216** 0.0222**
(0.0174) (0.0178) (0.00640) (0.0135) (0.00609) (0.00863) (0.00874)
fractionalization 100 -0.00685 -0.00223 -0.0217 -0.00499 -0.0120** -0.0144**
(0.0263) (0.0103) (0.0212) (0.00565) (0.00478) (0.00532)
linguistic distance 125 0.0161 0.0167 0.0115* 0.0228* 0.00747 0.0207** 0.0213**
(0.0173) (0.0176) (0.00648) (0.0132) (0.00605) (0.0100) (0.0101)
fractionalization 125 -0.0128 -0.00336 -0.0255 -0.00426 -0.0116** -0.0145**
(0.0306) (0.0114) (0.0246) (0.00661) (0.00496) (0.00542)
linguistic distance 150 0.0156 0.0162 0.0111 0.0220 0.00669 0.0154 0.0160
(0.0173) (0.0175) (0.00658) (0.0132) (0.00607) (0.0128) (0.0129)
fractionalization 150 -0.0164 -0.00106 -0.0285 0.000457 -0.00698 -0.0103
(0.0358) (0.0124) (0.0286) (0.00762) (0.00607) (0.00656)
linguistic distance 175 0.0152 0.0159 0.0108 0.0215 0.00617 0.0128 0.0133
(0.0174) (0.0175) (0.00662) (0.0131) (0.00604) (0.0154) (0.0155)
fractionalization 175 -0.0213 -0.000880 -0.0319 0.00453 -0.00346 -0.00657
(0.0419) (0.0125) (0.0333) (0.00813) (0.00718) (0.00756)
linguistic distance 200 0.0150 0.0158 0.0106 0.0212 0.00576 0.0109 0.0110
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.00659) (0.0132) (0.00597) (0.0176) (0.0179)
fractionalization 200 -0.0256 0.000424 -0.0363 0.0107 0.00214 -0.000864
(0.0489) (0.0132) (0.0386) (0.00928) (0.00882) (0.00902)
linguistic distance 250 0.0145 0.0150 0.0117* 0.0199 0.00610 0.00795 0.00738
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.00668) (0.0134) (0.00600) (0.0204) (0.0207)
fractionalization 250 -0.0377 -0.0146 -0.0530 0.00208 -0.0115 -0.0140
(0.0626) (0.0165) (0.0483) (0.0150) (0.0164) (0.0157)
N 658755 658755 658755 658505 658505 657795 657795
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of child death. OLS regressions have been used. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-country level. The numbers after linguistic
distance and fractionalization variables indicate the radius of the circle around the mother in which
these variables have been calculated.
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Table C.11: Infant mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6
infant death
linguistic distance 75 0.0440 0.0431 0.0699** 0.0273* 0.0509 0.0523*
(0.0420) (0.0433) (0.0353) (0.0152) (0.0313) (0.0317)
fractionalization 75 0.0110 -0.0404 -0.0155 -0.0338 -0.0410*
(0.0474) (0.0388) (0.0243) (0.0210) (0.0222)
urban -0.0765*** -0.0512*** -0.0519*** -0.0488***
(0.0226) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0112)
female -0.0831*** -0.0846*** -0.0850*** -0.0850***
(0.00482) (0.00492) (0.00493) (0.00493)
education years -0.0254*** -0.0146*** -0.0138*** -0.0138***
(0.00372) (0.00224) (0.00217) (0.00216)
wealth index 2 0.0237* 0.00827 0.00670 0.00673
(0.0140) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00998)
wealth index 3 0.0150 -0.000726 -0.00250 -0.00219
(0.0171) (0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0158)
wealth index 4 -0.00292 -0.0341** -0.0371** -0.0366**
(0.0193) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173)
wealth index 5 -0.0525* -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.106***
(0.0290) (0.0212) (0.0206) (0.0202)
lndist2cap 0.0173**
(0.00700)
ln geog dist -0.0421
(0.0340)
N 821918 821918 821609 820832 819820 819820
pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.098 0.099 0.099
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The dependent variable is the probability of infant death. Pooled probit regressions have
been used. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the DHS survey-country level.
The numbers after linguistic distance and fractionalization variables indicate the radius of
the circle around the mother in which these variables have been calculated.
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